Office of the Historian

500.A15A4/2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham)

Washington, March 28, 1934—6 p.m.

117. For Norman Davis.

1.
During your absence in Sweden, the general disarmament picture has grown distinctly more discouraging. The French note seems to make further progress along the lines of the British compromise plan virtually impossible, at any rate without further British guarantees of execution. I notice signs that an attempt is being made in the press once more to place the onus for Britain’s disinclination to give further guarantees on us, and hope that you will be able to counter any such effort. For your information, the President, in a press conference on [Page 35] March 23, emphasized that, with respect to consultation and sanctions, we could not, of course, change what we said last May.80
2.
The next move from Europe will probably be an inquiry as to whether we are interested in pursuing negotiations looking toward a treaty of limitation on the basis of the status quo for the heavily armed Powers and legalized re-armament for Germany, along the lines proposed by Italy. Our inclination is to regard such discussions as a negation of our disarmament efforts, and as an attempt to draw us into a political adjustment in Europe from which we would gain no advantage. I should appreciate receiving your analysis of present and probable future developments, your views as to our best course of procedure, and any suggestions you have as to any further step or gesture we might make in line with our traditional views.
3.
The press has, in the last few days, carried sundry stories from abroad regarding the purported British plan for a limited air agreement among certain of the European Powers. Do you have any information as to the basis of these despatches?
4.
With respect to the preparations for the Naval Conference of 1935, I agree with you that we should, as far as possible, leave the initiative to Great Britain. The only developments since your departure have been the exchange of notes between Hirota and myself,81 a summary of which was telegraphed to London, and the President’s statement upon signature of the Vinson Bill,82 which we cabled textually. As to the alternatives set forth in your letter of March 6 to the President,83 I much prefer the second alternative and feel that you and Bingham should endeavor to Work toward this end in your talks with MacDonald.
Hull
  1. See President Roosevelt’s message of May 16, 1933, to various Chiefs of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, p. 143; also telegrams Nos. 644 and 646, May 19 and 20, 1933, from the Chairman of the American delegation, ibid., pp. 154 and 158.↩
  2. For this exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 127–129.↩
  3. Signed March 27, 1934, this Act authorized a construction program which would build the Navy up to the limits prescribed by the Washington and London treaties of 1922 and 1930 respectively; 48 Stat. 503. For text of President Roosevelt’s statement, see Department of State, Press Releases, March 31, 1934, p. 176.↩
  4. Post, p. 222.↩