Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4 General Committee/339: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham)

Washington, May 5, 1933—8 p.m.

94. For Norman Davis. Your 614 and 615, April 27.⁷²

1. In assenting in principle to the MacDonald plan (Parts II–V) the President was aware of the many technical objections which it presented. His decision was made in the belief that there is a better chance of real achievement at the Conference if we support this plan in its broad outline than if we attempt to perfect it at the cost of remodelling. This does not mean that you should not attempt to improve it where possible, but this should be done in private talks with the British and other delegations, and in such a way that it does not appear that we are weakening our general support of the plan.

2. Our idea was not to sign Articles 1–3 of the British plan, but to constitute Part I of the MacDonald plan a separate part of the Disarmament Convention (paralleling the technique worked out in the London Treaty⁷³) which we would not sign, but to which we would attach our unilateral declaration. If, as you suggest, other Non-League members do not sign this part, then it becomes important that they should attach similar declarations.

3. Whether MacDonald insists on his idea of a separate method of consultation, or is willing to agree with the French that such a machinery is already set up by the Covenant of the League⁷⁴ and need only be incorporated by reference in the Disarmament Convention, seems after all a question to be settled primarily between the British and French. We have discussed the situation more fully with MacDonald and Herriot on the basis of the former’s draft, but there would not seem to be any insuperable objection if the other approach prevailed.

4. We do not however favor putting in contractual form either our obligation to consult or our attitude toward neutral rights. This is partly for political reasons, partly to reserve to ourselves the right of an unchallengeable interpretation of its meaning, and partly to accentuate our complete independence of judgment and decision. We talked this over very fully with Herriot, who gave every indication of satisfaction. It goes without saying that we should view the applicability of such a declaration as just as much contingent upon general ratification of a satisfactory disarmament convention as we should a contractual undertaking. In other words, we feel that the larger objective is Parts II to V of the plan.

5. The President gave careful study to the idea, which was implicit in your earlier recommendations, of limiting the scope of our declaration to the continent of Europe. He has not overlooked its advantages, but, in balancing the pros and cons, has convinced himself that another genuine effort at a universal approach to both disarmament and security would be the best means of solidifying international cooperation, which we regard as a necessary preliminary to success in both the Economic⁷⁵ and Disarmament Conferences. Thus the President feels that our primary effort should be for a world-wide approach, but if it appears that definite accomplishment in this respect is impossible, we could then proceed within a more limited scope.

6. Before deciding with regard to either the contents or the occasion of a statement, the President would appreciate receiving any suggestions you might wish to offer concerning points which might usefully be included.

7. Please repeat this telegram in your discretion to Geneva for the guidance of Wilson pending your return.

Hull

72. Ante, pp. 112 and 113.
73. Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.
74. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3336.
75. For correspondence relating to the Monetary and Economic Conference, held in London, June 12–July 27, see pp. 452 ff.