500.A14/730
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European, Affairs (Moffat)
Senator King called to see me to inquire as to the status of the 1925 Arms Traffic Treaty which had been passed by the Senate last spring with his reservation. The President has not yet ratified the treaty. Senator King came in to inquire why not and what were the future prospects for the treaty.
I explained that when the Senate had consented to ratification with the Persian Gulf Reservation we had inquired of the French Government, which was the depositary of the treaty, what formalities would be required. The French Government replied that the reservation would have to be accepted by all signatory Powers and possibly by some additional adhering Powers. Assuming approval by all Powers, experience had shown that this would take at least a year or two. We had then made informal inquiries at Geneva and elsewhere and found that the chances were decidedly against universal acceptance of the reservation. We thus found ourselves in the situation of having the reservation, if maintained, prevent the treaty going into effect.
[Page 487]In the circumstances, was the reservation of sufficient importance to warrant losing the treaty? The Senator said that he could not believe that any Power would decline to accept the reservation which he considered merely to affirm Persian rights in or over the Persian Gulf. He said it must be as offensive to Persia to have British gunboats running up and down the Persian Gulf as it would be to us if British gunboats were running up and down Lake Michigan. I took the Senator to the map and showed him that the parallel was not apt as while Lake Michigan was entirely surrounded by American territory, Persia only held the north side of the Persian Gulf, while Iraq, Koweit, a British possession, Arabia, Oman, et cetera, were on the south side. The Senator agreed.
His next question was: Is the treaty really important? I told him that we considered that it was very important. He asked whether the new treaty61 would not be better. I said undoubtedly, but that it had not as yet been negotiated or signed, much less ratified. This would at best take some time and we wanted the 1925 Convention put into force as soon as possible.
Senator King then asked if the President was going to return the treaty to the Senate. I told him that this was a political question which was entirely out of my province and on which I had no information. He asked who might know. I suggested that he might wish to talk with Judge Moore62 on the political phases, or if he wished to pursue the Persian angle further, that he see Mr. Murray.