Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/1815: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State

Paris, April 16, 1933—9 p.m.
[Received April 18—6:05 a.m.³⁵]

164. From Davis. [1.] We have prepared the following general analysis of the basic fundamental elements in the disarmament situaation as they appear to us on the basis of the analysis and discussion of the past 7 years. Two factors stand out so definitely as to warrant serious consideration in determining our policy, (1) the impracticability of the universal treatment of certain phases of the problem particularly that of land armaments and consequently the need for applying regional treatment and, (2) the importance of determining the effect upon neutral rights and obligations of the postwar development of international law. These questions are closely related especially in so far as concerns American participation in disarmament and the latter has been particularly treated in my telegram 163, April 16, 8 a.m. [p.m.], paragraph 1. The continent of Europe presents a special problem in contrast to the rest of the world as regards disarmament.

The states of Europe are highly developed, have few and ineffective natural frontiers and have particular racial and historical bitternesses. They are animated by mutual distrust so deep that in the opinion of most of the European states only the most far reaching organization of control and supervision of treaty provisions together with the setting up of machinery for collective action will satisfy them. Consequently the continental European states are concentrating on the idea of organizing themselves in such a way as to make war too costly and dangerous for any aggressor. From this there arises a willingness on the part of most, if not all of these powers, to commit themselves to collective punitive action against an aggressor to a much greater extent than the rest of the world is disposed to do. Continental European thought is predicated upon the disastrous experiences of the past and the fear psychology produced thereby. In fact continental Europe looks upon peace as an interval between wars while the rest of the world considers peace as the normal and continuing condition.

2. Great Britain presents a factor quite separate from the rest of the states of continental Europe. Geographically speaking Great Britain through the Empire has as great if not greater interests in the rest of the world than it has in continental Europe. Politically speaking Great Britain has serious commitments in the continent of Europe resulting from the Covenant of the League and the Locarno treaties and some of the Continental states will certainly insist upon some association by England with a continental organization of peace. Nevertheless from the initiation of the Covenant of the League Great Britain has tended to interpret the Covenant as an indefinite obligation and has sought to avoid, if not evade, the strict construction which most states of the Continent prefer and which they are constantly struggling to reenforce vis-à-vis England.

Russia, like England, has very definite continental European problems and obligations and at the same time great interests outside of Europe.

Therefore, from the point of view of disarmament and the attendant political considerations the states of the world roughly speaking divide themselves into three categories:

(a) the continent of Europe,

(b) the British Empire and Russia,

(c) and the rest of the world.

3. The United States of America has such a special relation towards the states of the American Continents and towards the Far East,³⁶ a situation which is special not only geographically but also historically and traditionally, that any endeavor towards collective punitive action outside the continent of Europe must almost inevitably depend upon the attitude of the United States. The reverse would seem to be true if the case arises on the Continent. Collective punitive action there would be determined, initiated and undertaken, by the states of that continent and the action of the United States in this connection while important would be supplementary thereto rather than the determining factor. This phase of the problem and suggestions as to our policy have been developed in my 163, April 16, 8 a.m. [p.m.].

4. Even before the initiation of the General Disarmament Treaty Japan’s action in Manchuria had brought about a state of affairs in the Far East where it was inconceivable that Japan would accept for itself any such measure of disarmament as would be essential to write into a treaty relating to the continent of Europe if any satisfaction is to be given to Germany. This attitude of Japan’s has had a vital bearing on our action as regards armaments. When we have discussed a treaty of universal application there has always been certain unreality as far as the United States is concerned because we know that we cannot accept a treaty limiting American armament unless the same type of limitation applies to Japan and that the measures of limitation which are now envisaged for a universal treaty will be essentially unacceptable to Japan. As a result it appears that a treaty which will be of any use in Europe in reducing the apprehensions, allaying the fears and to some extent conceding equality to Germany, will be a treaty which Japan will not now accept and which by the same token we cannot accept.

5. A brief examination of sections of the British plan shows that it can not have universal application.

(a) Effectives. It will suffice for the entire world with the exception of continental Europe to limit the numbers of men called to the national colors and to drop all reference to pre-military, extra-military training and to formations organized on a military basis.

(b) Artillery. Outside of the continent of Europe the heavy mobile artillery constitutes an essentially defensive factor and could be handled much more simply between the extra-Continental states than it could be between the Continental states on the one hand, and the extra-Continental states on the other hand.

(c) Air Forces. There is a complete divergence of thought on the Continent and in the rest of the world concerning civil aviation. There is the very natural desire on the Continent to limit the size of the individual military airplane in opposition to the equally natural desire outside of the Continent to have big airplanes for purposes of long haul, et cetera, which have a geographical basis in fact. This fundamental difference of opinion could be composed, it is believed, if the treaty were to be dealt with on a regional basis.

(d) Security. We have already stressed the regional character of the measures for security contemplated for Europe.

