500.A15A4 Air Armaments/242: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation ( Davis )
318. Your 594 of March 27, 3 p.m. The following is a summary of the Navy Department’s comments on your telegram, paragraph by paragraph:
- First Paragraph. It is the Navy Department’s view that even though any resultant agreement may take the form of a lump-sum allowance of planes to each nation, there should be within such allowance a definite limitation upon the number of planes which a nation may assign for naval use, as otherwise, with each nation free to allocate to its Navy any or all of its allowed air strength, the air limitation may become completely unbalanced on the naval side.
- Second Paragraph. The Navy Department’s views referred to related only to the naval limitation which may be made in the disarmament [Page 100] treaty now under consideration by the present Conference. Further adjustment of the number of naval planes may subsequently be effected at the 1935 naval conference, to accompany the naval provisions adopted thereat.
- Third Paragraph. Confidential sources indicate that the present air strength of Great Britain is 1,700 planes (naval and military), and of Japan 2,900 planes (1,100 naval and 1,800 military) as against 2,200 planes (1,000 naval and 1,200 military) for the United States. It is, moreover, understood that the current Japanese program calls for an expansion to a total of 3,700 by the end of 1933, of which 1,500 will be naval planes. The figures for Great Britain and Japan, while believed to be essentially correct, have not been absolutely confirmed and should not be quoted to any one outside the Delegation. They indicate, however, that the existing number of planes would not, so far as the United States is concerned, be a satisfactory basis of discussion.
The Navy Department recognizes the weight of your objections to the employment of “requirements” as a basis for the present negotiations. The number of planes necessary for naval defense is not a matter of absolute requirements, but is dependent primarily upon the relative naval strength between signatory Powers in surface vessels, particularly in those categories in which air planes are embarked: i. e., aircraft carriers, capital ships, and cruisers.
The Navy Department appreciates the complexities attendant upon fixing a ratio agreement as to naval air planes with Great Britain and Japan in view of their air organizations. It offers the suggestion, however, that the problem may be attacked by separating the total airplane strength of each country into two arbitrary components, military and naval. The naval components may then be discussed on the basis stated in the preceding paragraph, and the military components on such other basis as may be determined. In this connection, see comment on first paragraph.