894.00/613: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 13—1:30 p.m.]
74. 1. The Prime Minister received me today.
2. He said that his former policy as Minister for Foreign Affairs would continue without any change whatsoever and that it would now always prevail owing to his position as head of the Government. He added that all members of the Cabinet were in accord with his policy and that he would eventually select a Foreign Minister equally in sympathy with that policy.
[Page 760]3. I observed that the press was constantly talking about the new Government following a “positive diplomacy” and I asked if he would define this term. Hirota said that the term applied exclusively to Soviet Russia and China and simply meant the speeding up of the policy already enunciated.
4. As regards Soviet Russia, the army desired the establishment of defensive forces in Manchuria more nearly equalling the Soviet forces in Siberia. He said, however, that there would be no war while he was in office. A Japanese war with Soviet Russia would be stupid because both parties would have everything to lose and nothing to gain.
5. As regards China, the Japanese Government would proceed on the basis of the three points already enunciated. I asked him to define these three points. He did so as follows.
- (a)
- Cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda and activity.
- (b)
- Recognition of the existence of Manchukuo and regularization of factual relations such as communications, transit, customs, et cetera. This need not imply de jure recognition.
- (c)
- Sino-Japanese cooperation to combat the spread of Communism.
These three points he said had been accepted in principle by the Chinese Government and would form the basis for negotiations.
6. I said that I would be glad if the Prime Minister could authorize me to reassure my Government concerning the protection of foreign rights and interests in connection with the pursuance of Japan’s policy in China including the preservation of the principle of the open door. The Prime Minister said that the principle of the open door would not be injured by Japan. The only possible result of Japan’s policy in China which might indirectly affect foreign rights and interests so far as he could see would be the possible relinquishment in his opinion of her extra-territorial rights in China as an eventual result of future negotiations.
7. The Prime Minister said that he saw no serious problems existing between Japan and the United States. In this connection I took occasion on my own initiative and after stating that I was not speaking under instructions to mention the difficulties encountered by the Government in Washington arising out of the increasing flow of cheap Japanese goods into the American markets. I spoke of the cooperative steps of our Government to solve the problem through friendly and informal discussions with the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the mutual efforts to find equitable and practical solutions of the difficulties. Nevertheless pressure on our Government from domestic industrial interests was becoming increasingly heavy and I might eventually have to appeal to him for more restrictive [Page 761] efforts on the part of the Government of Japan. I labeled these observations as entirely informal but thought it best to leave this thought in the Prime Minister’s mind.
Paragraphs 1 to 6 inclusive repeated to Peiping.