740.0011 Mutual Guarantee (Locarno)/613
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 15.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 89 dated March 11, 9 a.m. in which I set forth the general factors in the European and African situations in their relationship to the League as they appeared to me at that time from the Geneva viewpoint. In their broader aspects, the set of circumstances which I described do not appear to have undergone any marked changes in substance during [Page 283] or since the series of Council meetings in London. Geneva’s attitude during and since those meetings has been an attentive watching of developments; but the results of such attention have chiefly been in the field of speculation with many differing opinions, rather than an emergence of conclusions as to the future course of events or, indeed, as to the precise meaning of what is almost daily taking place.
The general reaction is that there is exceeding difficulty in distinguishing between the basic positions of the powers chiefly concerned and positions which they may take for internal or external tactical purposes. It is furthermore felt that this difficulty in formulating judgments will prevail for some time to come. I am by no means certain that this attitude in Geneva is different from that at any other relatively neutral point. I shall, however, describe it as I see it in its broadest terms. Naturally, in this Geneva attitude the relationship of the League to these matters acquires a more pronounced rôle.
(a) The crux of the entire European problem is seen as Germany’s “intentions” or, more correctly, as the course which Germany may ultimately pursue. The views differ from the belief that when Germany has achieved the complete equality which she demands she will follow a peaceful and constructive policy in line with her present protestations, to the view that Germany will continue to pursue what might be termed a Bismarckian policy of gaining her ultimate ends of expansion point by point even to the extent at an opportune time of striking to regain her “lost provinces” from France. The situation of East Prussia and Danzig and the Polish Corridor and Berlin’s silence on these scores are cited as proofs of the validity of the latter point of view.
To me the notable thing about these differing viewpoints respecting Germany, is that even after giving appropriate weight to the influence of nationalistic biases and individual hopes, the expressed opinions of the best informed and customarily objective observers here are diametrically in opposition on this subject.
(b) Great Britain is seen as having striven for, and successfully achieved at the moment, the middle position, in this instance between France and Germany, which is the traditional basis of her continental policy. The Foreign Office, taking the long view that Germany might become an eventual threat to the British in Europe and also to the Empire, and believing thus that in any European war Great Britain must be against Germany and hence on the side of France, have displayed an urge to orient their policy within this concept. The British public, however, being keenly desirous of peace and roused by a threat of war, have seized strongly on the belief that Hitler’s proposals are sincere proposals of peace. The British Government’s present policy is thus seen as satisfying itself at this juncture with the substantial, although in the minds of many members of the Foreign Office the [Page 284] dangerous, advantage of holding the balance—the reason for it being dangerous is that in effect it favors a possibly threatening Germany.
This position is moreover rendered exceedingly complicated for Great Britain by the African situation. The belief now held here, whether correct or not and despite the superficial evidence of such matters as the Maffey report,42 is that Britain’s efforts against Italy in Geneva have at all times been due to her concept that an Italian controlled Ethiopia would be a threat to the Empire and thus must be countered at all costs. London is nevertheless regarded as at all times having held her cards so closely that her true motivations in this affair have never been clear.
How London will reconcile her European and African interests is, next to Germany’s policy and intentions which have been discussed, regarded as the great problem in the situation.
(c) The position of France seems to me much more clear. Her fear of Germany is basic and unchanging. As a counter to that fear she unswervingly seeks for guarantees of security by collective measures, through arrangements with the Eastern European powers, from Great Britain, from Italy, or wherever they may be found.
No less than the British, however, the French public is anxious for peace and it would appear that there is a developing feeling in France, despite the outward positions which Paris may take, that ultimate peace will be found only in a reconciliation with Germany.
(d) While Italy’s preoccupations by geographical necessity must be primarily European and, to the extent to which Germany constitutes a threat, Germany is definitely a potential threat to Italy, Rome is seen as occupying herself strenuously with the African issue which she regards as necessarily immediate. It is felt here, nevertheless, that Italy is at present bargaining, or hopes shortly to bargain, behind the scenes with Great Britain over her European-African situation. It is presumed that she may be waiting in this for a clearer demonstration of her advantageous military position in Ethiopia.
