862.20/948
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Wright) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 24.]
Sir: I take special gratification in reporting that, as a result of a previous informal conversation upon the subject with Mr. Jan Masaryk, son of the President of this Republic and Czechoslovak Minister to London—whom I have intimately known for some years—Mr. Masaryk called upon me yesterday and, upon his own volition and with the express acquiescence of Dr. Beneš,78 orally communicated to me the tenor of the minutes of the meeting which took place in Prague on April 4th between Mr. Anthony Eden and Dr. Beneš. Mr. Masaryk was present during the conversations, as were Sir Joseph Addison and Mr. Strang who accompanied Mr. Eden and Dr. Beneš Chief of Cabinet.
The Department will probably find interest in reading this report in connection with my despatch No. 142 of April 679 which was based upon information from Foreign Office sources before this account of the interview became available.
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It was, of course, neither proper nor possible for me to make notes of what Mr. Masaryk conveyed to me—as the conversation was a very rapid one arid it would have appeared in the worst of taste to have done so. The following résumé, therefore, is the result of my transcription of the conversation from memory immediately thereafter, and I have no reason to believe that any important items have been omitted.
[Page 328]The conversation between Eden and Beneš opened with a description by the former of the conversations which he and Sir John Simon held with Chancellor Hitler in Berlin. These conversations consumed a total of fourteen hours in two sessions, at the end of which Mr. Eden frankly confessed fatigue, due not only to the strain of the important subjects but also the difficulties and interruptions of translation. Chancellor Hitler, having reiterated his willingness to discuss with his visitors the subjects dealt with in the British communication when the interview was first arranged, set forth frankly and fully why and how conscription was to take place in Germany—referring bluntly but without belligerency to the shortcomings of the former Allied and Associated Powers in failing to reduce armaments in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Versailles, and in this phase of the conversation he several times assured his visitors of his desire and that of the German nation for peace. The minutes did not state—or at least it was not communicated to me—how far the conversations went in that direction, save for the reiteration of Hitler’s contention that Germany insisted upon being considered as an equal in such matters and therefore entitled to an expression of her views and intended contributions to that end—rather than as the recipient of measures which had been forced upon her.
Hitler said that he was ready at once to accept in principle the proposed Aeronautic Convention—if the right of Germany to construct aerial forces equal to that of either France or of Great Britain were recognized, and with the further proviso that in case the aerial force of Russia should exceed that of Germany, the latter would build to that equivalent as well. Mr. Eden informed him that while gratified to learn of the Chancellor’s readiness to accept the Air Pact, there were other proposals which would have to be considered at the same time and that the bases of the conversation could not be split up and accepted or rejected in fragments. (It is interesting to note that this attitude on the part of Germany conforms exactly to the prediction which Dr. Beneš made to me as reported in my despatch No. 131 of March 25, 193580).
The Chancellor told Mr. Eden that he was not interested—in fact that he was opposed to—an Eastern Pact, but was willing to consider—and participate in, if acceptable—a multilateral agreement for general security with the door left open for the subsequent adherence of those who might not sign at first, provided that no “unacceptable superstructure” were erected on such a foundation. My informant gave me no information as to what Hitler meant by the latter statement—but it was not difficult to deduce that he had in mind an international [Page 329] agreement which would smack of encirclement and be unacceptable to Germany.
Hitler displayed no territorial ambitions whatsoever and referred to colonies or overseas possessions only twice: once to observe, with a sense of humor which Mr. Eden was surprised to discover, that Germany’s only “colony” was East Prussia, thus showing that the question of the Polish Corridor was uppermost in his mind; arid once to question, with some vigor, Japan’s right to the mandate over Germany’s former possessions in the Pacific, in view of the fact that both Japan and Germany were no longer members of the League of Nations.
The Chancellor said to Mr. Eden quite frankly that Germany desired a Navy of one-third the strength of that of England—again referring to the present necessity of communication by sea with its “only colony”.
Hitler displayed no discernible interest in the League of Nations and the impression was obtained that Germany would certainly not express a desire, or accept an invitation, to re-enter that body except upon a basis of equality and a nearer approach to a solution of correlated problems.
The Chancellor was given several opportunities to refer to Czechoslovakia but did not do so, save to mention once the number of army divisions by which Germany was at present surrounded (in which he estimated the army strength of Czechoslovakia as seventeen divisions—which my informant says is in error, as the present military force of this country comprises only twelve divisions); and once to disclaim any plan of marching across Bohemia.
With regard to the Anschluss (which is somewhat closely connected with the immediately foregoing observation) the Chancellor stated categorically that Germany had no desire for the Anschluss “now”—observing that the economic situation in Germany at present is too difficult to justify increasing it by assuming the responsibilities and difficulties of a decrepit nation.
Hitler expressed himself in favor of a Danubian Pact as an additional contribution to the peace of Europe—although such a Pact would not directly affect Germany. He displayed an open and receptive mind on this point.
Eden confirmed the impressions which have been obtained here that the Reichswehr is all powerful in Germany and that Hitler is now definitely under its control. During the conversations of Simon and Eden with Hitler no mention whatever was made of Memel.
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Respectfully yours,