500.A15A4 General Committee/760: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
London, January 29, 1934—7 p.m.
[Received January 29—5:40 p.m.]
[Received January 29—5:40 p.m.]
23. In an informal conversation this afternoon the Prime Minister discussed:
- (1)
- The general demoralization of world trade through increasing establishment of bilateral agreements and quotas which he deplored but recognized as successful temporary expedients. The correction of this situation he felt might well lie in a future meeting of the Economic Conference,46 but every advice he had received from [Page 16] abroad indicated that foreign capitals regarded a future meeting as futile until the question of foreign exchange had reached a less uncertain point than at present. The Prime Minister said he would welcome any suggestions you might have to offer.
- (2)
- He then referred to the British memorandum mentioned in my 21, January 29, 1 p.m., the text of which he said had been discussed with the French Government on Saturday last.47 This was the third time, he pointed out, that a French Government had fallen48 just after Anglo-French accord had been reached on a comprehensive disarmament scheme. The Prime Minister added that he personally did not trust Hitler, and felt the German-Polish Pact,49 just completed, merely was a guarantee that for 10 years that Germany would concentrate more determinedly on issues along her other frontiers.
- (3)
- Then he referred to the official announcement made last week that Japan would seek a change of ratio when the Naval Treaty50 comes up for revision, and stated that I might inform you very confidentially that England had already begun to study her naval program for 1935. The Prime Minister pointed out the British Fleet was necessarily stationed over many waters, while the American Fleet was divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, although connected by the Panama Canal, but the Japanese Fleet was “concentrated in a narrow lane in the north Pacific”, and that while equality between the United States and Great Britain would never be an issue, England could never permit an equal naval ratio to Japan. However, if England and the United States refused revision of the naval ratio then Japan would claim the London Naval Treaty terminated in 1935 and free to construct [sic]. “What then[?]” asked the Prime Minister. “Our two Governments must shortly undertake an exchange of views between duly qualified officials, but the inception of these conversations must remain secret in so far as possible.”51
Atherton
- For correspondence relating to the Monetary and Economic Conference, London, June 12–July 27, 1933, see ibid., 1933, vol. i, pp. 452 ff.↩
- January 27.↩
- The second ministry of Camille Chautemps had resigned on January 27; it was succeeded on January 30 by the second ministry of Edouard Daladier.↩
- Signed January 26, 1934; for text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxvii, p. 495.↩
- Signed at London April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.↩
- For correspondence concerning preliminary naval conversations, see pp. 217 ff.↩