(e) There remains in the consciousness of Geneva the recent belief, now attributed to have been chiefly the result of British propaganda, that the Italian forces were in a bad situation in Ethiopia. With this in mind, Geneva is chary, despite accounts of the present Italian successes, of expressing conclusions on the exact military status of the Italo-Ethiopian war. There is furthermore found here but little upon which to base sound estimates in this respect.
[Page 285](f) Respecting the League as related to these matters, even the most orthodox of the officials of the League Secretariat perceive the League Covenant as “suspended” in the international field, in the sense that a national constitution may be suspended in a national government. Under these conditions, although the forms of League procedures may continue, in the Geneva view they have lost for the time their accustomed and “textual” meaning. I may say that I consider it as exceedingly important that developments be followed here with this concept clearly in mind.
An illustration of this is the attitude of the small Council powers toward the meeting of the Committee of Thirteen in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict which is about to take place. Although the delegates of these powers must take their place in this meeting as representatives of their governments, they express themselves as completely at a loss as to the reason for the meeting being called at this particular juncture or what end it is intended to serve. The reasons governing the decision to hold the meeting are seen as lying so deeply hidden in the policies of the Great Powers that there is left for those on the outside only speculation concerning them. The unreality of their adopting responsible positions is thus most present in the minds of the representatives of the small Council powers and their chief interest seems to be to avoid taking a position which will involve them in unforeseen commitments. Associated with this, there is evidenced a certain resentment that “great power” action taken here be regarded as “League” action.
It is thus generally felt that for an indeterminate period the League will in fact be left to one side. It is believed that such procedures as may be followed looking to a solution of the European situation will also physically take place outside of Geneva. On the other hand, it is nevertheless seen that the Great Powers may demand that the League play a rôle and that Geneva may thus be the forum in which will be voiced the results of negotiations taking place elsewhere.
Despite the generalities of the foregoing, there remains nevertheless an important element which is of the essence of the very existence of the League. It is the appeal, no matter what the manifest political complexion of any given case, to public opinion in matters which outrage public feelings. It is in part from this background of public feeling that the League has sought and has gained much of its strength. This consideration is illustrated and comes to the fore in certain elements of the immediate situation. There is a difference, in part perhaps emotional, in the reaction in many League states to the admitted German violation of treaty obligations and the Italian war as prosecuted in Africa. In the latter case, actual warfare is in progress, individuals are being killed, and it is believed that the Italians are employing poisonous gases, bombing open towns, and in [Page 286] general indulging in illegal operations. There is thus an urge to take measures against Italy, quite aside from the purely political considerations involved. I think that it may be stated that Great Britain in her attitude against Italy has in this respect the support of wide popular opinion to count upon. It is something which the French Government cannot well gainsay; moreover there is a French public opinion. I feel that this element of the situation should be given due consideration in any observation of developments in the Italo-Ethiopian case before the League, and that it might, if the British are skilful in their leadership, even lead, although this does not seem really probable, to an extension of sanctions.
(g) A change in the League is forecast. There is much discussion of it here. It is believed that it will ultimately mean a constitutional change. Action taken “within the framework of the Covenant” which has been an oft-repeated expression has not, in the view of Geneva, in truth existed for some time in respect of the major European questions. It is now more strongly realized that this separation of theory and reality cannot indefinitely continue if the League is to continue. It must eventuate that the League will operate within the “framework of the European situation”, whatever that may be. Just as what may come into being in Europe is speculative, so the future form of the League is speculative.
For similar reasons discussed under the preceding paragraphs, the small powers are apprehensive, and resentful, of changes which are envisaged. Certain representatives express this feeling as follows: “We entrusted the League to the great powers. They have failed us. Whatever our Governments may desire to do, our people will not be willing for us to follow the great powers again.” By this they mean that the peoples of their countries will not reconcile themselves to a new League which from present indications they believe will be one in which the theory of the equality of the states members will no longer be dominant in its structure. My personal view is, however, should this eventuate, that when the time comes the small states will accept what is offered them rather than turn their backs on the only form in which participation will be open to them.
Respectfully yours,
- In January 1935, the British Government established an interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Colonies (Maffey), for the purpose of estimating British interests in Abyssinia. The Committee reported on June 18, 1935, that there was no important British interest in the area with the exception of Lake Tsana, the waters of the Blue Nile, and certain tribal grazing rights. (Despatch No. 1997, February 25, 1936, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom; not printed.)↩