Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

550.S1/745

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁸⁵

May 5, 1933, 4 p.m.

Davis: There are several things I have got. In the first place about this tariff truce. I understand you cabled me this morning as to details. Just about what I indicated in my cable⁸⁶ the P.M. has not been able to do. I mean the Cabinet is very favorable to a truce, but they want it worded in such a way as to permit them to go ahead with the negotiations they have been conducting, which of course is a truce on agricultural produce, including bacon and eggs. I told him that while of course they would have to stand by any agreement they had made, I thought it was going rather contrary to the big broad program which he and the President had agreed upon and which really prohibited …⁸⁷ He said he just simply could not. His statement is that he is waiting for the final wording of the actual final agreement to be negotiated. The real trouble is on the wording. The question is how much do we want this. If we can get one through, it will only be eye-wash.

Phillips: I think we want it very much.

Davis: All right. Here is the physical difficulty I am up against. Sir John is sick. He has been away all week. He is chairman of the organizing committee and we cannot get that together without his calling it, and there is objection to having them act because it is not within their terms of reference, and I rather think perhaps the best thing would be to write a letter, telling them what we want, but I guess that is not the way you want to deal with it now.

Phillips: You are referring now to the intermediary truce that is between now and the opening of the conference. Are you not?

Davis: When he left Washington there was not any talk about the organizing committee. That was a new thing, and his argument is that he thought we were going to agree upon the final wording even as to what is to be presented at the conference and that we would agree upon that also. But I have explained to him how that would be impossible, that we could not possibly get that done in time and after all this resolution we propose is a question more than anything else and a recommendation. I think I could stay here and probably get something by Monday. I ought to be in Geneva Monday as there is a very serious situation developing there at the conference and I ought to be there on Monday morning for some things at the Bureau,⁸⁸ and I was just wondering if the P.M. ought to be in Geneva too. He was wondering if I could get the wording of what we would agree upon tomorrow. You might take it up then through the Ambassador in Washington.⁸⁹

Phillips: Well, why can’t you do the very best you can for the wording of the six weeks’ truce. Just do the very best you can.

Davis: But the trouble is how to get those people together. Sir John would have to call them, and I cannot get him. It is a very unfortunate thing. He has gone away and they do not expect him back for a week or two. He is not well at all. The only thing we could do would be to get the Government here to take it up with those nations and have it as a joint statement to be issued by the several nations that are represented on the committee itself, which I think would really be still more effective if we could get it done.

Phillips: Well I think if you cannot get it done any other way through Simon, I think it is the best way. The thing now is to get some truce in the intervening weeks between now and the opening of the conference and just the wording is less important.

Davis: Even if it includes continuance of negotiating these agreements.

Phillips: Has Simon a substitute?

Davis: No. They have refused to offer any. I told them I was ready to sit down and talk it over. And they then said what are the other nations going to do. We do not want to commit ourselves unless we know what the other nations are going to do.

Phillips: We are considering sending you a communication, which I am going to read parts of to you. It is in relation to the British-Argentine Treaty.⁹⁰ We have been discussing the matter with the Argentine Ambassador⁹¹ who is here now and this is a communication that we are proposing to send to you for such action as may seem to you advisable.

“The American Government has taken note of the terms of the treaty now in process of negotiation between the British Government and the Government of the Argentine Republic and has discussed with the Argentine representatives now in Washington the possible significance of the terms of the treaty, particularly in regard to (a) the operation of the foreign exchange rationing arrangements; (b) the ultimate effect on American trade of the tariff changes contemplated in Section . . of the treaty.

The American Government realizes also that in all probability the British Government would, after the Washington conversations, wish to hold the conclusion of this treaty in abeyance pending the outcome of the Economic Conference. Nevertheless, in accordance with the spirit of complete frankness in which the recent Washington conversations were carried on, the American Government desires to point out that the proposed British-Argentine treaty contains elements of discrimination in favor of British trade which are inconsistent with the policies and aims for world cooperation, which alone can give real meaning to the Economic Conference and to the preliminary conversations in which the American Government is engaged.”⁹²

Phillips: Under ordinary circumstances we should of course send that message as an aide-mémoire through the diplomatic channels, but not knowing the political situation over there and wishing to act to strengthen the Prime Minister’s position and not weaken it, we are thinking of submitting it to your judgment to decide whether to so transmit it, or whether in a personal conversation you should outline our position, or whether such a conversation should take place here with the Ambassador, or whether we should do nothing at all. The President and all of us feel that we should take some action to present our point of view.

