793.94/7785
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s strictly confidential despatch No. 184 of January 17, 1936,80 with regard to the subject of the conflicting policies of China, Japan, and the Soviet Union in Eastern Asia, and to enclose for the information of the Department a copy of an editorial, entitled “Neither Accepted Nor Rejected”, published in the Peking & Tientsin Times (British) of January 31 1936,80 discussing the problem of China’s present position in the triangle.
[Here follows report on the editorial.]
The initiative, as heretofore, rests with the Japanese. As emphasized by Ambassador Grew in his confidential despatch No. 1630 of January 7, 1936,81 the moderate group in Japan is loath to have the Japanese Army undertake any adventures on the Asian continent that might check the substantial improvement of economic conditions now being experienced in Japan. The Army, stressing the political aspects of the situation more heavily than the economic, is convinced of the need of establishing the Japanese position in Asia on so strong a base that the Japanese Empire would be free from threat from any quarter, but it recognizes the strength of the argument that a China thrown into disorder would be to the disadvantage of Japan both [Page 54] economically and politically. It is probably primarily because of this realization that the Army has endeavored to achieve its ends in North China and Nanking by the exercise of steady pressure and threats to force acquiescence from the Chinese side without open conflict between the two countries.
The policy of attrition, however, is necessarily slow, and in China forces seem to be gathering which threaten to decrease the pace still further. Japan can hardly view with equanimity the growing radicalism in student circles, weakness of the economic structure, obduracy toward the Japanese program in even “pro-Japanese” officials, and growing strength of Chinese Communism, which threaten to bring the whole thing down upon the Japanese Army’s head. And on “Manchukuo’s” frontiers, the strength of the Soviet Army grows appreciably from month to month.
In those circumstances, the question would seem to be how long the patience of the Japanese militarists can last under a strain that is increasing. The border incidents arising out of clashes between Japanese-”Manchukuo” and Soviet Russian and Outer Mongolian forces have of late been increasing in number and intensity, and there is now reported in the press the advance of augmented “Manchukuo” forces to the Buir Nor region which has been the scene of frequent pitched battles. (An informed Russian newspaperman states that both Soviet Russian and Mongol sources report that the presumably hostile troops have not yet appeared on the border, and he suggests that the Japanese have perhaps in this case been more interested in creating an alarm than in actually going into action. Consul General Adams of Harbin in his despatch No. 192 of January 27, 1936,82 also gives evidence indicating that Japan does not contemplate major hostilities with the Soviet Union in the immediate future.) As regards North China, there exists substantial evidence that the Japanese are pressing hard on the local Chinese militarists for a definitive settlement along autonomous lines and that, in the absence of such a settlement, Yin Ju-keng’s East Hopei regime and other “autonomous” organizations may be expected to constitute the spearhead of a new Japanese thrust into North China. It is reported by the Military Attaché’s Office that Yin Ju-keng is now expanding his military cadres, which were built around the former Peace Preservation Corps, into five divisions of troops totalling 27,000 men; Japanese advisers and instructors are said to have been engaged. At Changpei in Chahar the “Manchukuo” forces of Li Shou-hsin are already in control—and Changpei District extends to Kalgan and includes that part of the city lying northwest of the river traversing its area, so that Kalgan, important both strategically and commercially, would probably [Page 55] fall without a blow. Abandoned to their fate by the National Government, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in Chahar are apparently being forced into a position which will give them no choice but to throw in their lot with the Japanese, for reasons of self-preservation.
In a well informed quarter in Peiping it is held that the Japanese Army would not dare force war with the Soviet Union prior to the establishment of control firmly in North China; however, as regards the Outer Mongolia-”Manchukuo” border incidents, the same authority stated that it is quite possible that the Japanese Army is preparing at this time to open “the Outer Mongolia problem”, and to make an initial test of the Soviet Union’s attitude toward the question of that country’s defense, by launching a strong attack westward on Ulan Bator (Urga). A simultaneous Japanese advance into Suiyuan, he pointed out, would facilitate a flank attack on the same objective.
In this connection, the recent visit to Moscow of Premier Genbun of Outer Mongolia and the popular importance attached to the visit to the Kremlin of a delegation from the Buriat-Mongolian A. S. S. R. at the end of January may be of significance and are facts attesting to the Soviet Republic’s interest in this situation. It is improbable that the Russians view Outer Mongolia indifferently, especially inasmuch as the control of that territory by Japan would not only put the Soviet Union at a grave strategic disadvantage militarily but would result in a serious loss of Soviet prestige both at home and abroad. According to a statement made by a local Russian to a resident British banker, the Soviet Union’s attitude regarding Outer Mongolia can be discovered from a careful reading of the speech made on foreign relations by Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissariat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the meeting on January 11 of the Central Executive Committee. This speech, it is said, was meant to be a clear warning to Japan. (There is enclosed; for the ready reference of the Department, a copy of that section of the speech which deals with the Far East, as reported by the Tass News Agency.83)
The military conferences at present taking place in Tokyo are therefore of more than usual significance. Major-General Isogai (Japanese Military Attaché in China), Lieutenant-General Sugiyama (Vice-Chief of the Tokyo General Staff), Minister of War Kawashima, and other important Japanese militarists are said now to be considering the whole matter of the future of Sino-Japanese relationships. There is enclosed, in English translation, a copy of a news item83 appearing in the Yachou Min Pao (Asia People’s Voice, Japanese Chinese-language newspaper, Peiping) of January 31 which purports to give the agenda of the discussions. If this report is correct, [Page 56] it will be noted that the present discussions are very comprehensive. After the conference has terminated, Sugiyama is scheduled to make a one month’s trip to “Manchukuo” and North China, reputedly for the purpose of coordinating the policies and activities of the Kwantung Army and the North China Garrison with the plans of the War Office; Isogai will return to Shanghai; as already reported, Major-General Doihara intends to take up a permanent residence in Peiping “for the purpose of promoting Sino-Japanese relations”.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy