Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A5/337

Memorandum of Conversation Between the American and British Delegations at the House of Commons on December 4, 1934, at 4 p.m.³⁰

London, December 4, 1934, 4 p.m.

Present for the U. S.	Present for Great Britain
Mr. Davis	The Prime Minister
Admiral Standley	Sir John Simon
Mr. Atherton	Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell
Mr. Dooman30a	Admiral Chatfield
Commander Schuirmann	Admiral Little
Mr. Field	Mr. Craigie
	Sir Warren Fisher
	Commander Hodsoll

Mr. Davis: I asked for the meeting today because of the pending denunciation of the Washington Treaty by Japan, which, according to our latest information, may be moved up, instead of waiting until the end of the month. That will so completely change the situation that we feel we ought to have a meeting to discuss procedure after official notice has been given. While we have been in agreement with you as to objectives and principles, there has been a difference as to methods and tactics. We have been quite willing for you to go along with the conversations as long as you think it advisable and as long as the Japanese show a desire to continue them; but denunciation would so change the situation from what it was when we met that our Government feels that if and when Japan does denounce, it would cause a clean break, and so change the situation as to make it inadvisable, if not impossible, to continue further with the conversations. If you think that anything can be accomplished now, and that the Japanese representatives are in a position to accommodate themselves to a settlement, the only thing I can suggest is for you to try to persuade the Japanese to postpone their denunciation.

Mr. Craigie: You understand that the date has been advanced.

Mr. Davis: Mr. Dooman was told yesterday by Mr. Kato that it would probably be on the 12th.

Mr. Craigie: Our present information is that the proceedings before the Council will take a fortnight.

Sir Bolton: Do you think denunciation would make a great difference in the United States?

Mr. Davis: Why, I think it would make a very great difference. We came here to discuss a renewal of the London Treaty. It is true we had advance notice that Japan intended to denounce, and when we learned later, here, that it was an irrevocable decision, we realized that this would very seriously complicate the situation. We were none the less ready for you in the meantime to go ahead and try out a face saving formula, providing it meant no fundamental change in the Washington Treaty. You remember that after the last full meeting³¹ you felt this formula would not be acceptable, and you stated that you were in favor of a further effort, which you called the middle course. I explained I had no authority to discuss the middle course, and you asked me to submit it to Washington, which I did. Then in the meeting with the Prime Minister and Sir John Simon, the other day,³² I explained that my government felt that irrespective of any intrinsic merits the middle course might have, it would be very bad tactics to go ahead, in the face of denunciation, and that it would be best to have a clean break and take up the question at a later date. Now, if the Japanese want to go on with the talks, the only way is for them to postpone denunciation.

Sir John: I think we must take it that it is not only the fixed, but the declared, intention of Japan to give notice before the end of the current year. It does not look as though they could be persuaded not to do that. But I had never heard that they were going to advance the date.

Mr. Davis: If the Japanese had said “We feel that we need certain modifications, failing which we would have to denounce”, it would have been much easier; but they have held denunciation as a hammer over our head, without even sitting down and talking it over with both of us beforehand; they have decided arbitrarily to destroy the peace structure and collective system set up in the Far East. If we immediately proceed now to negotiate, after formal notice of denunciation, there is no escape from the conclusion that the United States and Great Britain are giving tacit approval to denunciation, or are at least recognizing its justification.

At the first meeting last summer, the Prime Minister brought up as his first point that the cardinal policy of both governments should be the maintenance of the Washington Treaty and the discouragement of denunciation in every possible way.³³

Mr. MacDonald: Yes, but apparently we have failed. I have been reading the extracts of the Japanese press, and there is no indication that the Japanese are aware of the situation they have gotten themselves into. It is most difficult. Have you been thinking about the problem, Simon?

Sir John: I quite see that if the Japanese give notice before the end of the year it does raise a serious question. However, I have not felt myself that we were in a position of weakness because of the pending denunciation. We have known that it was coming for a long time, in fact we got the first hint from the United States. It is not exactly a new fact. I feel strongly that if we once let those people go, we shall not be better off, to say the least.

