862.20/837: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:35 p.m.]
136. Your 74, April 4th, 6 p.m.77 The factors in the European complex immediately affecting the Soviet Union are possible German aggression and the counter measures thereto.
The “war scare” in the Soviet Union if perhaps slightly exaggerated is genuine; not as occasionally in the past simulated for tactical reasons. While Germany may not be deliberately planning a war of aggression German aims and aspirations are such that in the final analysis they can be satisfied only by war.
France has subscribed to the Soviet thesis of “indivisibility of peace” and is committed in principle to the Soviet Government to effect an Eastern Locarno or an adequate substitute therefor; in other words to a system of “preponderance of force” against Germany. This policy was preventive and primarily designed by France to bring effective pressure to bear on Germany in the interest of a general understanding. However, the German position instead of being modified has become even more aggressive and the Eastern Pact as originally foreseen has miscarried (largely through the negative attitude of Poland and the uncertain position of the Baltic states).
French policy towards Russia has now grown more cautious and less determined. France under the present circumstances could not count on effective military aid from Russia which has no contiguous frontier with Germany. Moreover, inadequate transportation facilities and other economic factors would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to maintain a large army in the field for any length of time. Aviation to which Soviet efforts have been specially devoted, will not play a highly important role in case of war in Eastern Europe. In consequence an unequivocal French commitment with the Soviet Government for mutual assistance involving immediate and unconditional military intervention in the event of German aggression against Russia is still hanging in the balance.
Though the Soviet mind has been disabused of its fear that Great Britain was deliberately inciting Germany to a war of conquest against Russia it is clear that British collaboration with the Soviet Government if any will be platonic; also that the British Government in seeking a formula for postponing the European crisis will not wish to accept commitments in respect of Northeastern Europe or for that matter to see France become too deeply involved with the Soviet Union.
[Page 327]Italian interest in and relations with the Soviet Union although active and reasonably friendly are secondary. They give no basis to suppose that Italy would care to accept any specific commitments in Northeastern Europe.
In view of reported differences of opinion within the French Cabinet and the divergence of views between Simon and Eden it is probable that no far reaching decisions will be arrived at until after the Stresa meeting which however should serve to show which way the wind is blowing. The direction will probably be toward finding a point of departure for a revised system of security. The immediate results will doubtless be limited to a euphemistic reiteration of solidarity and desire for peace.