Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/611: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, January 12, 1936—7 p.m.
[Received January 12—10:10 a.m.]

9. For Davis, London. Department’s 6, January 11, 4 p.m.¹⁸

1. Final instructions to Nagano¹⁹ drafted in 6–hour conference between Foreign Office and Navy officials last night and approved by Cabinet this afternoon. I understand that Navy officials were prepared to break up Conference by withdrawal, but that Foreign Office was able to secure Japanese continuance in order to avoid blame for complete rupture. It is reported that Nagano is instructed to make clear Japan’s proposals to provide real reduction, but that Japan cannot enter temporary agreements which would continue inequalities and will not discuss qualitative apart from quantitative reduction. Delegates may, however, remain in effect as observers and may participate in later phase of Conference for discussion submarine warfare and other subsidiary subjects. Definite confirmation of foregoing report is lacking.

2. It is my belief that the Foreign Office, while wishing to avoid forcing a formal vote on quantitative limitation which would oblige Japan to quit the Conference and thus accept the onus for a complete break, will, nevertheless, welcome a definite and final clarification of the parity issue so that this chapter may be closed and some new program involving political agreements set in motion. The Japanese press has recently carried various tentative suggestions along these lines as allegedly emanating from London which I am reliably informed are “kite flying” pure and simple. I am unaware whether there is any basis for the report published here today alleging Eden’s reference in the private Anglo-Japanese conversation on January 9th to the question of the eventual fortification of the Philippines and Hong Kong.

3. The situation here is as usual shrouded in fog owing to the discrepency in views between the Foreign Office and the Navy and the consequent lack of unanimity in the Government not in point of general objective, but regarding methods and tactics. Obviously the Japanese Navy in demanding parity had principally the American Navy in view, but failed to foresee the complications which their attitude would create in Europe. Having burned their bridges, a reconsideration of the parity issue is for them out of the question, and we may now expect to see the Foreign Office exploring the possibility of finding some alternative of a political nature.

Grew

18. See telegram No. 14. January 11, 4 p.m. to the Chairman of the American delegation, supra.
19. Admiral Osami Nagano, War Counselor to the Emperor and Japanese delegate to the Naval Conference.