767.68119/905
The Ambassador in Turkey ( MacMurray ) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 1.]
Sir: Referring to my telegram No. 11 of April 11, 1:00 p.m.,5 I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the note addressed by the Turkish Government on April 10 to the governments that had participated in the negotiation of the Straits Convention concluded at Lausanne on May [July] 24, 1923. The text of this note had been communicated at Ankara, on April 10, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Tevfik Rüştu Aras) to Mr. Shaw,6 under the circumstances [Page 507] set forth in the following comment with which Mr. Shaw accompanied the copy forwarded for my information:
“At 7:30 p.m. the Foreign Office telephoned me to say that as the Ambassador was away the Minister wished to see me at 8:30. The Minister greeted me with even more exuberance than usual. He said that, as I was aware, they always wanted to keep the friendly American Government informed of their doings and therefore he was giving me a copy of a note on the Straits régime which had been approved after an all-night session of the Council of Ministers and which was being addressed to all the Governments which had taken part in the negotiation of the Lausanne Straits Convention. On purpose he said he had chosen a broad formula since some Powers which had signed the Convention had not ratified it; e. g., the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia. He said the note would be given out on Monday and the Turkish Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to inform the Department concerning the note tomorrow. After I had had an opportunity of reading the note the Minister asked me what I thought of it. I expressed satisfaction that Turkey after setting forth clearly and soberly her view of the case was prepared to negotiate a new régime rather than create a fait accompli. The Minister replied that Europe had been treated to various ways of handling international questions, but the present note represented the Turkish way. He called my attention to the fact that the note contained no reference to prestige and honor and no high-sounding phrases. I inquired how he envisaged the negotiations. He said that some of the Governments addressed would doubtless say they weren’t particularly interested in the matter of the Straits and Turkey could do as she wished; others would have definite ideas and negotiations would be carried on at Ankara. I asked the Minister whether I was correct in thinking that Articles 1 and 2 and the Annex to Article 2 of the Lausanne Straits Convention were not affected by the present Turkish action and that it was Article 4 that the Turks had particularly in mind. The Minister at once replied that there would have to be changes in the Annex to Article 2 with respect to vessels of war. He was not too clear as to just what these changes should be. He spoke of the desirability that each case of a war vessel entering the Black Sea should be considered on its merits with ample previous notice, not only to Turkey but to other interested Powers. He spoke of the responsibilities of Turkey to Europe in this connection. He said Turkey hadn’t the slightest anxiety about the naval programs of any of the Black Sea Powers. Under their naval agreement with the Soviets there was notification of any naval building and the confidence created by this fact eliminated any apprehension. On commercial navigation of the Straits the Minister was most emphatic that Turkey stood squarely not only for the facilities set up under the Lausanne Convention, but for any extension and liberalizing of those facilities that could be worked up. He pointed out that Turkey had always considered the Lausanne Convention as applying not only to the commercial vessels of the signatory countries, but to all commercial vessels and that they would not depart from this view in the future. He said that if he were called upon for a text of an agreement regarding commercial navigation of the Straits, he would at once propose the pertinent parts of the existing Convention. He even went [Page 508] so far as to say that they would have no objection to the continuance of some kind of international Straits Commission. They welcomed witnesses, he said. I said I supposed Turkey had no intention of raising any question over the demilitarized zones set up by Article 1 of the Thracian Convention.7 He replied ‘No’, as with the present limitations on Bulgaria’s military establishment that demilitarized zone is unobjectionable from the Turkish point of view, but should Bulgaria rearm then Turkey will insist on fortifying Edirne (Adrianople) to restore the balance of forces.…”
“While I was talking with the Minister Suad Bey8 telephoned from Geneva. The Minister told me that Suad Bey reported that Mr. Titulesco9 was fearful of the effect upon Hungary and Bulgaria of Turkish action on the Straits régime. Dr. Aras had given Suad Bey reasons for believing Mr. Titulesco’s fears were quite groundless.”
