550.S1/718: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 6—2 a.m.]
101. From Davis. 1. In conversations with MacDonald yesterday and today with regard to the tariff truce he took the position that action by the Organizing Committee as contemplated in the resolution submitted by me under your instructions97 had not been discussed in Washington before he left; that he had agreed in principle to a tariff truce subject to agreement on the wording and which he had thought should begin to run May 1st but that he had explained that exception must be made of negotiations and measures already begun by his Government some of which involved the establishment of quotas on certain agricultural products including bacon and eggs but that it was understood that the final wording of the truce agreement was to be prepared and furnished to them and for which he is still waiting.
2. At the Prime Minister’s suggestion I also talked with Runciman98 who said there was no objection to entering into a truce with certain provisos which upon analysis means that Great Britain could go ahead making agreements such as she has been completing. His contention was that these regulations did not raise but in every case reduced the tariff between the two countries concerned and so far as Great Britain is concerned they established quotas only on imports of agricultural products.
3. After the Cabinet had met to discuss the matter today I had a further talk with MacDonald who said that the Cabinet liked the idea of a truce but could not agree definitely on it until they get the final wording for which he is still waiting. I inquired if that means in effect that the wording must be such as not to prohibit further agreements involving quotas on agricultural products. He replied affirmatively. I then told him that I must report to my Government just what the situation is which I understood in effect to be as follows:
- 1.
- The British can not concur in the resolution in the form proposed to the Organizing Committee for the interim.
- 2nd.
- The British Cabinet is in agreement with the idea of a truce with a protective reservation subject to agreement upon the actual wording which they are waiting for us to present.
He said that was putting it rather bluntly but he supposed that was about the truth. I told him what disturbed me was that their position seemed to be at variance with the broad constructive program outlined in the communiqué issued by him and the President which [Page 593] condemns the quota system and also that in my opinion the immediate advantages they might get from the special trade agreements would be of minor importance in comparison to their share in general world improvement that would result through a broad and constructive program such as that agreed upon by the President and him. To this he replied that he had explained in Washington that the condemnation of quotas did not include quotas on agriculture under certain conditions but then said he was in an embarrassing position and he could not get through the Cabinet a wording that would prohibit them from carrying through agreements and measures now in progress of negotiation.
MacDonald indicated that the British Government does not want to commit itself during the interim period unless the other principal governments are all likewise committed and his impression was that the French would not agree without reservations that would leave them practically free. He nevertheless admits the advisability if possible of getting some sort of truce.
From my telephone conversation with Mr. Phillips this evening99 I understand that you are most anxious to get the truce for the interim period even though it requires modification to meet British position. I shall therefore take the matter up with the Prime Minister tomorrow on this basis and endeavor to get agreement on a text but in view of differences of opinion in Cabinet Prime Minister will probably not be willing to commit himself finally without another Cabinet meeting next week. It will then of course be necessary to secure the agreement of the other Governments represented on Organizing Committee. [Davis.]