550.S1 Washington/359
Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) of a Conversation With the German Chancelor (Hitler)25
Mr. Davis said he welcomed this opportunity to meet the Chancellor and to discuss ways and means of bringing about a successful result of the Disarmament Conference and also to consider matters relating to the World Economic Conference. The Chancellor replied that he likewise welcomed this opportunity to meet Mr. Davis and said that he could tell him at the outset that Germany believed in disarmament but that that did not mean solely the disarmament of Germany but that other Powers must also disarm. Germany had no intention of leaving herself as defenseless as she now is with France and her Allies having a crushing superiority over her. Mr. Davis replied that he felt Germany would be on more solid ground if their spokesman emphasized their desire for protection against invasion and made clear that they did not want the means to invade any other country. The best solution he could see would be for all countries to be deprived of the power of successfully attacking any other countries, that is, to strengthen the means of defence and and to weaken the powers of aggression so as to keep armies where they belonged, i. e., at home.
The Chancellor then stated that the root of all the difficulties was the Versailles Treaty26 with its provisions designed to keep Germany forever in a state of inferiority and to discredit them in the eyes of the world. He asked what would have happened in the United States if, after the Civil War, the Northern states had tried to make the Southern states sign a treaty which would have held them in subjection for an [Page 86] indefinite period of years. Mr. Davis replied that he happened to be a Southerner himself and that he could say without fear of exaggeration that the way the North treated the South after the Civil War was far worse than anything France had done to Germany. The North even went so far as to put in ex-negro slaves as judges and it was not until 1872 that representatives of any Conferedate States were able to sit in Congress.
The Chancellor replied that he had probably chosen a bad example in citing the instance of a civil war. For civil wars are almost always very bitter. But, take the War of 1871, for example. They had formal proof that France deliberately started that war, yet in three years the war was entirely liquidated and France was free to pursue her military, naval and colonial policies as she saw fit. Take also the case of the war with Spain at the conclusion of which the United States imposed no terms upon the vanquished which were in any way similar to those of the Versailles Treaty.
Mr. Davis replied that in the case of the Spanish War one of the reasons why the terms of the peace were made easy for Spain was because the United States had no fear whatever of Spain. Such was not the case as regards the relations between France and Germany, for France stood in real fear of what a strengthened Germany might do.
The Chancellor interrupted Mr. Davis to exclaim that he did not see how there could be any real ground for France to fear Germany. Germany was defenceless and France, in addition to its large well trained army had over four thousand military airplanes, thousands of tanks, heavy guns and all kinds of materials of war. It was ridiculous for France to have any fear of Germany. The only reason why France could have any apprehension of Germany was because she knew she was doing an unjust thing in trying to force Germany forever to live under treaty conditions which no self respecting nation could tolerate. These conditions were not compatible with the promises which had been made to Germany in the fourteen points of President Wilson27 on the basis of which Germany had agreed to lay down her arms.
Mr. Davis said that he was not attempting to argue in favor of or defend all that had been done since the World War. He would state in passing that the United States at the time of formulating the Treaty of Versailles had tried, without complete success, to eliminate some of the terms which it considered too harsh. Since the signing of the Treaty it had used its good offices to mitigate some of the articles of the Treaty. Mr. Davis also pointed out that notwithstanding certain [Page 87] bad points the Treaty nevertheless had a feature which was unique in that it contained provision for a peaceful revision of its terms.
The Chancellor asked what Mr. Davis meant by this and Mr. Davis replied that he referred specifically to Article 1928 and to the various Commissions set up under the Treaty. The fact that these facilities may not have been used to the extent which might have been desirable did not exclude the possibility of making future use of them. Mr. Davis added that he wished to emphasize that he had been working with the French off and on for fifteen years. He had never found them in a frame of mind more favorable to a reduction in armaments and to considering revision at least of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Herriot29 and Daladier, who had never been defenders of all of the Versailles Treaty are now the men in power. What would have been impossible under preceding Governments of the Right might well be accomplished if the recent occurrences in Germany do not make the French too hesitant or too fearful to pursue this more liberal policy. At present Messrs. Herriot and Daladier for political reasons were forced into the position of defending the Treaty of Versailles, more or less as it stood, but this did not mean that peaceful revision in certain particulars, especially disarmament, was impossible. When you come right down to it, French policy is based upon her fear of a more populous and a potentially powerful and resentful Germany.
