500.A15A5/317: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:15 p.m.]
67. For the President and Secretary. Analyzing your instructions we understand our position, in effect, to be that (1) no compromise agreement is possible before denunciation and that the Japanese must go home empty handed; (2) we will not agree to proceed immediately after denunciation in any effort to find a basis for future agreement lest it be inferred that we are accepting the Japanese contention that the present system must radically be altered; and (3) we will not agree now to reconvene in the future unless some country is willing later on [Page 389] to assume the responsibility of making new proposals and on their basis to call another meeting.
While our delegation is unanimously of opinion that Japan should be given nothing to ease the consequences of denunciation, that denunciation should terminate the first phase of the conversations, and that the second phase should not be started immediately thereafter, we all seriously doubt the wisdom of further insisting upon the procedure outlined in Department’s 22, November 15, 6 p.m. regarding a future meeting. It is, in our opinion, most important that we do nothing to make it appear that we do not want an agreement of any kind and are even unwilling to pave the way now or in the future for a settlement consistent with the fundamentals of our position.
The British fully recognize the logic of the attitude taken by the American Government with regard to the termination of the present phase of the conversations, but our reluctance to agree now to a resumption at a fixed date has troubled them and aroused certain misgivings as to our desire to achieve an agreement. In view of their repeated assurances of desire to cooperate with us and their understanding with us that they would not propose any agreement to Japan unacceptable to us, the British feel that we should be willing to have them at least explore further the basis upon which we may agree to reconvene after the denunciation with some hope of reaching a subsequent agreement. They evidently would now prefer the present conversations to end without attempting to attach guilt to any individual party and by fixing a date for the resumption of the conversations make it possible for the Japanese on their return home to make clear to Tokyo, on the basis of their London experience, what faces Japan if she continues to insist on a policy of absolute isolation, thus paving the way for their return to the conversations at the date determined in a different frame of mind.
There is therefore reason to believe that the British may propose to adjourn the present conversations on the eve of Japanese denunciation and simultaneously suggest a fixed date for 1935 preparatory naval conversations, thereby avoiding the onus of a complete failure of the conversations which they have initiated, and particularly a blow up upon Japanese denunciation. This they also contend is the only way to avoid the question of responsibility for calling a new meeting which no power would wish to assume, and to diminish the risk of no conference and no future naval agreement; which public opinion here increasingly demands.
The British are in the complicated position that they cannot get the kind of agreement with us that they would like and they cannot afford to make an agreement with Japan without us. They, therefore, have every reason of cooperating with us without any commitment on [Page 390] our part or of taking an independent course and thus endeavor to retain the friendship of both Japan and the United States. I am satisfied that they prefer, and that it is in their interest to cooperate with us even without a commitment, and that they will do so, unless we impose conditions of cooperation which will make it too politically difficult for them to accept, because the second alternative is uncertain and precarious.
There are increasing evidences that Yamamoto as well as Matsudaira is now [convinced] that Japan is making a seriously false move but they are helpless at this time to rectify the Japanese position to any appreciable extent. Their efforts therefore will be directed towards securing agreement to an adjournment on such conditions as may permit the Japanese Government later to modify its position. Furthermore if the Japanese are wise, they won’t, if they can help it, get caught in the position of having their denunciation terminate the conversations and thus will favor an adjournment for a fixed period just before denunciation. Moreover Yamamoto announced yesterday that “abrogation does not constitute a reason for my giving up my work here”.
Accordingly if and when the British are willing to continue the initiative and accept the major responsibility of making a proposal for preparatory naval conversations in 1935, I suggest it will be virtually impossible for us to avoid acceptance and therefore urge that I be authorized to reply immediately to the British that the United States Government agrees to such conversations, provided they are preparatory conversations called under the provisions of the Washington Treaty and/or the London Treaty and are not in fact a continuance of the present discussions. Concurrently I urge that I be authorized immediately upon acceptance of the British proposal on such a basis to inform the press simultaneously with the Department.