500.A15A4 Air Armaments/231: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 27—10:25 a.m.]
594. Your 311, March 23, 6 p.m., reference paragraph on table following article 41 under air armaments. General comment indicates that we will not be alone in holding that numbers indicated are inadequate. In our opinion table should be redrafted in form to provide for four columns covering respectively, 1 army, 2 navy, 3 air force, 4 total. For nations, in which air components are integral parts of army and navy, columns 1, 2 and 4 would be filled in. For nations having separate air force, columns 3 and 4 would be filled in. This system will meet your suggestion as to subdivision of aircraft into military and naval aviation.
In regard to the last sentence of paragraph in question does this mean that it is impossible to discuss numbers of naval aircraft until [Page 76] naval provisions of disarmament treaty are agreed upon? Or does it mean that it is impossible for us to fix numbers of naval aircraft until result of 1935 naval conference is known?
In view of the various difficulties arising out of tonnage ratios as laid down in the Washington and London Naval Treaties we believe that the establishment of ratios on aircraft will complicate enormously the negotiation of the revision of the Washington and London Treaties. Furthermore, unless our figures are erroneous we believe that our present superiority over Great Britain and Japan is considerably greater than the 5:3 ratio. The fact is that neither Great Britain nor Japan has an exclusively naval section of air and therefore a ratio arrangement will be almost impossible to negotiate with them. We think that you may see obvious advantages in taking existing numbers as our basis of discussion rather than arbitrary ratios. We venture also respectfully to raise the thought that “requirements” of any one power while computable within the boundaries of that power are not tenable as a basis for presentation of figures to other pówers. We have contested for years this theory of “requirement” as applied to naval needs.