500.A15A4 General Committee/215: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 18—10:30 a.m.]
577. My 569, March 17, noon. Comment on chapter III—Air Armaments.
Article 34. Under the provisions of the resolution of July 2389 we are on record as accepting the abolition of all bombardment from the [Page 60] air but this article excepts bombardment from the air “for police purposes in certain outlying regions”. The character of the police purposes and the location of the outlying regions are not specified. It is believed that unless bombardment from the air is entirely and completely abolished for all time without any exceptions or conditions the thing is a humbug and we question whether we should accept it for the following reasons: if exception is made numerous countries will present cases which allow them to retain bombardment aviation and an organization for the exercise of this right. The disadvantageous position of the United States in such an event is obvious. It is questionable whether we should accept total abolition of bombing without compensating advantages.
Article 35 places upon the Permanent Disarmament Commission the work of making studies providing for the ultimate and complete abolition of military and naval aircraft but lays down the condition precedent of “supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes”. We have maintained here that from the point of view of the United States this condition precedent does not exist. Canada and so far as we know all other non-European countries share our views. The alternative given in clause b for a numerical limitation in the event of the failure of the abolition of military and naval aircraft appears to offer the only reasonable and acceptable solution for the limitation of military and naval aviation.
Inasmuch as the provisions of these articles can be effective only as the result of a second disarmament conference you might consider that we could accept it in its present form after a statement of our views. The provision appearing in the last sentence for measures relating to civil aviation which appear under annex 2 are unsatisfactory but will be discussed in detail in a later paragraph.
Article 36. The first paragraph words “capable of use in war” is unsatisfactory because it is vague, incapable of accurate definition and useless for practical application even as supplementary to a numerical limitation. We believe that the only reasonable way of applying numerical limitation to airplanes is to lay down the total numbers which are assigned to the army and navy, respectively, or the independent air forces of the signatories. In regard to the second clause of article 36 the 25 per cent allowance appears to be inadequate.
Article 37. We believe that qualitative limitation by means of unladen weight is technically unsound and impracticable. The exception made for the case of troop carriers and flying boats is not sufficient to meet our requirements in view of conditions which we face.
Article 38. It would appear that with adequate provision being made for the abolition of bombing from the air the potential offensive use of dirigibles would disappear. In these circumstances we believe [Page 61] thought should be given to whether there is any more reason to suppress dirigibles used solely for observation and scouting than to suppress airplanes used for the same purposes.
Article 39. A definition of unladen weight appears in annex 1, for contents of which see Conference Document 123, July [June] 8, 1932, report of Air Commission.90 In our opinion unladen weight is an unacceptable criterion for limitation either with or without a numerical limitation. Our requirements as to radius of operation, ceiling and useful load are so different from those of European countries that there appears to be no system of limitation other than that of numbers which can be universally and fairly applied.
Article 40. The expression “capable of use in war” appears to be too vague for inclusion in a convention of this kind. With this exception there appears to be no objection to the remaining provisions of the article with the exception of the table which will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph.
Article 41. This article in so far as it concerns unladen weight referred to in article 37 and discussed under article 39 is objectionable although there appears to be no objection to the destruction of surplus planes in accordance with the time schedule indicated.
Table.
The lumping together of planes for the Army and Navy and establishing a limit of 500 for the total must be considered carefully. The British proposal seeks parity by bringing France and the United States down to her level and places us on a parity with Japan. It might be better to consider numerical limitation initially on the basis of the numbers of actually existing planes and then consider what numerical reductions can be made in view of national defense requirements. In this connection it should be noted that the reduction of both Army and Navy planes below a given level may involve the creation and maintenance of additional reconnaissance and scouting facilities both afloat and ashore. We should also consider the advisability of allowing the British to work the same system for gaining parity in regard to air armaments that we worked on the British in regard to naval armaments.
Annex 2. This concerns civil aircraft and corresponds textually to Conference Document C A 50. The provisions appearing under section 1 C 11 and 1 E and F are objectionable. While sections 2 and 3 may be accepted, section 4 could be accepted on the understanding that our air mail contracts and the activities of the Department of Commerce in establishing airlines, landing fields, radio beacons, information service, et cetera, are not to be considered as direct subsidies.
[Page 62]It is believed that proposals relating to the control, supervision or internationalization of civil aviation will be made in connection with measures for the abolition or limitation of military and naval aviation. We think that non-European powers will go no farther than agreeing to national control upon a regional basis which will involve only prohibition of incorporation of military features in civil aircraft with full publicity as to the characteristics of all civil planes registered or constructed within jurisdiction. In the event this question arises in connection with this chapter on air armaments we will cable draft text covering this point.
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, p. 318.↩
- Records of the Conference, Series D, vol. iii, Minutes of the Air Commission, pp. 299, 311.↩