Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I

500.A15A4/2587

The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

No. 101

Geneva, September 27, 1934.
[Received October 5.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction dated August 23, 1934, in regard to the Draft Articles for the Regulation of the Trade in and Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War and to express my appreciation of the most helpful comments therein contained.

Applying to practical purposes at Geneva the line of thought presented in my confidential letter to the Secretary of September 22,⁷³ there is a general impression here among the Delegates that any immediate consideration of the disarmament problem in its broader phases would not only be useless, but actually dangerous.

The question then arises as to whether the President of the Conference should call a Bureau meeting in the near future. If a meeting is called there appear to be several alternative courses of action which might be followed:

1. The Conference should be terminated with a report to the Council and with the request that that body consider the situation in the light of changed events and come to a decision as to how the States Members of the League might fulfill their obligations under Article 8 of the Covenant;

2. The situation should be met by a continued series of adjournments or an indefinite postponement of the Bureau and General Commission of the Conference in the hopes that the situation in Europe will so change in the near future that work can again be hopefully undertaken;

3. The Bureau should be convened, perhaps in November, the Commission set up, and an endeavor made to write the Convention as far as may be possible without Germany and in the face of the completely negative attitude of Italy and Japan.

4. The Bureau should be summoned for November when the situation should be frankly faced and the Conference instructed to turn to the accomplishment of such definite and tangible objectives as are capable of being written into autonomous treaties which, with certain additions might later form a part of a general disarmament convention.

Before the Assembly met there was a certain current of opinion in favor of the first alternative. As the idea gained ground, however, that an admission of complete failure would play into the hands of Germany in its supposed desire to disrupt the Conference and weaken the League of Nations, this idea was abandoned, at least for the time being. As for the second alternative, the procedure unsuccessfully pursued to date, it would appear to have all the objections of the first and to be an even less courageous method. As to the third alternative, I am constrained to state that endeavors to carry on the work of writing a general convention are now so surrounded by an atmosphere of unreality that I cannot conceive any useful purpose would be served by pursuing this course.

Having reached this conclusion and having been much influenced thereto by the thought which apparently lies behind your instruction to prepare a text on the manufacture of and trade in arms which could stand alone, not be a part of a general convention, I took many occasions to sound out the views of members of other Delegations on this subject. I did not, of course, intimate that my Government had made any suggestion of this nature and maintained the discussion on a purely personal basis and as a means of clarifying my own thoughts. I was surprised to learn how many of the Delegates, impressed with the dangers of both failure and adjournment, were approaching the problem from a similar point of view. There appeared also a considerable measure of accord that accomplishment was possible only in a very limited field. In fact as one looks over the Draft Convention, there would appear to be only three subjects, aside from naval questions which are being treated separately, on which a measure of accord might be possible under present circumstances. They are:

1. Manufacture of and trade in arms;

2. Publicity on budgetary expenditure;

3. The establishment of a permanent body whose primary function would be the supervision and control of the foregoing.

The first and third items are intimately related. Likewise publicity of national budgetary expenditure has a sufficient association with (1) and (3) to warrant the belief that these three aspects of the disarmament problem could be satisfactorily grouped together in a convention of limited objectives.

In stating that these are the only subjects which give ground for the belief that there is possibility of agreement, I am aware that on numerous other subjects accord is apparent. I do not believe, however, that such accord is real. For example, in the case of the abolition of gas warfare, France and other States have always insisted that such abolition is contingent upon an agreement whereby methods of coercion will be used against any State violating its undertakings. To carry on discussions of such a solution would mean embarking upon discussions of the political questions involved. The question of bombing from the air is rather in a separate category. As you will remember the British have made a reservation which has never been officially withdrawn. The Italians likewise have stated that they would only accept the complete abolition of bombing from the air if capital ships and submarines are abolished. A limited agreement whereby States undertake not to bomb civilian populations might perhaps be possible.

