500.A15A5/657: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 12—5:30 p.m.]
94. I learn very confidentially from the French Delegation that their delay in coming to agreement is due to the fact that the French Government is considering the political consequences of the participation of Germany or adherence in some form to the naval agreement. The French Cabinet feels that since French acquiescence in German participation would, in a measure, condone the violation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it would be disastrous to the French Government if this were followed by a step over which the French are very apprehensive, namely, a further violation of the treaty through the military occupation of the Rhineland.47 The French, therefore, desire, before acquiescing in German participation, to iron out with the British the attitude which the latter will take in the event of such violation. The French assure me that they are prepared to make a four-power treaty regardless of Germany. Since, however, the British are insistent upon bringing Germany in, and the French themselves admit that this is most desirable, the French believe they can work out a satisfactory method for German participation if the Rhineland question between England and themselves can be satisfactorily adjusted. The French urge us in the meantime to be patient and not press them too much for immediate decisions on technical questions.
[Page 59]The French like the proposal for a protocol as they would like to have the four powers reach an agreement now and defer the actual signing of the treaty with Germany until after the French election.
In spite of the French preoccupation about the political aspects and consequences, I am satisfied that while they desire eventually to get the Germans into an agreement for exchange of information and qualitative limitation, they want us to trade on the British desire and need for German participation. They also seem to have an idea that for some reason Germany will be willing to pay something to get into the agreement which I somewhat question. The French understand perfectly well, as I told them, we would have nothing whatever to do with any extra treaty adjustments between ourselves and the British but that we have no objections to their trying to clear up questions as between themselves that would facilitate a naval agreement so long as this does not affect the naval agreement itself and does not unduly delay the termination of our work.
The French intimate that once they have cleared up the Rhineland question with the British, which they seem to think they can soon do, they will meet us on the question of battleships which is the chief unsettled question regarding qualitative limitation.
In case there should be any leak and press despatches about any political discussions between the European powers, you may, of course, if occasion arises, state that we are in no way participating in them.