500.A15A5/604: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 9—5:05 p.m.]
39. In a talk I had with Eden alone this afternoon I told him that apparently the Conference had reached a stage which made it important for us to determine very carefully what our next move should be and that although I knew he was overwhelmed with the duties of his new office, I hoped very much we could have the benefit of his counsel and cooperation. He replied that he was impressed with the importance of doing this and had, in fact, had a long meeting of the British delegation this morning with a view of bringing himself up to date on the questions at issue and preparatory to the meeting they are to have with the Japanese this afternoon at which he will preside.
I then told him that the British and American delegations had been cooperating most harmoniously and satisfactorily but that I was afraid there was a little too much tendency, particularly on the part of Craigie, to avoid coming to an issue on certain fundamentals which had been raised—such as the common upper limit—in the hope that by prolonging the Conference they might ultimately bring Japan into line. I then gave him fully the views expressed in your 8, January 7, 6 p.m., and his reply was that this appealed to him as being very sound. In order, finally, to dispose of the questions which had been raised before, originally by Craigie, as to a pact of nonaggression or of consultation, I explained the fundamental objections and he replied that he had been thinking this over since Craigie brought the matter up to him and had come to the conclusion that a pact of nonaggression was out of the question and that he still had doubts as to the wisdom of even a consultative pact that would not include all of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty12 plus Russia and to which Japan would probably not be favorable.
He then told me he would like to read to me just what he had decided in conference this morning to say to the Japanese this afternoon which was to the following effect—that the British, having taken the responsibility of calling the Conference, were entitled to expect cooperation from all the powers represented and particularly on a question [Page 27] of mere procedure; one power should not attempt to dictate to the other four; that he would like to know if the Japanese wished to discuss the common upper limit and have it finally disposed of and once that was done, which would certainly be unfavorable to them, he would like to know if they were prepared to attempt an agreement on any other phases of the naval problem and if so, on what, and if not, what did they propose to do.
He then asked what I thought of the advisability of hinting to the Japanese that if they wished to go home without an agreement the other four powers would probably stay on in an effort to reach a naval agreement to which Japan might later adhere if she so desires. I told him I saw no objection to this.
I said, however, that I entirely agreed with the position he proposed to take with the Japanese and felt that if we showed any further tendency to evade the issue on the common upper limit we would begin to appear ridiculous, and therefore the sooner we disposed of this matter the better. He replied that he agreed entirely with me and that his effort would be to work most closely with us.
Eden said that he would see me at the official dinner tonight and inform me exactly what happened with the Japanese this afternoon.
- Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.↩