You will remember that a year and a half ago we considered and discussed with some of the Delegations the advisability of attempting a treaty of limited objective.⁷⁴ But at that time we contemplated some reductions of existing maximum sizes of armament, and still entertained the hope that definite decisions could be taken on these matters in view of the fact that we were suggesting merely partial solutions of the problem. It is now, unfortunately, clear that even partial solutions of these semi-political problems are impossible at the present time. On the other hand, public opinion in most countries, at the time when a treaty of limited objectives was envisaged, had higher hopes for the ultimate solution of the larger issues involved. Today these hopes appear to have diminished. Public interest has perhaps turned from the consideration of disarmament as a whole: the aspect of the disarmament question which now seems uppermost in the public mind relates to the control of the manufacture of arms, which, to many, seems the only one capable of solution in the present troubled political situation. Thus I believe that any accomplishment along these lines would be hailed as a definite step forward and, through the establishment of a permanent body of supervision, might provide the machinery for the preparation of a more general convention under more auspicious circumstances in the future.

Both the British and the French, as well as other Delegations, seem to be in general accord with this analysis and disposed to make an attempt, if the United States is also willing. Eden has specifically requested me to keep him informed of my Government’s views on the subject after I had submitted this question to you, and hoped that we could later discuss it before the Bureau meeting. Aubert made the same request and volunteered the personal suggestion that if we were disposed to follow this procedure, the question of such a treaty might be made one of the items on Barthou’s agenda for his visit to Rome.

On the other hand the attitude of Italy appears to be a definite obstacle to the realization of such a treaty. As you will recall, the Italian Delegation has steadfastly refused to play an active part in the Conference since the departure of Germany. Nevertheless the present attitude of Italy is tending toward a closer cooperation with the French and it might be that French influence could prevail upon Italy to cooperate in this procedure, if we could reach a prior understanding with the French in this respect.

I have had some talks with unofficial Germans in Geneva and expect to see Schnee and Hasselmaier at the end of the week. Those with whom I have spoken have expressed deep interest in the clauses of manufacture of and trade in armaments. It is not to be expected that the Germans will return to Geneva and participate in any way or in any of the organs of the Conference on Disarmament until their major political questions are solved. On the other hand, it might be possible during the course of negotiations on a limited treaty to obtain from time to time the views of the Germans on the various factors thereof in the hope that they might be willing to adhere to this limited product of the Conference. The matter of Germany’s position is of prime importance, since obviously a treaty on this subject would be impracticable without Germany’s participation.

Also there is no use hiding the fact that Japan’s position is dubious. Japan has stated repeatedly that it will tolerate no form of inspection.

I believe that the Department in coming to a decision on this work should weigh fully the fact that due to the attitude of one or another of the three above mentioned States (Italy, Germany, Japan), a treaty may never come into being.

If you believe, however, that such a limited treaty should constitute the Conference’s objective, it is obvious, and I suppose that it is well realized by the Department, that the United States has been the initiator in the case of the present Draft Articles. Therefore it logically follows that other Delegations would continue to look upon the United States as the leader in the necessary modifications of these Draft Articles so that they might stand alone. In taking the initiative and suggesting changes in these Articles, it must, of course, be realized that such initiative implies the proposal that the Conference cannot continue in its present form and must limit its objectives. In view of the responsibility which would be ours for suggesting means which might in fact constitute a breakdown of the Conference in its present form, you may consider it preferable to defer taking such initiative until its fate has been decided. On the other hand, if the Conference once admits complete failure, it may be difficult to get the States together even for a limited objective.

We in the Delegation are of course endeavoring to carry out your instructions as to a revision of the clauses on the manufacture of and trade in arms and I hope within the next week or ten days to be able to send you a draft of such revision. We have been necessarily delayed in this matter both by the pressure of other work and the fact that Colonel Strong will not be fit for consultation for another few days.

I am sending this information by mail rather than by telegram as I wish to feel free to put it to you in some detail. Inasmuch as Barthou’s visit to Borne will take place about the middle of October, it will be helpful if you could send me by cable any advice for my guidance.

Respectfully yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

73. Not found in Department files.
74. See Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 22–42 passim.