Mr. Davis: I am not asking you to send them away. If they don’t want to terminate the conversations, it is up to them. I think you have rendered a service in your efforts during these conversations; you have clarified in their minds what you consider are the wider issues involved; you have brought up the question of the integrity of China; we have nothing but praise for your efforts. On the other hand, I don’t see how either one of us can construe denunciation as anything other than a determination on the part of Japan to end the talks. It is Japan’s act which ends them. I don’t see how you, as hosts, having asked the two of us for conversations on a specific basis, can come to any other conclusion than that since one of the parties you invited has acted in such manner as to break up the conversations, there is nothing to do but adjourn.

Sir Bolton: If they went away, Mr. Davis, how would you resume again?

Mr. Davis: That is something we would have to consider. One thing might be for us to adjourn with no agreement as to when to meet again, but with an understanding that any time one of the Powers has a proposal and thinks he might do something, or that Japan shows a desire to get together, there would be another meeting.

Mr. MacDonald: One thing I can’t make up my mind to face is this: Suppose these talks break up as a result of denunciation, don’t think for a moment that as long as I am Prime Minister I will ask the Japanese to come again; we would at once give them the opportunity to say “Cock-a-doodle-doo! They are asking us to come again!” Any resumption would have to be on Japan’s invitation.

Mr. Davis: I feel that under the circumstances I am prepared myself to tell the Japanese that, while we are not taking a direct part in your efforts to find some basis of understanding with them, we are quite willing to have these talks continue as long as the Japanese want them to, but that this can only take place if denunciation is delayed, since denunciation would automatically constitute termination.

Sir John: That would be helpful, as I shall see Matsudaira also.

Mr. MacDonald: I would like to ask Admiral Standley, have you done your best to get Yamamoto to be reasonable and see the awful situation in which he is putting his country? My first impression of Yamamoto was that he was perfectly hopeless to deal with; that he had been fortified by those extraordinary demonstrations upon his departure from Japan, when he was the good, patriotic seaman, and when it was a question of suicide if he did not go along with the extremists. I have come to modify that conclusion, and to believe that he actually does want an agreement, but that having done his duty to bluff both of us, and having found it was no good hoping to change our views, he may be in a mood where we may now be able to get something out of him. But there is this, Admiral: He has a great affection for the seamen—he likes private conversation only with a fellow seaman—and I am wondering if he has made any attempt with you?

Admiral Standley: Yes I have had very interesting conversations with him, in fact he won my money at bridge once or twice. I found him very human; but he is not entirely free. He is bound by what his navy is willing to do. I have very recently had a conversation with him of his own seeking, in which he spoke very frankly and indicated that they are anxious to have some sort of understanding, but are absolutely committed to denunciation.

(Admiral Standley here briefly outlined his impressions of Yamamoto’s present views, but requested that no notes be taken, in view of the very personal nature of the talk.)

Mr. MacDonald: My predominant aim is to keep the peace of the world. War is like seasickness; once begun it never ends. If you once break peace under present day conditions, you are no longer dealing with three or four Powers which can control the forces of destruction which have been let loose; on the contrary, there are now so many states involved that there is no man on earth who can control the situation. There are two very horrible things we face, one, denunciation of the Washington Treaty—I can’t conceive of anything worse, and I want to control it and its results if I can; and, two, if we break down here, neither of us can say to Japan within the next six or seven years “I would like to have a conference with you”; our pride will prevent us from doing that. Just look at the gap which would be left in the Pacific peace structure. I share with you the horror of the consequences of denunciation, but I don’t want to let matters slip and slip until both of us have to bring our navies into the Pacific. I think, in fact, our navy would be there before yours.

