862.20/839: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:45 a.m.]
302. Your 117 April 3, 7 p.m.73
1. In attempting an estimate of the political situation in-Europe at the present time it is clear that two alternatives present themselves to those countries which are faced with the possible consequences of the unilateral denunciation by Germany of her treaty obligations. The first alternative is that these nations, knowing Germany to be re-arming, should seek to stop her by the exercise of force. This alternative has to be discounted for it is doubtful if any of the countries concerned, with the possible exception of Italy, are willing to countenance a preventive war. There remains a second alternative, namely, to establish new balances, of power in order to arrive at settled peace. Just how these new balances of power may be arrived [Page 323] at is the question which is disturbing Europe to-day. It is abundantly clear that French public opinion will not countenance a preventive war and it seems equally certain that under the present circumstances France would make no military move to aid Poland or the states of the Little Entente in case of a German threat or aggressive acts. It would seem that French efforts for a closer tie-up with Russia are more to satisfy French internal political necessities than because the French Government believes that it might constitute a real guarantee against Germany. The Radical Socialist Party controlled by Herriot has long been a partisan of a Russian alliance and considering the strength of this group in the majority of the present government, its views have to be considered.
The situation is undoubtedly critical but may not for the moment be considered necessarily as leading up to an imminent war. The Embassy is most reliably informed that Laval personally considers that war is as ultimately inevitable as ever and that Hitler’s statement of March 16th74 has not advanced the date of hostilities. In other words war will come when Germany is prepared and not a day before.
The diplomatic battle which will ensue is between those governments who desire to tie up the Continent with mutual assistance pacts and those who oppose them. Any such mutual assistance pact would have to have teeth in it, that is to say, authentic sanctions. In the first place is France with Russia, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and with the benevolent approbation of Italy. In the second is Germany with Poland and Hungary. England is still trying to play between the two and is endeavoring to preserve her traditional role of mediator and to maintain a balance of power on the Continent. England is not in favor of the French policy of blocks believing that it will inevitably lead to secret military alliances and the virtual encirclement or isolation of Germany. That policy England fears would incite Germany to embark upon extreme solutions.
Italy now stands with France which is of unquestioned help to the latter country. However, Italy above all European nations would undoubtedly prefer a new four power pact with Russia replacing Germany Rome wants Italy, France, England and Russia in a super pact to rule over Europe because Mussolini fears that Germany’s ultimate aim for expansion would be in Austria and that Italy would consequently be the first to suffer from Germany’s military strength.
Simon in conversation with me in London frankly stated that his Berlin trip was not productive of much result. He described his [Page 324] conversations as exploratory. Eden’s visits to Moscow, Warsaw and Praha as reported by the press have only been successful in so far as a clarification of the atmosphere is concerned. In my despatch 1751, April 3rd,75 I mention that in conversation with Malcolm MacDonald76 in London he expressed as his personal opinion that England would remain at France’s side and would not allow Germany to separate the two countries and that he did not consider that war was inevitable. He added, however, that it was his personal belief which he believed was also shared by his father, the Cabinet and the country that the policy of Great Britain would be for collective pacts of mutual assistance and that failing these that it would be his Government’s policy to endeavor to negotiate bilateral pacts. This opinion has since been given some weight as a result of a reported conversation between Simon and Corbin (French Ambassador in London) that in the event of trouble France might count on England.
The general situation is confusing and is in a formative stage. As yet the former allies do not constitute a sufficiently cohesive unit to discourage Germany’s aggressiveness or to initiate impressive counter plans. Hitler’s policy has consolidated Germany but has not made foreign friends who may be counted on in the event of hostilities.
From present indications Germany may be expected to pursue a policy towards achieving an Anschluss with Austria and in furthering her aims on the Eastern frontier but in such a careful manner as not to precipitate a serious conflict. Parenthetically it is our opinion that any attempt by Germany to take over Austria would result in a conflict with Italy in which France would find it necessary to take part. At the same time she will seek to consolidate her political influence in the southeast, particularly in Yugoslavia.
2. With regard to the second point of your telegram; namely, the probable developments as we foresee them, this is difficult to comment intelligently upon until (a) the termination of the Stresa conference and (b) the return of Laval from his visits to Moscow and Warsaw.
At Stresa on April 11th the rival viewpoints (those of the nations favoring a general pact as opposed to alliances) will probably be evident from the start and Laval seems very determined not to depart from the French policy, namely, that nothing but mutual assistance pacts can persuade France to abandon the Eastern Locarno project.
At Stresa England will probably report little or no progress and suggest that her negotiating mandate be prolonged. France on the other hand is willing to give England all the rope she wants feeling that England is sure to fail in such mediation and in the end must tie [Page 325] up with the block to protect herself from the German threat. Laval will certainly not agree at Stresa or at any other time or place to any English suggestion of a pact which does not provide sanctions and mutual assistance. If France cannot get that through the Eastern Locarno or by means of a four power pact, it is probably that Laval will attempt to obtain it through secret military accords. France does not favor any German suggestions of bilateral non-aggressions pacts because Hitler has refused to write sanctions into them. A solution might be to write more sanctions into article 16 of the League Covenant but inasmuch as Germany is no longer a League member that scheme would appear futile.
Nothing much is expected to happen at the Council meeting in Geneva beyond the consideration of the French protest which is based on paragraph 2 of article 11 of the Covenant. Shortly after Laval will depart for Moscow and stop at Warsaw on his return. He may push the Franco-Russian military alliance at Moscow but this at present would appear doubtful. His voyage is primarily for the purpose of giving Hitler food for thought and worry. A few months ago France was begging the Soviet Government for military alliance, today the roles are reversed and Russia is begging France. Laval is not in a hurry because he can use the threat of a possible military alliance between France and Russia as a menace to England.
Mussolini is credited with being the author of the article headed “Stresa” which appeared in the Popolo d’Italo of April 2nd. This article states that many hopes are turned towards Stresa but that unfortunately too many illusions are being encouraged and that it might be well while not belittling Stresa to pour some cold water on its accomplishments. This inspired pessimism is interpreted by impartial critics here to mean that Stresa will either be just another conference or else that it must signify a “full stop” to the agitated sea of European politics and an abandonment of the dangerous Utopia of disarmament.
In the meantime and to face realities 4 million men are under the colors or will be under the colors when the present plans of military expansion throughout Europe are completed. According to the closest estimates which the Quai d’Orsay has been able to obtain these are the discouraging figures: Russia 900,000, Italy 800,000, Germany 600,000 (probably more), France 480,000, Poland 450,000, Yugoslavia 325,000, Czechoslovakia 300,000, Turkey 150,000, England 150,000.
The above views and opinions are the result of careful comparison and discussion of information and impressions gained by the senior members of the staff of the Embassy and by me from a wide range contacts including Government officials, pressmen, bankers and persons prominent in various shades of French political life.