761.94/873: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:20 p.m.]
45. Your 19, February 6.85 It is extremely difficult to ascertain the real views of the Kremlin with regard to the possibility of an attack by Japan during the present year since the statements of responsible Soviet officials frequently differ and sometimes change from day to day. After a careful consideration of all the information which it has been able to obtain from published sources and from Soviet civilian and military officials and competent foreign observers in Moscow, the Embassy nevertheless ventures to set forth these views as follows:
- 1.
- The Kremlin does not believe that the Japanese Government is deliberately planning a war against the Soviet Union this spring, although it feels that Japan is energetically making preparations internally and externally for the eventuality of such a war.
- 2.
- It feels that although the Japanese Government has no desire for an immediate war with the Soviet Union, there is grave danger that some incident may occur which might strengthen the hands of an aggressive and active minority in Japan which is of the opinion that if the Soviet Union is to be eliminated as an important factor in the Far East that elimination must take place this year. This feeling is reflected in the extreme nervousness with which some of the border incidents are regarded. (See my telegram 39, January 31, 4 p.m.)
- 3.
- The Kremlin takes the position that the border incidents which have already occurred have been sufficiently grave to justify the Soviet Union in making war upon Japan. It is determined, however, not to be provoked into a war as long as these incidents do not constitute a serious invasion of Soviet territory or a dangerous’ threat to the security of the Soviet Far East or as long as they are not of such a nature as to force the Red Army to take defensive military action.
- 4.
- The Kremlin is particularly concerned regarding possible developments in Mongolia, since it feels that the Kwantung army might [Page 57] take action in Mongolia which, for military and political reasons, it would hesitate deliberately to take in Soviet territory. It is believed that the extent of assistance which the Soviet Union would give Mongolia in case of invasion would be determined by the internal situation at the time and the type of campaign conducted.
- 5.
- Kremlin is hopeful that the Japanese Government will continue to consider that China proper, not the Soviet Union or Mongolia, offers the best field at the present time for Japanese expansion on the Asiatic Continent. Recent announcements regarding the strength of the Red Army are promoted in part by a desire to warn the Kwantung army that the difficulties of penetrating into the Soviet Union or Mongolia would be much greater than those connected with further penetration into China proper and at the same time to convince that section of Japanese opinion which is in favor of driving the Soviet Union from the Far East that it is already too late to engage in such an undertaking without help from other great powers.
- 6.
- The Kremlin is convinced that developments in the Far East are dependent to a certain extent on those in Europe and vice versa and feels that Great Britain may be the deciding factor in the maintenance of peace, since, in its opinion, Germany will not embark on an eastern European adventure with an actively hostile Great Britain at its back and Japan will not deliberately go to war if it feels that it cannot count on support from the West, particularly if it cannot depend upon the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain.
In view of the above, one of the main objects of Soviet diplomacy at the present time is to bring about a closer rapprochement with Great Britain which it apparently feels may be more valuable over a protracted period than the mutual assistance pact with France. Although the Soviet Government is confident that the pact will be ratified within the next few days, after the experience of the last 2 years, it has grave doubts with respect to French dependability. In general, the statements of officials of the Foreign Office are believed to be somewhat more optimistic than the actual feelings of the Kremlin would justify. Since his return from the West, Litvinov, in particular, is bubbling over with optimism. The Embassy has learned from several sources, believed to be reliable, that he states that his conversations in London were extremely satisfactory and that he feels that with the changed situation in Great Britain, the danger of the Soviet Union being drawn into an armed conflict has been averted for the present, at least.
- Not printed.↩