Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/601: Telegram

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

London, January 8, 1936—10 p.m.
[Received January 8—7:12 p.m.]

38. Your 8, January 7, 6 p.m. We entirely concur in the views indicated by you and have been thinking very much along the same lines. Unfortunately, Eden⁴ has been so swamped this week in getting installed in his new office and entertained by all the Ambassadors and Ministers that he has not been able to come to grips with the naval matter. He has, however, written me that he wishes to have a good talk with me in the very near future and I think it desirable to discuss fully with him the questions raised before reaching a final decision as to our course.

As reported in a separate cable,⁵ the Japanese almost brought matters to a head today by refusing even to discuss the British, French and Italian proposals for an exchange of information.⁶ After the meeting today Craigie⁷ told me he would like to have at once a talk with Phillips⁸ and me in which Monsell⁹ later joined.

Craigie in substance said they were satisfied that the Japanese Admiralty wished to bring the Conference to a head without delay but that the Japanese Foreign Office is still anxious to keep the Conference going and desirous of getting some kind of a so-called political understanding that would enable them in effect to agree to continue the naval status quo. The British would therefore like to discuss further the question they had raised with regard to a pact of nonaggression. We told him frankly that we could not consider such a pact.¹⁰

Craigie then suggested as an alternative a consultation pact which would state in effect that in a desire to cooperate for the promotion of peace in the Far East and to remove sources of misunderstanding, etc., we would consult when necessary. He said that this would really be meaningless but would give the Japanese some justification and help save their pride. We told him it would be difficult to explain to our Senate why we had signed a treaty that had so little meaning and that it would also raise questions as to Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies, and all other powers interested in the Far East. Craigie replied that the Covenant of the League¹¹ would protect them insofar as these other powers were concerned but we explained that we were not in the same position.

I then asked Craigie if Eden were in favor of such a suggestion and he said that so far he had had very little time to discuss it with Eden who has not yet made up his mind.

(In this connection before the Conference this afternoon Phillips called on Eden at the latter’s invitation with Ambassador Bingham, Craigie also being present. The two pacts above mentioned were brought up during the course of conversation by Craigie but Phillips got the impression that Eden did not seem to regard them as practicable though he felt a pact of consultation might be worthy of study.)

Craigie then said that he could understand our basic objection to such a limited pact of nonaggression but that it was so vitally important to them to get a naval agreement with Japan, if possible, that he hoped we would think over further the possibility of a so-called pact of consultation mainly as a means of helping to save the Japanese face. We told him that while we were glad to do anything reasonable to promote an agreement our reaction was distinctly unfavorable, but that if after thinking it over further we had any possible suggestions to make we would let him know.

Monsell and Craigie told us they were going to have a meeting with the Japanese tomorrow at the Foreign Office and tell them that since they know perfectly well that their common upper limit will be rejected the British would like to know if the Japanese wished to have this done immediately and if they are then ready to attempt to get an agreement on any other basis; and if not what they propose doing. The British felt that after this meeting it was very important for us to have a meeting and decide what to do.

Monsell then said that they could not consent to having Japan dictate to the Conference what we may discuss and agreed with us that since the Japanese are forcing the issue it is better once and for all to definitely and finally to reject the common upper limit. Craigie evidenced a desire to keep the Japanese on even as observers but Monsell agreed more with our attitude.

Monsell said he would rather have the Japanese run out by refusing even to discuss the French, Italian and British proposals for exchanging information as to future construction than on a flat rejection of the common upper limit, he added that if they were to pull out as now seems probable he thought we should go ahead and negotiate a fourpower naval agreement which would have an escape clause and would provide for Japanese adherence later if she so desires. The British now believe France and Italy would be willing to join in such a treaty. Both the latter powers have shown of late a marked interest in a fourpower agreement.

Davis

4. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
5. Telegram No. 37, January 8, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation; not printed.
6. See Report of the Delegates of the United States …, pp. 199 ff.
7. Robert L. Craigie, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and adviser to the British delegation.
8. William Phillips, Under Secretary of State of the United States and American delegate.
9. Viscount Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty and British delegate.
10. See telegram No. 34, January 6, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, vol. iv, p. 1.
11. Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 69.