500.A15A5/322: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 11—12:25 p.m.]
68. The following summary of an informal conversation during the week-end between Atherton and a British official is sent for your information:
It was restated that the British are not working to the end that the present conventions [conversations?] with the Japanese will result in any final settlement before the denunciation. The purpose of these discussions is rather to indicate to Matsudaira and Yamamoto (who have stated their conviction that after denunciation Tokyo will be more pliable in regard to naval programs), what conditions Japan must be prepared to meet in order to negotiate a new agreement with England and the United States and furthermore to emphasize the points of agreement and disagreement. The British have evidently accepted Matsudaira’s statement that any contractual naval program on the present basis is politically impossible in Japan and are therefore discussing along the line of unilateral declarations of building programs 1937–1942 which in general would maintain the ratios of the present treaties. These declarations would contain clauses that no change in the program be undertaken without prior notice and would be an annex to an eventual new treaty which would also embrace such portions of the existing treaties as the interested parties, in agreement, decided to retain.
It was stated that the British are already discussing with Yamamoto their 1937–1942 building programs and British civil officials claim they are encouraged by the reaction of Matsudaira and Yamamoto and more especially by their opinion that this program is not irreconcilable with Yamamoto’s figures for Japan and does not constitute an insurmountable barrier which would cause Japan to refuse further conversations in 1935. In other words, the British hope by these building program conversations to make available to Yamamoto and Matsudaira for future use such an indication of British and presumably American general naval policy as will reassure Japan that it is not based on aggression in the Far East; and that this will give Yamamoto a means of returning home and persuading Japan to negotiate a new treaty along the lines of some face-saving formula and unilateral declarations, to be annexed to a treaty, of building programs which would practically maintain intact the present naval ratios.
[Page 394]With this background Atherton was informed that we will be asked to discuss its 1937–1942 naval program with the British at a very early date. Atherton’s informant indicated that we are already in possession of the main outlines of the British program for this period and that they are accordingly anxious for information from us. They would like to know in particular at this time how great are the bases for controversy, if indeed there are any, which exist as between the American and English programs respectively for this period, as apart from the Japanese angle.