Mr. Davis: I feel about denunciation as you do. It seemed to me as I stated at our last meeting that neither one of us had impressed upon Japan sufficiently what a terrible thing she was proposing to do. I thought that instead of discussing technical questions for which they were destroying the basis, it would be better for us to concentrate on an appeal to Japan not to destroy that basis; it seemed to me that the moral pressure of our two great nations might have an effect. There are no two countries in the world that have a greater desire and interest in promoting peace than the United States and Great Britain. If Matsudaira and Yamamoto could do what they felt was in the interest of their own country, the situation would probably be changed, and we might have an agreement. But it is a question whether you are going to have peace more easily by trying to make a settlement with people who are hamstrung, or by saying to them “You go home now and let us try again later”.

Mr. MacDonald: We cannot negotiate an agreement now, I see that. But what I would like to do is to come to an understanding before they go home—not an agreement—as to a basis for a new agreement at a conference.

Sir John: In a way, I think it is a more terrible problem for us than for the United States. In any case, it is very serious for both of us. To my way of thinking, it is a question of the choice of risks. We are not being taken by surprise. Denunciation is a very grave step, and we have already emphasized that to the Japanese. But notice of denunciation is not the same as actual termination. Mr. Davis is impressed with the idea that we are actually encouraging these people if we are willing to confer with them when they are so determined to denounce. I quite see that risk. But is not the other risk greater? The worst thing of everything would be to make further conversations impossible. Then the door would be shut and could never be reopened. What would be the reaction in the press of the world—I won’t even guarantee the reaction in our own press—if we let this thing break up? One of our difficulties is that we have a free press just as you do, which we cannot control. Japan’s extremists, I fear, would control her press and there would be bonfires on the return of the Japanese Delegation. I don’t like facing the second risk until we are quite certain that all other possibilities are exhausted.

Mr. MacDonald: That is generally my feeling also.

Mr. Davis: We have been trying for six weeks, and have made very real and determined efforts, to find something to save the situation, but I don’t think you have any hope yourself that you can do it now, have you?

Sir Bolton: I have a feeling that the Japanese, although they have quite decided to denounce, feel that they have got nothing out of it, because neither of us has agreed to the common upper limit. I am not at all sure that they are very happy about it. I feel that Yamamoto is far more anxious to come to an accommodation if he possibly can.

Mr. MacDonald: I have very little hope, but if you ask me have I no hope, I should say “Oh, no, that is not the situation; I don’t think it is quite hopeless yet”. I can’t help feeling that there is something in Yamamoto that we have not yet found out.

Mr. Davis: I feel, if Yamamoto had the authority, or the influence, we could get further, but that he would not have been picked by the navy to come here if they had not considered him as their man. But the impact of our two Powers standing together has made a tremendous impression on him, and if he can go back now, under that influence, he can do more to bring his people around than he could ever do by cable.

But this matter of denunciation is a pretty good test for Japan, if she really does want to continue. Matsudaira had told you, and has told me, that they want to continue. Now, if you told them, and we told them, that we would be glad to do that, if they did nothing to put an end to the talks, but that if they did denounce, it would actually mean termination,—it would put it squarely up to them to end the conversations or to keep them going. It would be more effective, in talking to them, if you were to emphasize this as the British view, rather than to tell them that it is only the American position. Even if the Japanese decision for ultimate denunciation is irrevocable, I do not see that there is any reason to denounce while the conversations are in progress.

Mr. MacDonald: For two years after denunciation you will still have a chance for a settlement.

Mr. Davis: Certainly. I want you to understand I do feel there is a lot in your point that no one would want to take the responsibility for reconvening; but we could say that we would be glad to meet again when Japan asks for a meeting.

Sir Bolton: We are bound to meet within a year, under the Washington Treaty.

Admiral Standley: The same thing holds in connection with the London Treaty.

Mr. Davis: Well, we don’t have to meet if we all agree not to meet.

Sir John: It does not follow, because a man gives notice to terminate a lease that he intends to cease being a tenant. It merely means that he wants to discuss new terms. That is a recognized practice among business men. Notice of denunciation is merely notice that the Japanese want to discuss a revision and want to create a more fluid situation for such discussion. I cannot but feel that it is rather foolish to consider such notice as the end of the world.

