740.0011 Mutual Guarantee
(Locarno)/639
The Ambassador in Belgium (Morris) to
the Secretary of State
No. 789
Brussels, April 14,
1936.
[Received April 22.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a
memorandum of a conversation which a member of my staff had today with
the Viscount de Lantsheere, Chef de Cabinet of
the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Commerce, concerning the questions which engaged the attention of the
Locarno Powers (other than Germany) at their meeting at Geneva on April
10, 1936.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in
Belgium (Sussdorff)
In the course of a conversation this morning, Viscount de Lantsheere
furnished me with the following information regarding the Rhineland
and Abyssinian questions:
- (1)
- The Belgian Government considers that the communiqué which
was issued by the Four Locarno Powers at the conclusion of
[Page 288]
their meeting
at Geneva on April 10, 1936,44 was the best arrangement
that could possibly have been reached under the
circumstances. It was a compromise measure and was
calculated to bridge over the situation until after the
French elections.
- (2)
- The French representatives manifested a less intransigent
spirit at Geneva than the Belgian and British Governments
had expected.
- (3)
- The British Government will now approach the German
Government and ask for clarifications of certain points
raised in the German Government’s last memorandum. In this
inquiry, the latest French memorandum will serve as a basis.
The Belgian Government considers the French memorandum well
drawn up from a juridical point of view. In the new approach
to the German Government, the British, French and Belgian
Governments have nothing in the nature of a fixed
plan.
- (4)
- The Belgian Government regards the Abyssinian question as
destined to play an important rôle in the next stage of the
Rhineland negotiations. This is a connection of
circumstances—not a planned connection. The Belgian
Government sees no indication of any arrangement between
Germany and Italy. On the other hand, the Belgian Government
does not see now [how?] the
Abyssinian and the Rhineland questions can fail to react
upon each other—from the very force of developments. The
Belgian Government is still fearful of a split between Great
Britain and France regarding the question of sanctions
against Italy, which might naturally cause a series of
untoward developments.
- (5)
- In reply to the Italian inquiry as to whether Great
Britain, France and Belgium desired Italian collaboration in
the Locarno question,45 Messrs.
Flandin and van Zeeland both informed the Italian
representative that their Governments were still awaiting
the Italian Note of Guarantee.
- (6)
- Public opinion in Belgium is coming more and more to
demand that Belgium’s position as a guarantor in any
security pacts or similar arrangements shall be strictly
limited to League obligations. Reacting to this desire by
Belgian public opinion, as well as impelled by its own
instinct and judgment, the Belgian Government will probably
endeavor in concluding any new pact to limit its obligations
as a guarantor to agreements to defend its own territory.
Belgium does not want to be a guarantor for France. Belgium
has no alliances with Eastern European countries (such as
Poland or Czechoslovakia) and does not wish to be drawn into
struggles originating in Eastern Europe, or in fact in
Western Europe either if it can possibly keep out of
them.
- (7)
- The Belgian Government still feels that all hurried action
should be avoided in approaching the Rhineland question, as
time tends to cool people’s judgement.
Brussels, April 14,
1936.