6. The reasonable, if not the only practical method of handling the many difficulties which have been analyzed above, would be to have a disarmament treaty of universal application only insofar as it calls for,

(a) The renunciation of certain weapons in warfare

(b) the limitation of navies

(c) the establishment and activities of a permanent disarmament commission

(d) a general obligation to consult when danger threatens

(e) effectives and other analogous rules of general application.

Incorporated within the general framework sketched above should be separate documents covering: the special obligations assumed by,

(a) the continent of Europe

(b) England and perhaps Russia

(c) the rest of the world.

Under the special treaty which would apply to the continent of Europe there would be not only the special measures of disarmament that they may agree upon as applicable to themselves but also any particular undertakings regarding security, collective punitive action, et cetera, they may wish. It is in connection with this document that we might consider a declaration to the effect that if, and when, the states of Europe (i. e. the Council of the League of Nations) have decided upon measures of collective punitive action against a Continental aggressor and if the Government of the United States is also of the opinion that the state in question has violated the Kellogg Pact then the Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from action, and will withhold protection from its citizens if engaged in any action, which would tend to defeat the collective punitive action which the European states have decided upon.

7. Such action on security as sketched in the preceding paragraph would be the one most efficacious thing which we could do to contribute towards a solution of this most acute Continental problem which blocks disarmament in Europe. No measure of disarmament that we can undertake would have any appreciable effect in inducing Europe to disarm. It would constitute our supreme effort to help in bringing about conditions in which the states of Europe might perhaps find themselves able to solve the disarmament problem, at least for a period of years.

Such action would seem to cut two ways. First, it might, and we believe would, contribute substantially toward an agreement on disarmament and so constitute a definite step toward the relief of tension in Europe which is essential if we are not to have another clash there on a big scale. Second, this relief from tension would stimulate economic recovery. Third, we believe that an understanding by us of the character described above would not only strengthen our influence but would tend definitely to limit or at least diminish the necessity of our becoming embroiled in a European war.

The contractual obligation into which we would enter by such a procedure respecting neutral rights vis-à-vis the countries of Europe is a new form of undertaking as far as the United States is concerned. Nevertheless, I feel that the assumption of this undertaking might tend in the future to keep us out of serious complications in the event of the outbreak of war on the Continent. I submit that the objection which would probably be leveled at it, namely, that it is an entangling international agreement is unreal. While we may under certain conditions forego our rights we are also freed from corresponding obligations. These former rights or neutrality which are becoming somewhat obsolete are now merely rights to get into trouble as the world has evolved today. I should not think that there could be any strong argument brought forward in favor of attempting to maintain rights which might involve us in war when they can be got rid of without detriment to our interests or loss of national honor and indeed in such a way as to contribute to a solution of Europe’s pressing and dangerous problems which after all affect us considerably.

It should be noted that the contemplated undertaking applies only to continental Europe and would not apply to Great Britain since in our scheme Great Britain would belong to the second category or circle and not to the first or Continental circle. I assume that any undertaking which would run the risk of aligning us even passively with Continental powers in action against Great Britain would be unacceptable not only on sentimental grounds but on the more real grounds of the risk involved of a clash with the British fleet. We have therefore conceived this project with the distinct purpose among others of eliminating any possibility of being drawn into difficulties with Great Britain.

To summarize the relations of states both politically and economically are so close today that in the event of an outbreak in Europe it would be very difficult as things now are to resist the pressure of events and of public opinion towards our casting in our lot with one side or another. If, however, we have contractual relationships which clearly point out our duty, and if with the approbation and sanction of the states concerned this duty is restricted and limited to certain passive action, then it would seem that we stand a better chance of keeping our country from being dragged into the melee. Therefore, what appears to be an additional obligation and a new departure for us in the field of neutral rights actually is only a reasonable precaution or safeguard for our country in the light of the new relationships which are inevitably being thrust upon us.

To present the matter tersely we, together with all other states, would assume a contractual obligation in the event of war on the European Continent to forego our right to trade with an aggressor in that region. The price we all would pay would be infinitesimal in comparison with the advantages of keeping out of war and of sharing in the improvement of world conditions.

Such a contractual obligation should be considered in the light of its effects both in peace and eventual war;

(a) In peace we would lose nothing but would have a decided economic gain by contributing to international political stability to lessening fears and political tension in the European Continent.

(b) In war we, together with other states, might perhaps lose some foreign trade but at the same time we might gain by removing the causes which might and probably would drag us into the war.

In conclusion we recommend that we base our policy first on a regional treatment of disarmament along the lines suggested above combined with, second, a determination of our attitude on consultation and neutral rights. I would appreciate instructions on the former. As to the latter we have submitted our views together with a precise formulation of the questions involved in our 163, April 16, 8 p.m. Upon receipt of your instructions I will submit details as to methods recommended for giving practical application to such a policy in the forthcoming negotiations.

Cipher texts have been mailed Geneva and Brussels. [Davis.]

Marriner

35. Telegram in twelve sections.
36. For correspondence relating to the Far Eastern question, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.