500.A15A5/266: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 16—7:35 p.m.]
41. After reflection and discussions among ourselves and with some of the British with regard to the questions raised in the last meeting with the British (reported in my 37, November 15, 8 a.m.93) I wish to submit the following observations and conclusions.
- A.
- The British now agree with us that since Japan has repeatedly informed us of her unalterable decision to denounce the Washington Treaty, it would be unrealistic from now on to continue the negotiations without accepting at face value the Japanese decision and proceeding on the basis of such denunciation.
- B.
- That group within the British Cabinet who are particularly fearful of the European situation, from which Great Britain cannot detach herself, and who feel that it is of vital importance in some form to bind and limit Japan by agreement, are at present largely controlling the course of negotiations. The predominant opinion even in that group, however, is that in any such agreement with Japan it is vitally important that the United States should be a party. The British are thus anxious that we should go along with them in the discussion of such a program but, if not, that we should at least agree for them to explore all possibilities, keeping us informed of every move. It is for that reason that they frankly outlined the so called “middle course”.
We have thus reached a situation where I feel that we need your instructions on certain definite questions.
- (1)
- Can we agree to go along with the British in discussing with the Japanese some such “middle course” proposal as was outlined to us at our last meeting?
- (2)
- If the answer is in the affirmative what are the conditions we must insist upon, particularly with respect to qualitative limitation, without any quantitative limitation?
- (3)
- If we cannot cooperate along the lines of a “middle course”, how shall we proceed, bearing in mind that denunciation will otherwise make it difficult to avoid a new conference, under article XXIII of the Washington Treaty?
I personally think that the wisest course would be for us to go along with the British as under (1) above, with proper precautions and safeguards. Thus, the British take the primary responsibility and we safeguard our position by preventing them from acting as mediator and later proposing something that would be embarrassing to us. [Page 352] In keeping this on the British doorstep we may avoid a possible responsibility that might otherwise devolve upon us under article XXIII of the Washington Treaty. We should furthermore bear in mind that, in the event of a conference to be called as a result of a denunciation of the Washington Treaty, presumably preliminary conversations would be necessary, in which case we could not well avoid such discussions.
If you decide that we shall acquiesce in the middle course proposed by the British as a basis of further discussion, I suggest for your consideration the following:
- 1.
- If there is to be included in the “middle course” a statement of the respective building programs either to be embodied in a treaty or by unilateral undertaking, these programs should maintain the present ratios and failing that, any statement of building programs should be eliminated altogether, and it should be understood that we are free as to quantitative construction within such qualitative limitations as may be agreed upon.
- 2.
- If it should be deemed advisable to maintain the present provisions for non-fortification of bases in the Far East, we might, in agreement with the British (as Simon has suggested to me) make it a condition that there be an additional provision granting the right of full and free inspection.
Since the present naval treaties are based on political agreements as to certain principles and policies, we might reserve the right in connection with any new naval treaty to reexamine any question, political or otherwise, which would be involved in or affected by such a treaty.
The impending Japanese denunciation of the Washington Treaty of course adds considerably to the complications of the situation. It is difficult to accept it as a fait accompli, and difficult to ignore it. It would in a way simplify the problem if the Japanese should go ahead and give notification of denunciation but, if we are to continue to negotiate before they denounce it is important to have a clear understanding as to the bases of the negotiations and that we are not negotiating a modification of that treaty.
I had been inclined to favor an early adjournment if it could be done without our taking the responsibility for it, thinking perhaps that we could meet under better auspices after denunciation. However, I am now more inclined to think it wiser to permit the negotiations to continue under British initiative and responsibility (particularly since the British favor it and the Japanese are apparently willing to go ahead) in the hope that we may be able to clear up the matter one way or another.
If we are to participate even indirectly in negotiations for an entirely new agreement it would seem important, for political reasons, [Page 353] to avoid the impression that we are considering modifications in the present agreement and thus making concessions to Japan. It should be made publicly known that the Japanese have announced to the British Government and ourselves their definite intention to denounce the Washington Treaty and their determination not to continue bound by the ratios and principles embodied in both the Washington and London Treaties, and that this decision is reluctantly accepted as final. Also that the Japanese have presented certain proposals predicated upon the abandonment of the principles embodied in the present system of naval limitation and intended to form the basis of a new treaty of limitation; that these proposals the British and ourselves have been unable to accept and that we have accordingly decided to explore the possibilities of an entirely new agreement.
It might be well to consider whether it would be advisable for the British and ourselves, and perhaps the Japanese, to agree upon a public statement setting forth these facts.