Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume II

765.75/486: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, April 12, 1939—11 p.m.
[Received April 13—8:39 p.m.]

35. Your telegrams 21, April 7, noon,⁴¹ and 24, April 10, 6 p.m., to Ankara and my No. 13, April 11, 9 a.m., from Istanbul.

1. The following is an outline of views expressed to me this morning by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Although heartily sympathetic with the plight of Albania he considers it politically important only as an evidence of, and incident to, German-Italian plans of eastward expansion. He considers that the Italian occupation of Albania was a purely military decision made by the German and Italian General Staffs (possibly although not certainly with the participation of the Hungarian General Staff) for the purpose of securing a strategic position which would immobilize Yugoslavia and Greece and perhaps with a view to invasion of the Balkans and the Ukraine, this action, considered in conjunction with the recent German economic agreement with Rumania⁴² (which he regards as at least the first step in the development of an absolute German control over Rumanian resources) has alarmed and demoralized the other members of the Balkan Entente. He was in a very pessimistic mood about the possibilities of cohesion on the part of the Entente. He felt that both Greece and Yugoslavia (particularly the latter) felt themselves under such irresistible constraint as to be compelled to put a good face on the Italian aggression in Albania in spite of their very bitter resentment, and that Rumania was under such pressure as to be independable. Turkey would be ready to acquit herself of her full obligations under the Entente agreement; but she was not prepared to commit herself to the further obligations of military support to another Balkan Entente state (other than Greece with whom Turkey has not only particular treaty relationships but also an especial mutual confidence) attacked by one or more non-Balkan states where Bulgaria was not involved. For the matter of that, Bulgaria felt that she would be endangered by an aggression against any of the Balkan states and had therefore given Turkey the assurance that she would not take any action against members of the Entente. (As against this, however, I should report an expression of personal opinion by the Bulgarian Minister who had participated in the recent conversations between his Prime Minister and Turkish officials to the effect that it would be difficult for his Government to restrain its people from insisting on taking advantage of any opportunity to reclaim the Dobrudja from Rumania and to force Greece to concede the promised outlet to the Aegean.) In reply to a question as to Turkey’s attitude in the event that (other conditions of the Entente being applicable) one of the members were to refuse cooperation, the Minister said that that would in the judgment of his Government depend upon whether the default were wilful or the result of force majeure. When asked whether Turkey in her own interests and regardless of treaty obligations would support any other state attacked by the Axis powers he intimated that that depended upon calculations in which the principal factor was the degree of support that might in that case be expected from Great Britain and France whose attitude was still enigmatical. They had had no constructive policy of resistance to the aggressions of the totalitarian governments and had been so vague and hesitant that they had allowed their rivals to take over more economic and military potentialities than those that Italy possesses while they were considering how to buy Italy out of the Axis combination.

2. My British colleague, who saw the Minister an hour later, has told me that he was then in a much less pessimistic mood and I gather was prepared to be receptive towards any proposals for cooperation which might be suggested. The British, however, have not yet made to Turkey (or I understand to Greece or Yugoslavia) any such proposals for guaranty as they have made to Rumania⁴³ along the lines of the guaranty to Poland. Hugessen also told me that he knows of no basis for the rumors of representations to Turkey about freedom of passage of the Straits for British or French naval vessels in case of war. (This accords with denial made to me by the Rumanian Ambassador in reply to my inquiry as to the rumors of a project for the establishment of a base for British naval forces on the Rumanian coast.)

3. As regards the Turco-Rumanian conversations of last weekend, I got from the Minister of Foreign Affairs nothing more definite than that the Turks had received the impression that the Rumanians are frightened and bewildered. The Rumanian Ambassador has informed me that the conversations (which in the absence of other representatives of the Entente were of course not agreements but merely exchanges of views sought by the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in view of his forthcoming visits to Berlin, London, and Paris) had principally been concerned with points of interpretation of the Entente agreement,⁴⁴ and that the results might be roughly summed up as follows:

(a) Doubtful interpretations of the text of the agreement are to be resolved in favor of the principle of mutual assistance; and

(b) even where the obligations of the agreement do not apply the several parties should observe towards each other the most “benevolent” neutrality in case of need. (He implied that this might include Turkey’s allowing British and French fleets to traverse the Straits for the purpose of assisting Rumania.)

4. I understand that the German Chargé d’Affaires has within the past few days inquired of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, first, whether Turkey would support Rumania in the event of an attack by Germany and, second, whether she would permit the free passage of British and French naval forces through the Straits, and received the answer that the terms of the Balkan Entente covered his first question and those of the Montreux Convention⁴⁵ his second.

MacMurray

41. Not printed.
42. Signed March 23, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. cxcix, p. 82.
43. On April 13 Mr. Chamberlain announced that the British Government would give any assistance within its power to Greece and Rumania if their independence were threatened. See Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, Vol. v, p. 186.
44. Balkan Entente of February 9, 1934, between Greece, Roumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliii, p. 153.
45. Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed July 20, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, p. 213.