500.A15A5/266: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)
25. Your 41, November 16, 9 p.m., and all previous. The following may help in showing you the way our minds have been running here.
A review of the conversations to date convinces us that a definite and obvious common alignment of British and American viewpoints as a symbol of coincidence of view between them on the subject of naval limitation—which is the subject for consideration in these conversations—and of future cooperation between them offers greater promise of eventual success than any current search for a formula to salvage portions of the existing naval treaties. A termination of the present conversations on the clear cut basis of a Japanese denunciation of the treaty and their insistence that they are not able to agree to a prolongation of the present system of limitations embodied in the treaties, and effected without a counterbalancing gain to them in the form of new commitments either by the British or by us or by both, would contribute toward convincing the Japanese leaders and people that their militarists who had dictated the policy of denunciation of the Washington Treaty had had their way in that particular but had failed to achieve in the place of the treaty any diplomatic gain. It would also give new evidence that Japan’s official views and course of action are out of line with the views and objectives of the [Page 354] two most powerful of the great Powers, among and with whom they aspire to be ranked and associated. If this were followed by prompt concrete indication of the definite intent to build to full treaty strength by the United States and Great Britain, we feel that the moment might arrive soon when Japanese apprehensions would lead them to take a new initiative by themselves proposing further consideration of naval disarmament, in which event the advantage in the ensuing conversations would lie with the Governments which really desire disarmament. Matsudaira’s statement to you of recent date94 seems to be in line with this conjecture and to give support to our estimate of possible developments after the termination of the present conversations.
A continuation on the part of the British to endeavor to play the role of middle man will only result in increasing suspicion and resentment here. If it should further lead to any bilateral agreement or compromise agreement which would encourage the Japanese to believe that they had driven an effective wedge between the British and the United States, it would make them more self-confident than ever and would probably encourage them to embark upon new courses of aggression in the Far East which if pursued would be as menacing to British interests as to American and would make more complicated and dangerous the whole situation in the Far East.
The course thus seems clear for us to expend our best efforts to bring about an early open and conclusive indication of alignment between the British and ourselves. The making of any new tripartite agreement at this time, on the heels of or coincident with Japanese denunciation of the treaty and destruction of commitment to the present ratios—for which we and the British have stood—would have the same effect but in greater degree.
We believe that the present conversations should not be permitted to develop into a negotiation.
We do not accept the view that termination of these conversations now or before December first need result in necessity for us to call a conference. See for information and guidance our 22, November 15, 6 p.m.
Please expound, as on your own responsibility and avoiding anything suggestive of a desire on our part to bring the conversations abruptly to an end, the above line of thought.
More definite instruction as to our position in the light of your 41, November 16, 9 p.m., will be sent you as soon as possible.