It will be noted that this communication of the Turkish Government looks to the reconsideration (or, by obvious implication, the abolition) of those provisions of the Lausanne Convention relevant to the demilitarization of the Straits: and that, although the determination to be rid of such military restrictions is plainly enough indicated (in the penultimate paragraph) by the words that this Government “may be brought to take before the nation the responsibility incumbent upon it, by adopting the measures dictated by the imperative necessity of the circumstances,” that threat of eventual unilateral action is nevertheless subordinated to the conciliatory assurance that the Turkish Government “is ready to undertake discussions with a view to arriving, in the near future, at the conclusion of agreements designed to regulate the régime of the Straits under the conditions of security indispensable for the inviolability of Turkish territory, and in the most liberal spirit as regards the continued development of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.”
The Turkish Government would seem to have taken advantage very adroitly of the conjuncture of European affairs consequent upon the German remilitarization of the Rhineland and (incidentally, though not negligibly, from the viewpoint of the Near East) upon the Austrian reestablishment of conscription. Not only is the moment one at which Turkey might expect to find a minimum of effective opposition, because of the preoccupation of the principally interested Powers with far graver “revisionist” threats to their interests and to their actual security; but the course of the discussions that have thus far taken place between Germany and the other Locarno Powers—discussions in which the latter have in effect taken the position that they would consent to the revision of the Versailles Treaty10 and the [Page 509] reconsideration of the Locarno Treaty11 if only Germany would pay at least symbolic deference to the sanctity of those instruments—would seem to have estopped Great Britain and France and Italy from taking any strong stand against the less vital revision of military restrictions which Turkey now proposes to effect by negotiation and mutual accord. It would thus seem that Turkey is likely not only to achieve her present purpose, but to acquire, in doing so, the kudos of having set an example of correctness and good-will in her international relationships.
There is indeed some question whether this wise moderation of the Turkish Government’s démarche originated with it. From certain conversations which he has had in Ankara, Mr. Shaw has received the impression that, almost until the last moment before despatching the note, the Turkish authorities had intended to exploit in a less conciliatory way the opportunity which the European situation now affords them, but that their intentions were moderated as a result of conversations with the British Ambassador. Although, in a brief talk which I had with him yesterday, Sir Percy Loraine did not actually confirm that impression, he did seem to me to lend color to it by stressing the admirable manner of the Turkish démarche, even while stating that he did not yet know what view his Government would be disposed to take towards the substance of the request.
The attitude thus expressed by the British Ambassador may perhaps be construed to indicate that his Government has not at any rate reacted strongly against the Turkish demand for revision, and may be expected to acquiesce. And it would seem that France has no such proximate interest as would warrant her taking a definite attitude of opposition. Nor would it appear likely that Japan, although one of the Powers guaranteeing the régime under Article 18 of the Straits Convention, would feel disposed to concern herself actively in so remote a question, any more than in the analogous case of her participation in guaranteeing the status of the Memel Territory; both cases are perhaps mere survivals of an international orientation of Japanese policy, which has since been discarded in favor of a policy centred almost wholly upon Asia. Italy would seem to be the only one of the guaranteeing Powers which might prove disposed, on account of her considerable mercantile interests, and possibly for reasons related to her present tendencies towards a form of imperialism, to oppose substantial objections and difficulties in the way of Turkey’s obtaining the desired revision of the Convention.
But even although the guarantors and other Powers signatory to the Convention may prove disposed to acquiesce in the revision which Turkey demands, it may well be that Great Britain and France, at any [Page 510] rate, would find it embarrassing to deal with the question of Turkey’s remilitarization of the Straits until at least there shall have been worked out some tolerable solution of the question of Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland. It is therefore possible that Turkey’s démarche may remain for the present in abeyance, save perhaps for some preliminary informal assurances, until definite progress may have been achieved in the settlement of the crisis in Western European affairs.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed; it summarized the Turkish note of April 10, supra.↩
- G. Howland Shaw, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey.↩
- League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 141.↩
- Suad Davaz, Turkish Ambassador to France; member, League of Nations Council, April 1936.↩
- Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3329.↩
- League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, pp. 289–363.↩