Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, General, British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A3/1842: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)

Washington, November 21, 1936—noon.

413. Your 546, November 19, 9 p.m.³⁷ Referring to the intention of the British to retain five “C” class cruisers by recourse to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, you are requested to hand to Craigie the following memorandum:

• “1. Reference is made to the draft note handed by Sir Robert Craigie to me on November 19, 1936,³⁷ for communication to my Government, which relates to the intention of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to retain five subcategory (b) cruisers of the “C” class, namely the Cardiff, Ceres, Caledon, Calypso, and Caradoc, by recourse to Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty, 1930.
• 2. It is noted that the retention of these vessels will cause the tonnage for the cruiser category permitted the British commonwealth of Nations under the London Naval Treaty, 1930, to exceed the limit of 339,000 tons by 20,270 tons.
• 3. It is noted further that the retention of the four vessels of the Hawkins class is merged in the subcategory (b) tonnage allowed to the British Commonwealth of Nations under the London Naval Treaty, 1930, through the substitution of 6.1 inch guns for the existing 7.5 inch guns.
• 4. Finally it is noted that the British Government, in retaining the five “C” class vessels, undertakes that (a) these vessels shall be retained for a maximum of 5 years’ peace service and (b) they will be used not as cruisers but as anti-aircraft ships which will involve the substitution of a lighter armament than the existing 6 inch gun armament.
• 5. As was stated in this Government’s communication, dated October 28, 1936,³⁸ this Government does not question the right of the British Government to make the proposed increase in the cruiser category in excess of the tonnage specified in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, as not to be exceeded on December 31, 1936, nor the right of the British Government to be the sole judge in determining whether its security has been affected to such an extent that the retention of this excess tonnage in the cruiser category becomes a necessity, on the condition that the British Government has recourse to Article 21 of the Treaty which is the only method provided by the Treaty for raising the tonnage limits of the Treaty.”

We wish you to ascertain whether in fact Craigie has communicated a copy of the British draft note to the Japanese Ambassador. Upon receipt from you of information to the effect that he has done so we propose to present to the Japanese Embassy a copy of the above memorandum.³⁹ It seems to us that this is called for in view of the fact that the Japanese Embassy here has from time to time been obliged to request a clarification of our position in the conversations relating to the retention of tonnage in excess of the limits laid down in the London Naval Treaty, 1930, and has asked for assurances that we have maintained with the British in respect of the cruisers the strictly legal treaty position we have maintained with the Japanese in respect of the retention of excess destroyers and submarines. You may inform Craigie of the above.

Moore

37. Not printed.
37. Not printed.
38. Telegram No. 385, 7 p.m., p. 149.
39. The British draft note was given to the Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom on November 24; telegram No. 581, November 30, 10 a.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (500.A15A3/1845). The American memorandum was accordingly given to Mr. Yoshizawa, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in the United States, on November 30 (500.A15A3/1849).