740.00/52
Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt)55
I called on Von Neurath, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on May 18th and had a long talk on the general European situation.
Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until “the Rhineland had been digested”. He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. “As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France can not enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,” he said.
We then discussed the position of the Little Entente, and Von Neurath said that he could assure me with absolute certainty that Yugoslavia positively would not recognize the Soviet Government. Yugoslavia definitely had refused to join Rumania and Czechoslovakia in forming a bloc under Russian hegemony. He said that Germany’s relations with Yugoslavia had improved greatly. He accompanied the latter statement with something like a wink, which I took to mean that some sort of definite understanding had been reached between Germany and Yugoslavia.
[Page 301]In discussing France, he said that he could swear to me that the deepest desire of Hitler was to come to a real understanding with France. He added that I knew from the many conversations we had had on this subject over a long period of years that to establish a Franco-German understanding had always been the core of his personal foreign policy. He then said he regretted that there seemed to him today not the slightest chance of bringing about a reconciliation between France and Germany. He asserted that every attempt he or Hitler had made to draw closer to the French had resulted in either no reply from France or a rebuff.
Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached between Germany and Italy and admitted that the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present time he could see no way to reconcile the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time. The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his army mobilized on the Austrian border ready to strike and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse. The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more toward the Nazis and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time. The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.
With regard to England, he said that he regretted greatly that no really friendly contact had been established between the German and British Governments. I asked him if he meant that he did not talk and could not talk with Eden or the British Ambassador in Berlin as simply and directly as he was talking to me. He replied that he absolutely could not and that it was totally impossible. I asked him what he thought would be British policy with regard to Germany. He replied that he had said to Hitler in the course of the previous week that he was expecting a British gesture of friendship toward Germany which would possibly take the form of a statement made privately that England could see no moral objection to the joining of Austrian Germans to the German Republic. He went on to say that he and Hitler were fully prepared for this maneuver; that the real desire of Britain was to embroil Germany with Italy by producing a Nazi coup d’état in Austria. “We have no intention, however,” he said, “of being the cat’s paw for British policy in Europe. Our policy will be a German policy and nothing else.”
[Page 302]We discussed relations between Germany and the Soviet Government. Von Neurath said that he considered the hostility between Germany and the Soviet Union absolutely irremovable. He asserted that the Soviet Union believed that Nazi Germany was the one obstacle to the conquest of Europe by Communism. (This incidentally is the view of the Soviet Government.) There could be no end, therefore, to the hostility between the two States. He asserted that recently the German secret police had found that the Soviet Government, through the Comintern, was pushing the Communist movement in Germany with greater intensity than ever before. (The same statement was made to me recently in Moscow by Steiger, the chief agent of the OGPU with the diplomatic corps.)
With regard to internal affairs and particularly the appointment of Goering as Schacht’s superior, Neurath made the following assertions:
(1) He said that about two months ago Hitler had said to him that it was absolutely necessary to do something to protect Schacht from the attacks of certain Nazi Party institutions and individuals who were in the habit of using foreign exchange in large quantities without Schacht’s permission or control. I asked him what institutions he meant and he said that the worst was the Ministry of Propaganda under Goebbels which had been spending millions on foreign propaganda utterly without result. He asserted that Hitler had said to him he felt it would be desirable to shelter Schacht behind the broad figure of Goering, who had great prestige and power in the country and the Nazi Party. He asserted that the arrangement had been made with the full consent and approval of Doctor Schacht and that it was working very well.
He asserted that at major conferences to consider economic affairs Schacht and Goering both presided and that Goering interfered only if certain party chiefs refused to accept Schacht’s authority. He asserted that he expected the present arrangement to give satisfactory results and to last for a considerable period.
I suggested to Von Neurath that if, as he had pointed out to me in a previous conversation, those colonies which Germany could hope to reacquire could not provide sufficient raw materials to produce any amelioration in the German economic situation, it seemed most unwise, at a time when it was desirable to have as much British support as possible, to raise the question of colonies needlessly. He replied that he had somewhat revised his views since he had talked to me on this subject and said that there were certain colonies which might be most useful, notably the Cameroons. He seemed to indicate, by further remarks on this subject, that Germany would attempt to obtain the Cameroons but would not push seriously other colonial claims for the present.
[Page 303]I asked Von Neurath when he would reply to the British note of inquiry as to the meaning of Hitler’s peace proposals. He answered that the German Government would take its own time about replying, that the reply would certainly not be made in the near future.
He went on to say that the entire matter of the British note of inquiry had been mishandled grossly by the British Foreign Office. He said that Sir Eric Phipps had brought him the note with the request to keep its contents absolutely secret and that he had agreed to absolute secrecy as it was impossible to reach any international agreements by debates in the public press. He said that, to his utter astonishment, Sir Eric Phipps had then telephoned to him and said that he regretted greatly to inform him that there had been a leak as to the contents of the note and that it would be essential for the British Government to publish it the following morning. Von Neurath asserted that he had asked Phipps if the leak had been in the French Foreign Office and that Sir Eric had replied that he was extremely sorry to say that the leak had been in London.
Von Neurath then went on to say that in view of the fact that it was now proposed to reform the League of Nations entirely and that as one of the proposals of the German Government had been that Germany should enter the League, it was impossible to make a decision or binding statements with regard to foreign policy until it was known what the nature of the new League would be. He discussed this matter at some length and seemed to indicate that the German reply to the British note would be long delayed and would not be specific and would explain the lack of definiteness by the excuse that until the new constitution of the League had been established, it would be impossible to make promises with respect to foreign policy.
The entire impression I gathered from Von Neurath was that Germany will attempt to behave in a quiet and inoffensive manner until her fortifications on the French and Belgian frontiers are completed and during that period will attempt to avoid any commitments which might restrict her future activities.
With regard to Czechoslovakia, Von Neurath said that although the Czechs were violently anti-German at the present time, he would not be surprised to see an improvement in relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia brought about by the construction of German fortifications on the French frontier. He said that the German Government knew just as well as the Russian that all talk of Russian military assistance to Czechoslovakia at the present moment was nonsense. He said that the Russian troops could not reach Czechoslovakia and that Russian airplanes could not easily fly to Czechoslovakia owing to the inability of the Russians to conduct long flights over such difficult regions as those which lie between Kiev and Prague.
- The Ambassador was en route to the United States. Apparently this memorandum was brought with him to the Department.↩