762.94/101: Telegram
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:20 p.m.]
351. The fact of the conclusion of the German-Japanese agreement not calling for the time chosen for its publication and the nature of its contents would seem to supply an important missing piece in the picture puzzle of Germany’s attitude in foreign affairs. The agreement goes a long way in our mind to connect such geographically distant regions as Czechoslovakia and Spain as regards German foreign policy and seems to confirm our feeling that Hitler may well have come to some rather definite broad scale decision. For example, we were told by a usually well informed source last Tuesday that the agreement to be published the next day meant that Germany would carry out with deeds as well as with words her “responsibilities” as a “bulwark” of Europe against Communism wherever this danger might show its head. In the view of many foreign observers here and foreign press comment and following the implications of the above information the German-Japanese agreement is considered to point as much towards Czechoslovakia as an ostensible military Soviet outpost as towards Spain.
Generally speaking we feel that the German-Japanese agreement proceeds along Hitler’s clever line, as previously reported to the Department, of following a policy which can lead at the same time in any one or more of several directions. For example, anti-Communism as a justification for helping Italy with regard to Spain, for sharing in any of the economic advantages to be had there or in any future political or territorial opportunities in Morocco. Secondly, the [Page 403] German-Japanese agreement being anti-Communist is anti-Jewish. Thirdly, it may well develop or be developing with respect to Czechoslovakia as indicated above. Fourthly, the insistence of the implied distinction between the Communist International and the Soviet Government leaves a loophole for a change in Russo-German relations. Indeed the present German policy may even be of assistance to Stalin16 in dealing with the Comintern should he so desire, permitting a better relationship between Russia and Germany as had important groups here in Germany at least greatly desired. Lastly, Hitler’s present policy may be used generally for the development, under a cloak of protection against Communist activities, of the vast imperialistic design which is often credited to him and to his most rash and influential advisers.
In this latter connection I am fearful that Ribbentrop’s signature of the agreement confirms both our understanding that his has been the initiative in the negotiations towards German-Japanese accord for the past year or more and that Ribbentrop is Hitler’s real confidant for foreign affairs whose influence we consider unfortunate and inclined toward ever greater adventure.
All this coincides with the economic difficulties inherent in the internal situation to which as is the case with all imperialism Hitler must and does give primary attention. We do not wish to overestimate the seriousness of the food, raw materials, and general economic conditions in Germany which it is easy to do at this time of the year. Our feeling is that the difficulties of the internal situation are now reaching a point where it is increasingly demanding Hitler’s attention and thereby exerting a greater influence on foreign relations in the direction of a more adventurous course. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in this dual party-state Government do not seem to have made any great advance lately towards solution, in fact we have the impression that if anything these difficulties have increased. A medley of brilliant inexperienced rivals in the party-state structure and a lack of coordinated government make for abrupt and adventurous policies.
I realize this telegram is pessimistic. We feel, however, that it conforms to the situation here. It must always be remembered, however, that thus far Hitler has shown an amazing capacity to escape triumphantly from a seemingly insoluble state of affairs. It remains to be seen whether this will again occur or whether as is the case with most geniuses of this character he is beginning to overreach himself and is making his first mistake.
Cipher text mailed to London, Paris, Rome, Praha, Riga, Istanbul.
- Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee.↩