500.A15A4 General Committee/759: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 29—12:45 p.m.]
21. I called on Foreign Secretary by appointment this morning (Eden also present) who opened the conversation by warmly commending Henderson’s work as President of the Disarmament Conference. He spoke less enthusiastically of Beneš and Politis whose views he felt were influenced by their nationalism. Simon then referred to his conversations with Mussolini on January 3rd and 4th and stated that he learned then the tenor but not the text of the communications that had been exchanged between Rome and Berlin. On January 3rd Mussolini had informed Simon of his intention shortly to make a public statement and also at another period of this conversation had stated that he was a realist and recognized that no European disarmament was likely. In reply to the latter Simon stated frankly this view could not be accepted by the British Government, and, to his satisfaction, on the following day received a promise from Mussolini not to make any public statement until, anyway, the awaited German replies had been received by London and Paris. Which in fact took place on January 19th. Consequently since January 19th Simon pointed out, Mussolini has been free to make a public statement.39
[Page 14]Simon continued that in the House of Commons this afternoon he would reply to a question in brief substance as follows: “Refer to the once again parallel and bilateral diplomatic disarmament negotiations which had been going on since late November, to his own personal visits to Paris and Rome, and to memoranda which had been exchanged, and then announce that considered British views had been set forth in a memorandum which had been despatched to interested British missions in Europe today for delivery to the respective Governments. The text of this memorandum40 would be made public in due course.”
Simon then added this memorandum of British views had only just been completed and would be delivered to Hitler at 1 o’clock today and other European capitals during the afternoon. He mentioned in particular Rome, Paris, and Brussels. Simon explained the reason for this urgency was that the memorandum might be in Hitler’s hands before he made his announced anniversary address on Tuesday. Simon expected the memorandum would be published in the form of a white paper41 some time the latter part of the week but not before in order that “Mussolini’s thunder” might not be stolen should he desire to make any contemplated statement such as above referred to in this telegram. A summary of the British memorandum is being prepared by the Foreign Office today and will be transmitted to Lindsay for delivery to you.42 Simon said the reasons for England’s preparing this memorandum [of British] views were several:
- (1)
- That Hitler’s memorandum of reply to the British of January 19 asked an expression of the English attitude.
- (2)
- The bilateral diplomatic exchange of views and notes between European capitals last Monday43 had not been correlated and Simon gave me to understand today’s memorandum had been drafted by the British with reference to such data.
- (3)
- When the officers of the Bureau met on February 13 there would be French, Italian and German data for consideration as well as suggestions from other countries but no statement of the attitude of the British Government without today’s memorandum.
- (4)
- Simon gave me to understand that the rather stiff tone of the German reply of January 19th to Paris, together with the 13 very pertinent questions appended, also decided the British Government to take some step in anticipation of avoiding a possible deadlock. Also to forestall any public announcement of policy by Hitler on Tuesday.
Simon explained in brief, that today’s memorandum was divided into three parts: equality, security and disarmament (I understand that Cabinet views on this memorandum had been exchanged with the [Page 15] French and that that section dealing with security in particular had received general approval of the Chautemps44 government). The principle of equality was granted by today’s memorandum although Hitler voluntarily would, for a contemplated period, confine himself to equality in normal defensive armament. I asked Simon if today’s memorandum defined “normal”. Simon replied no, but that he knew what was in Hitler’s mind and briefly referred as I remember to tanks not exceeding 6 tons and mobile guns not exceeding 155 millimeters.
As regards security, today’s memorandum suggested the general lines of the Kellogg Pact45 but contained a consultative clause for alleged violation of an agreement dealing with disarmament.
As regards disarmament, the pact was preferably for 10 years with no preliminary probationary period for Germany but during the 10-year pact period the highly armed powers would by agreement among themselves reduce their offensive armament in successive stages and, although no such statement was contained in today’s memorandum, one might infer that at the end of the pact period Germany might seek qualitative equality in offensive armament.
Simon asked that utmost secrecy be observed in regard to my conversation and laid the greatest stress upon no publicity being given to the reasons for which the British Cabinet were not publishing today’s memorandum at once.
I have forwarded a copy of this telegram to Wilson in Geneva and to Paris.
The Prime Minister has asked me to call on him at 4:30 this afternoon.
- For English text of Italy’s disarmament proposals, see Great Britain, Cmd. 4512, p. 15.↩
- Department of State, Press Releases, March 3, 1934, p. 110; also Great Britain, Cmd. 4512, p. 21.↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Not printed; it was handed to Under Secretary of State Phillips by Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador, on January 31, 1934.↩
- January 22.↩
- Camille Chautemps, French Prime Minister.↩
- Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris, or Treaty for the Renunciation of War), signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