The Chancellor replied that France well knew that this resentment in Germany was the natural consequence of the peace which she has imposed. It was no wonder that Germany should be resentful of her present position, entirely exposed on its eastern frontier to Poland with its vastly superior armaments. France on the west was protected by the Pact of Locarno30 but Germany has no such protection and is under constant fear of invasion by Poland.
Mr. Davis inquired whether it was really a fact that they feared Poland would invade them. The Chancellor replied that this fear was very real, that they must have means of defending themselves against it, and that whatever opposition may arise from any source, they intended to have it. He added that at any time there might be an incident on the Polish frontier which would result in the invasion of Germany. We knew from our history how incidents could provoke wars. Take for example the blowing up of the Maine. Any incident whether accidental or intentional, could at any time start trouble and Germany must always keep this in mind.
[Page 88]The Chancellor then added that he wanted Mr. Davis to realize that he did not want war, that he had fought right through the World War and that he knew the horrors of it and that if war came it would never be of his seeking.
The Chancellor then alluded again to the oppressive character of the Versailles Treaty and the necessity for revision. Mr. Davis replied that in his opinion the best way to obtain a revision was not to keep on talking about it publicly but to proceed quietly through conferences and commissions to get modifications here and there of various provisions of the treaty so as to reduce political tension, particularly as between France and Germany and give greater assurance for world peace. Too much talk about revision destroyed international confidence, especially if the idea is created abroad that anything in the nature of an attempted forcible revision was intended. Recent occurrences in Germany and reports of the excesses which had attended and followed the Governmental changes, had been very disturbing to public opinion abroad and had prejudiced the attitude towards Germany of public opinion in many countries and shaken international confidence in Germany to some extent. Further, it was unfortunate to create any impression that any agreements within the political or economic field which have been solemnly entered into should be modified by force.
The Chancellor then reiterated that they did not intend to use force (Gewalt Akt) to bring about any revision of agreements and that they intended to fulfill their obligations to the extent that they were allowed the means to do so. If, on the economic side, the markets of the world are closed against Germany they might be unable to find the wherewithal to pay their debts and the world should not be indifferent as to Germany’s ability adequately to protect the millions of foreign capital that are invested in Germany.
Mr. Davis remarked that unfortunately various occurrences and pronouncements had led some of Germany’s neighbors to believe that there might be an intention to find an occasion to seize the Polish Corridor by force. The Chancellor denied that there was any such intention but stated that they could not forever live under the terms of a Treaty which was iniquitous and based entirely upon false premises as to Germany’s war guilt.
Mr. Davis stated that if Germany was not too unreasonable in her demands and inspired confidence in her peaceful intentions she could thus gain for herself the support of public opinion for such reasonable modifications as may be justified and in this way would promote her own best interests and world peace. Sentiment was certainly growing for the reduction of the armaments of the armed Powers and the pressure of this sentiment would certainly bring results but if Germany [Page 89] emphasized any desire to rearm popular sentiment would undoubtedly change and Germany would defeat her own objective and find it all the more difficult to bring about the general reduction of armaments which was necessary to world peace.
In concluding the interview the Chancellor expressed his satisfaction in meeting Mr. Davis and reiterated that there was no change in the fundamental policies of Germany on the arms question which had been set forth by Baron von Neurath.
- Berlin, April 8, 4 p.m.; also present were Baron Konstantin von Neurath, German Foreign Minister; George Anderson Gordon, Counselor of the American Embassy in Germany; Allen W. Dulles of the American delegation; and Herr Hanfstaengl, who acted as interpreter. The memorandum was transmitted to the Department under covering letter of April 13, 1933; received April 22.↩
- Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, p. 3329.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1918, supp. 1, vol. i, pp. 15–16.↩
- Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 92.↩
- Leader of French Radical Socialist Party; Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chamber of Deputies.↩
- For texts of the agreements signed at Locarno, October 16, 1925, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, pp. 289–363.↩