500.A15A5/317: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
49. Your 67, December 7, 4 p.m. The trouble with committing ourselves in advance to a resumption of naval conversations at a fixed date is (1) that it ignores Japan’s act of rejecting the principles on which the Treaty of 1922 was based, and (2) that it makes a conference obligatory irrespective of future developments or of the prospects of success. To hold an unsuccessful conference does more damage to international goodwill, than to forego a conference. Thus there is no doubt but that American-Japanese relations have deteriorated during the prolonged discussion this autumn; even Anglo-American relations were subjected to a strain, which has now been fortunately dispelled, as a result of the suspicions aroused in this country by Britain’s desire to play the role of intermediary.
Cooperation with the British is something we earnestly desire, but to be successful it requires some “give” and “take” on each side. I doubt, for instance, whether the British appreciate that we have for more than a month acceded to their wish to continue the conversations while they explored every possibility of reaching a compromise with the Japanese in the face of their announced determination to denounce the Treaty, and that we have in deference to their desire to play the role of mediator borne alone the responsibility in the public view for standing firm on the principle of existing ratios, a principle which is as vital to the British as to us. We understand perfectly well that the British are confronted with difficulties; but we also have difficulties. There is obviously a difference in conception of the tactics which may to greatest advantage be pursued to meet the situation. The British seem bent upon temporizing and avoiding a clarification of the real issue. We feel that much of the present difficulty in the Far Eastern situation is directly attributable to the fact that there has been in the [Page 392] past too much temporizing and too little facing of the real implications and consequences of Japan’s intransigence. We regard that course as bad tactics, especially at present, and not conducive to attaining the objective of ultimately bringing about adoption by the Japanese of a conciliatory attitude which might make an agreement possible. We feel that it would be a great mistake to give the impression of yielding to the Japanese conception that the present situation can be basically altered and yet thereafter everybody proceed with negotiations on a new basis as though there had been no fundamental change. Your speech yesterday35 made it altogether clear that we stand for maintenance of the basic principle of equality of security, and the editorial reaction throughout this country has indicated abundant approval of our position.
The procedure which you now suggest seems inconsistent with that position. We therefore ask you to make another earnest and thoroughgoing effort to persuade the British to accept the formula suggested in our 22.36 If you do not succeed in this, then, as a last resort, we could agree to the following procedure. We could accept a British proposal to adjourn the conversations before Japanese denunciation on the understanding that we would all three meet in conference together with the French and Italians upon the call of the British at such time as they felt that the prospects of success warranted holding a conference, not however until after the Jubilee Celebration next spring. This would (1) give some time for the Japanese to show by action rather than words whether they are intent on pursuing a policy of dictation in the Far East or are anxious to continue to seek through cooperative effort to maintain both political stability and the principles of naval limitation; (2) give the British time to pursue through diplomatic channels their explorations as to a possible ground for future agreement “consistent with the fundamentals of our position”; (3) meet their political preoccupations of retaining the initiative while they believe that there is a possibility of success; and (4) avoid further “preparatory conversations” which have all the liabilities of a conference without the possibility of capitalizing in treaty form any meeting of minds that might be achieved. We have little faith in the reality of such a solution but in deference to your views could to that extent subordinate our judgment as to the soundest course to pursue.
The President approves foregoing.
- December 6, 1934, before the Association of American Correspondents in London; for text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 269.↩
- November 15, 6 p.m., p. 350.↩