500.A15A5/661: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 14—2:05 p.m.]
96. At luncheon with Eden today he told me in strict confidence of a conversation he had this morning with Corbin, the French Ambassador, which was in substance as follows:
Corbin reiterated the French objections from a technical and political standpoint to agreeing upon a battleship of the characteristics upon which we are insisting. Eden explained that notwithstanding their objections in which the British partially share it was advisable to acquiesce and necessary to do so in order to get an agreement and that an agreement would outweigh any of the objections.
Corbin then raised the question of French objection to binding themselves to sign at a fixed date a naval agreement to which Germany would be an original signatory. Eden told him that Great Britain considered it of vital importance to get a naval agreement and that in order to get it it was essential that Germany should be [Page 60] brought in and to do this it was necessary that she be given the opportunity to become an original signatory; furthermore, that Great Britain had done very much in many ways to meet the French views and that in this particular case they must ask the French to do something as a favor to them which after all was distinctly to the advantage of France herself. He also told Corbin that it was important to get this agreement without much delay and not try to bring in extraneous questions. Corbin told him he would go to Paris this afternoon to talk the matter over fully with Flandin48 and would see him again, and also me, on Monday.
I told Eden just what I told the French, that if it is necessary to clarify certain questions between themselves precedent to a naval agreement it is important that they do so without delay and that it should not affect the naval agreement itself in which alone we are interested and concerned. He said he understood this perfectly and that if the French should attempt further to bring in extraneous European political questions he was going to tell them frankly that he would be prepared to take up such questions with them after the Naval Conference but that it was not fair to the United States or wise to use the Naval Conference as a means of bringing up questions that had nothing to do with the naval question itself.
And for that reason Eden said that if the French insist on further commitments he would tell them that Great Britain would stand by Locarno but would refuse to make more precise the provisions of that pact49 and particularly in such a way as to alienate Germany and close the door to any possible appeasement with Germany.