Mr. Davis: Oh, I don’t say that at all. We cannot and do not want to force Japan into an agreement. But if she really wants an agreement, and has the power to reach an agreement along lines which would be essential for both of us, then she surely has the power to move a little more rapidly in the present conversations and at the same time postpone a little the date of denunciation. That would be the acid test.

Mr. MacDonald: The Japanese Government is a combination of navy and army; the civilian element is kicking against it, but is still in a minority. Now, the estimate of Matsudaira is “I can do nothing for two years; I think what Japan is going to do is bad, but I do not think it will be violent; the dominant opinion may take two years to calm down and to abdicate, and after that we can reach a settlement”. Well, whatever the truth of that may be it would be awfully foolish of us to refuse ourselves the opportunity of keeping in touch with this interesting and very virile little people. I think it might not be very difficult to get the Japanese Delegation to agree to some sort of a recommendation to their government which would enable them to go home, but you have to take care that it is not something which is going to make flags fly. If we can get them to recommend something which is good in its general tendency, we should take the opportunity.

Mr. Davis: Just in the last day or two I have received the impression that the Japanese are laboring under the idea that perhaps they had better accelerate their denunciation, since it might make their negotiations easier later on. If so, I think it would be helpful to let them know that it would not.

Sir John: We have no doubt whatsoever that denunciation would make things more difficult. I feel we have not quite tried out all possibilities on the Japanese. I would like to try out the idea with them, Mr. Prime Minister.

Mr. MacDonald: Before breaking off I would like to be able to tell the King that we have left the Japanese under no misapprehensions and that we have tried every possible way to bring them around. But I don’t feel I could say that if we were to break right now.

Mr. Davis: If they would postpone denunciation until the end of the year, that would give us three weeks, and we could do a lot in that time. I feel, in view of Matsudaira’s statements that they wish to continue, that I probably should say to him, “Well, you told me you wanted to continue; on the other hand, Kato told Dooman you were going to advance denunciation; I should point out to you that that would change the whole thing and we would consider denunciation as termination”.³⁴

Mr. MacDonald: I should certainly aid and abet you in saying these last words, but we do not want to speak for you. It would not be fair to either of us.

Sir John: There is this distinction: The earliest effective date is the 31st. Notice today won’t have the effect of bringing the treaty to an end any earlier. They lost nothing by postponement; except for domestic considerations there is no point in premature denunciation.

Mr. Davis: I have heard the opinion expressed that denunciation was not so much based on Japan’s desire to get a modification as in order to force both of us to sit down and discuss the political situation.

Mr. MacDonald: Oh, if that is the case, they are miscalculating.

Sir John: It is fair to remember that the Japanese have always insisted that they don’t want to confuse political and naval issues.

Mr. Dooman: They now have a tendency to admit that the ratio question is a political question.

Mr. MacDonald: Yes; it is like the man who says “I love you dearly, but I hope you won’t mind if I chop off your head”. Well, we have to go to another meeting now. I understand, then, that you will see Matsudaira, and we will see him, and then we will see each other again. By the way, when are you taking passage?

Mr. Davis: I have not taken it.

Mr. MacDonald: We thought you were going back for Christmas.

Mr. Davis: Well, we hoped to, but if the conversations are to go on, then we will have to stay.

30. Transmitted to the Department by Mr. Field, secretary of the American delegation, in his despatch of December 7; received December 17. Apparently these are minutes written by Mr. Field, not agreed minutes with the British.
31. Eugene H. Dooman of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
31. November 14, 1934; for minutes of this meeting, see p. 334.
32. November 23, 1934; see p. 368.
33. See telegram No. 332, June 18, 10 p.m., from the Ambassador in Great Britain, p. 259.
34. Mr. Davis took this course of action in his talk with the Japanese delegate on December 5, 1934; see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 268.