Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A4/2460: Telegram

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

London, March 31, 1934—2 p.m.
[Received March 31—2 p.m.]

143. From Norman Davis. Your 117 March 28, 6 p.m.

1. As soon as I have talked with the key men here including Henderson who are absent over Easter and become more fully informed of the inside situation with regard to disarmament I will give you my more definite views and suggestions as to our procedure. Although the possibilities of a constructive disarmament agreement seem to have become distinctly less promising it may yet be possible to turn this to advantage. I am inclined to think there is yet considerable bluffing and jockeying for position. While neither France nor Germany seem willing to make any further concessions I do not believe either of them want war at least now and once they are faced definitely with the necessity of choosing between war or of making reasonable concessions to prevent a race in armaments and war they may possibly with the aid of British pressure choose the latter.

2. British public opinion is strongly in favor of disarmament and equally opposed to being drawn into another European war which is considered inevitable unless there is disarmament. This is having considerable influence on the British Government which no doubt will make every possible effort to bring about an agreement not only in order to avoid becoming involved but to satisfy British public opinion and, in case of failure, to place the blame elsewhere. The Government here is still being criticized by those who believe that there would have been a disarmament agreement long ago if it had taken a more helpful role during the first year of the Disarmament Conference. The British who were first hostile to the idea of supervision and control have now come to realize the dangers of a disarmament agreement without it. While apparently less inclined than ever to guarantee any political settlements in Europe they are becoming more inclined to commit themselves to economic and financial measures against a nation that may violate a disarmament agreement. They cannot however proceed very far on this line until they have ascertained the position of the United States. It is therefore likely that the British may as a last endeavor to get a disarmament agreement agree to join in some form of sanctions against a violator of a disarmament treaty provided we will agree not to interfere. I do not believe however that they would do this just to get an armed truce as proposed by Mussolini. They are in reality becoming as much concerned about the Far East as about Europe and are not willing to make any commitments in Europe which might cause trouble with us or with the Dominions. Their ultimate course will I believe be largely determined by their ability to reach an agreement with us in respect of the navies and also a definition of neutrality.

3. I am informed that for the past few weeks rumors have been spread in Europe to the effect that the cynics and isolationists have gained the upper hand in the United States and that we have accordingly lost interest in disarmament and cannot be counted upon to go even as far as was indicated last May. This has discouraged the sincere advocates of disarmament and pleased those opposed to it. The President’s statement on March 24 [23?]⁸⁴ and also the one made at the time of the passage of the Vinson Bill both of which were very opportune will no doubt help to dispel such rumors. I am inclined to think it would be well to consider the advisability of reiterating the importance and even necessity of a real disarmament agreement if there is to be real peace and economic recovery making it clear that we continue ready to cooperate in every practicable way in achieving a general reduction and limitation of armaments if it is to be treated as a world problem and not as a purely European one; but that since we are unwilling to become involved in European political adjustments we would not be interested in a mere armaments truce based primarily on European political exigencies. Within a few days I hope to submit more definite suggestions.

4. With respect to preparations for the naval conference in 1935 I am glad you agree that the best procedure would be the second alternative set forth in my letter of March 6 to the President.⁸⁵ We will accordingly direct our talks to this end. [Davis.]

Bingham

84. See supra, paragraph 1, last sentence.
85. Post, p. 222.