I thanked the Ambassador, and added that while this Government is not a
party to the Lausanne Treaty it is naturally interested in all important
phases of world affairs, including developments in the Ambassador’s part
of the world, and that my Government appreciates the courtesy of his
Government in giving us at this time a copy of its representations as
aforesaid.
[Annex—Translation]
Note of April 10, 1936, From the Turkish
Government to the Parties to the Lausanne Treaty of
1923
In 1923, when Turkey consented, at Lausanne, to sign the Straits
Convention establishing liberty of passage and demilitarization, the
[Page 504]
general situation of
Europe, from the political and military points of view, presented an
aspect totally different from that which she presents today.
Europe was moving towards disarmament and her political organization
was to be based solely on the immutable principles of law sanctioned
by international engagements. Land, sea and air forces were much
less formidable and their tendencies were in the direction of
reduction. At that time Turkey signed the respective clauses of the
Straits Convention with the assurance given her by Article 18 which
had just added, to the guarantee of Article 10 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations,4 the engagement that the
signatories and, in any case, four great Powers undertook to assume
jointly and by all means decided upon for that purpose by the
Council of the League, the defense of the Straits when menaced.
Since then the situation which existed in the Black Sea has come to
present an aspect of concord reassuring in every way, while
uncertainty has settled little by little over the Mediterranean,
Naval Conferences have shown a development in the direction of
rearmament, and maritime shipyards will soon pour into the sea ships
of a power never reached before. In the domain of the air, the curve
is dizzily rising, and continental and insular fortifications are
constantly multiplied.
During this complete change of conditions the only guarantee which
was to have prevented entire insecurity of the Straits has just
disappeared in its turn, and while the most interested Powers
proclaim the existence of a threat of a general conflagration,
Turkey, at her most vulnerable point, finds herself exposed to the
worst dangers without any counterpoise to that disquieting
insecurity.
In acceding to the pressing requests which were addressed to her,
Turkey accepted the demilitarization of the Straits at that time
entirely occupied by foreign forces, after having long weighed,
under the existing conditions, the value of the minimum guarantees
which were granted to her, “in order that the demilitarization of
the Straits and of the contiguous zones shall not constitute an
unjustifiable danger to the military security of Turkey.”
To Article 18 of the Convention which sanctioned the security
guarantee indissolubly linked to the ensemble of the clauses
governing the régime of the Straits, the signatories attached such
great importance that they solemnly affirmed that the guarantee in
question formed an integral part of the clauses of demilitarization
and of freedom of passage.
[Page 505]
This is equivalent to saying that without an effective, practical and
efficacious assurance there could not have been imposed on Turkey a
diminution of sovereignty over a part of her territory the security
of which is indispensable to that of the whole country.
It is likewise obvious that if this guarantee becomes inoperative or
uncertain the equilibrium of the whole Convention is destroyed to
the prejudice of Turkey and to the prejudice of the peace of
Europe.
Now, the political crises have clearly demonstrated that the present
mechanism of collective guarantee goes into motion too slowly and
that a tardy decision is of such a character as to cause the loss,
in most cases, of the benefit of an international action. It is for
this reason that Turkey, like many other countries at the present
time, could not, in 1923, content herself with the collective
guarantee which the Covenant would have assured to her as soon as
she became a member of the League of Nations, that she considered
insufficient the collective guarantee of all the signatories of the
Straits Convention and that only the joint guarantee of the four
great Powers seemed to her capable of assuring, under the conditions
then prevailing, the minimum of security indispensable to her
territorial integrity.
But if that minimum itself is weakened or rendered problematic by
political and military circumstances entirely different from those
existing when it was established, the Government of the Republic
cannot, without rendering itself guilty of grave negligence, expose
the whole country to a sudden and irreparable attack (coup de main).
The position of the guarantors of the security of the Straits with
respect to the League of Nations, the special circumstances which
render at least doubtful the military and effective collaboration of
those guarantors as regards the objective assigned to them, are
factors which have overturned the general economy of the 1923
Convention.
Today it cannot be affirmed that the security of the Straits is still
assured by a real guarantee and Turkey cannot be asked to remain
indifferent to the possibility of a dangerous default.
It should be added to these considerations that the Straits
Convention only mentions the states of peace and war, Turkey being a
neutral or belligerent in this latter case, without contemplating
the possibility of a special or general threat of war and permitting
Turkey to then take steps for her legitimate defense. Now, it is
fully demonstrated today that the most delicate phase of an external
danger is precisely that phase of menace, there being a possibility
that a state of war might supervene unexpectedly and without any
formality.
This lacuna can by itself deprive the guarantees envisaged of their
efficacy whatever may be the value of the latter.
[Page 506]
From the beginning of its existence, the Turkish Republic has marked
out for itself a policy of peace and understanding the realization
of which in all fields has not failed to impose upon her sacrifices
which have often been heavy.
The Turkish Government has shown under the many circumstances which
have presented themselves during the last decade a spirit of
conciliation, of fidelity to its engagements and of sincere
attachment to the cause of peace which has been appreciated by all
the Powers.
The security which Turkey has always assured to others she has a
right to claim for herself.
Circumstances independent of the will of the signatories of Lausanne
have rendered inoperative clauses laid down in complete good faith,
and as the stake is the existence of Turkey and the security of all
her territory, the Government of the Republic may be led to take
before the nation the responsibility incumbent upon it by adopting
measures dictated by the imperious necessity of circumstances.
Taking into view the circumstances set forth above and believing with
good reason that the provisions of Article 18 of the Straits
Convention referring to a joint guarantee of the four great Powers
have become uncertain and inoperative and that they no longer can in
practice protect Turkey against a foreign danger to her territory,
the Government of the Republic has the honor to inform the Powers
which took part in the negotiations of the Straits Conventions that
it is ready to set on foot pourparlers for
the purpose of arriving promptly at the conclusion of accords
intended to regulate the régime of the Straits under conditions of
security indispensable to the inviolability of Turkish territory,
and in the most liberal spirit towards the constant development of
commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black
Sea.
