500.A15A4/2589: Telegram (part air)
The American Delegate ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 6—9:50 a.m.]
936. Reference my despatch of September 27th mailed on Europa September 29th. Since then Litvinov addressed a letter to Sandler, (My telegram No. 935, September 27, noon). The letter has given rise to much discussion as to the real meaning of Litvinov’s move and may well raise the fundamental question of how the disarmament movement will be dealt with. Litvinov would appear to have been motivated by three major considerations: (1) his fear of trouble with Japan coupled with the desire that the Russian western front be protected in the event of such trouble, (2) his desire that the United States will be in an organization such as his “peace commission” shortly [so that?] in the event of trouble between the Soviets and Japan consultation may normally be expected from us, (3) his conviction that disarmament for the time being at least is out of the question; that in any case Russia is not going to disarm in the face of the Japanese and German situations. Litvinov is, therefore, embarrassed by continuous discussion on disarmament in view of the very radical position which the Soviet delegation has taken on this question in the past.
Litvinov’s desire would appear to be to set up a permanent peace organization of which the United States is a member so that Japan [Page 153] and Germany would be confronted with the knowledge that the “peaceful-minded states” are jointly and continuously scrutinizing the situation and are on their guard. His original conception was limited to the foregoing. However, after numerous conversations in which he discovered that many states were unwilling completely to abandon disarmament efforts, he included in his declaration before the Assembly that one of the duties of the permanent peace organization should be to continue the attempts towards disarmament.
In a recent conversation with Aubert he pointed out to me that what we had been discussing, namely the possibility of a limited treaty within the scope of the Conference and what Litvinov was proposing, were compatible and merely different means of reaching a similar end. I told Aubert that I had no information as to how my Government regarded Litvinov’s suggestion that personally I could see difficulties from our point of view in following such a course. I added that my Government might feel that whereas it would be normal to negotiate specific and limited protocols under the Conference, to ask the United States to join the “permanent peace” organization would face our President with a political decision of high importance, this especially since no one could predict with what type of questions the peace organization would occupy itself. It might even take up the question of Austria, the Saar, or the Polish Corridor as dangerous to peace and try to solve them in such a committee. I added that if the states in Europe preferred to adopt the path which the Russians suggested it might, of course, be possible for such an organization to institute specific negotiations of a definite character in which case we might be able to cooperate in the same fashion that we do now on subjects of interest to us. However, the simpler path for us possibly would be that which involved no new political decision.
In connection with the preceding paragraph I feel that if a permanent Disarmament Commission received a mandate to endeavor to carry on with the objectives of the Disarmament Conference, a mandate which it is very probable would be given to any permanent body, such a mandate would commit us no further than is already the case under the Disarmament Conference. A new body with a fresh mandate of a political character might commit us further than we desire.
Presumably the suggestion of Litvinov will be considered at the next meeting of the Council which it is anticipated will be called approximately November 10. It is possible that at the same time a meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference will also be summoned. It would be helpful to have your comments on this situation at as early a date as possible.
Copy to London for Mr. Davis.