894.00/609: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, March 9, 1936—11
p.m.
[Received March 9—3:05 p.m.]
[Received March 9—3:05 p.m.]
66. Embassy’s 53, March 2, noon.
- 1.
- The choice of Hirota as Prime Minister and his determination to hold the direction of foreign affairs in his own hands owing to the army’s disapproval of Yoshida tends to support the statement made to me by the Vice Minister on March 2nd to the effect that the improvement of Japan’s foreign relations was given careful consideration in the selection of the new Cabinet.
- 2.
- The primary causes of the recent insurrection were domestic rather than international issues. The incident was an expression of basic social and economic maladjustments in Japan having root in the poverty of the masses of the people especially in certain rural districts, the absence of the stabilizing influence of a large powerful middle class and the alleged exploitation of the nation by the very wealthy who assertedly use the politicians and statesmen as their tools.
- 3.
- While the “direct action” group of younger officers in the army responsible for the recent incident is comparatively small, a considerable section of the army as a whole believes that it has a duty under the Emperor to relieve the alleged exploitation of the people to abolish political corruption and to unify the nation in a manner which they vaguely relate to ancient Japanese conceptions. They desire inter alia “new deal” and in this they are supported by the great mass of the people. To achieve this “new deal” will be the task of the new Government, the third “emergency Cabinet” organized since May 15, 1932. As no government in Japan can long exist under the opposition of the army the new Cabinet will have to deal drastically and effectively with the root causes of the recent insurrection or be forced out of office with the possibility of further violence.
- 4.
- Predictions as to foreign policies would be premature but it is logical to assume that in concentrating on essential domestic problems and readjustments the tendency of the Government as long as Hirota is in control will be to tranquilize Japan’s foreign relations. Only time will show whether Hirota will be strong enough to curb the dangerous tendencies of the army in China and on the borders of Manchuria.
Repeated to Peiping and Moscow.
Grew