740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/675
The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 9.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It is interesting to note that throughout the recent crisis growing out of developments in the Rhineland, the foreign policy of Belgium has shown an increasing tendency of an orientation toward Great Britain rather than toward France. In the years immediately following the termination of the World War, the balance of sentiment in Belgium favored a close military working agreement with France. This sentiment was symbolized by the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920 and the partnership between France and Belgium in the occupation of the Ruhr. It was hoped and believed by many people in Belgium at that time that France would extend to Belgium important commercial concessions in the form of a market for Belgian manufactured goods. Despite the attempts made by successive Belgian Governments to obtain commercial advantages from France, the concessions sought were never obtained and there has been an increasing disillusionment in Belgium vis-à-vis its southern neighbor and what the Belgians regard as its selfish commercial policy. The Flemish element in Belgium has always been opposed to the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920, claiming that it bound Belgium [Page 299] to the apron-strings of France. During the last few months, the Flemish extremists have been denouncing this Agreement more and more loudly and insisting that the Agreement was useless and dangerous. The Franco-Belgian Military Agreement of 1920 was in fact modified and defined by an exchange of Notes between the French and Belgian Governments on March 6, 1936,54 the eve of the German re-militarization of the Rhineland.
Although the Flemish extremists have been in the vanguard of those who have been in favor of Belgium’s cutting loose from France, there has been a gradually developing feeling here in political and commercial circles that it was not safe to place too much dependence on French aid. An unwillingness by France to grant any commercial favors to Belgium, the difficulties of Belgian labor in the French frontier zones, and the fear of France engaging in adventures or commitments that might prove embarrassing to Belgium, are the principal reasons that have caused people of moderate views in Belgium to feel that close collaboration with France alone would be dangerous. Flemish leaders have long felt that Belgium would derive great advantages from a closer co-operation with Great Britain. Mr. Franz van Cauwelaert, former Minister of Industry and Agriculture, a leading Flamingant, informed this Embassy two years ago that he favored a commercial orientation toward England. This orientation was in fact to a considerable extent achieved by the devaluation of the belga in March 1935. This financial operation marked the defection of Belgium from the so-called gold-bloc led by France and the establishment of an equilibrium between the purchasing power of the belga and the pound sterling. It, therefore, brought Belgium commercially within the orbit of the sterling group. Since 1920, the Belgian Government had been desirous of concluding a general staff agreement with England to supplement the military accord with France, but until recently the British Government was unwilling to enter into such an agreement.
The result of the factors described above has been that since the events of March 7, 1936, there has been a marked orientation on the part of the Belgian Government toward England. The fact that the British Government was willing to enter into General Staff conversations with Belgium has been a source of universal gratification here. The present Belgian orientation toward Great Britain does not, of course, mean anything in the nature of a crude breach with France. The Belgian Government, and the Belgian people in general—with the exception perhaps of a few Flemish extremists—realize that good relations and a good understanding with France are essential [Page 300] to the prosperity and welfare of Belgium. But it is thought that the situation precipitated by the recent events in the Rhineland may well mark the termination of the period of the close dependence of Belgium on France. The Belgian public in general is very liberal in bestowing credit on Mr. Paul van Zeeland for the skill and dignity which he has shown throughout the difficult negotiation of the last three months. Feeling that the British position of “condemn the past: build for the future” was the correct attitude for the Belgian Government to assume in its negotiations with Germany, Mr. van Zeeland has worked hard to induce the French Government to agree not to close the door to the discussions which Great Britain and Belgium thought should be carried on with Germany. The fact that he attained a fair measure of success in this difficult task is regarded here as a diplomatic achievement of importance.
Respectfully yours,
- For text of French note of March 6, see Documents on International Affairs, 1936, p. 72.↩