Davis: We do too. We feel very strongly that we should. I would not be surprised if the Prime Minister would not be glad to have it and I think the best thing is to get it, and I suggest that I talk with him about it.

Phillips: We will do it that way. We will send that along. Have you anything else?

Davis: He stated frankly that these negotiations which were pushed through so rapidly just before his arrival are going in the very opposite direction from the big broad program that was intended and outlined in the communiqué. I think we ought to make an issue of it right now.

Phillips: We will do that. Have you anything more?

Davis: I have a very serious thing about this disarmament⁹³—two or three things. In the first place, on Monday morning, the Germans and the French are to bring up the question of reorganization of the army, and the British Cabinet decided today that we must take a firm stand on that to uphold their conventions and got to take it up in the Bureau. They had Eden over today from Geneva to discuss it with the Cabinet and they say we have just got to make an issue on that. It may be that it will blow up the conference. I think myself it has got to come to a head. So on Monday morning what I would do would be—I will see him tomorrow here on this other thing and then leave here Sunday and be in Geneva Monday morning. In the meantime I would get a cable off to you as to what is the outcome about the truce. One other thing regarding disarmament again. We are not getting answers to our cables at all on those questions.

Phillips: We have a number of instructions,⁹⁴ three or four, to send you, which will probably go out tonight, and we are sending them over to London or Geneva whichever you want. But I think we have tried to answer all your questions raised in your various telegrams.

Davis: If you can get it off tonight, I would rather that you send it to London.

Phillips: That is, the political to London, and the technical to Geneva?

Davis: All to London and then I will get Hugh⁹⁵ on the telephone because I may want to discuss it with him.

Phillips: We apparently have everything answered except on the artillery.

Davis: I am going to suggest that either you or Cordell get hold of MacArthur⁹⁶ and talk to him on that. Otherwise, we are overruling the army, and if you do not look out whenever we bring back an agreement, then you will have the whole army against you unless it is talked out beforehand. I think the army is wrong. As we have explained, this artillery does not (break in connection)

Davis: I probably will cable you more fully on that. I think we are coming to the point. We do not have anything to do with it, which makes it embarrassing in the Senate. That is something we have got to look after. We have either got to reduce the number of delegates or got to get one or two more over here,—for the formality, if nothing else for the psychological effect of having a larger number of delegates signing the convention, if we ever get to signing the convention. Is it most important for me to be in Geneva to attend on Monday or Tuesday, or to stay here and work on this other thing. I think I can get it going far enough tomorrow so that it could be continued through, or I could get back here about Wednesday.

Phillips: I think if you could get back by Wednesday it would probably take care of it. I think it is awfully important for you to follow along in London.

Davis: It seems so right now. I declare, it is a queer situation. I have tried to keep you informed as to the situation here.

It would be awfully good strategy if you could send for MacArthur. I am sure he would agree to these artillery clauses if you would explain it to him.

Is Cordell back yet?

Phillips: He is at Cabinet.

Davis: Will you tell Cordell that I wrote him a personal letter about something that I am going to do when I get through with this disarmament and that I am expecting an answer that I have not had.

Phillips: I will tell him. Best of luck to you. You are doing a fine job.

Davis: It is not easy. Goodbye.

85. Between Norman Davis in London and Under Secretary of State Phillips in Washington, May 6 [5?] 1933, 4 p.m.
86. Telegram No. 101, May 5, midnight, from the Chargé” in Great Britain, p. 592.
87. Apparent break in telephone connection at this point.
88. Bureau of the Disarmament Conference.
89. Sir Ronald Charles Lindsay.
90. For attitude of the United States toward these negotiations, see vol. iv, pp. 722 ff.
91. Felipe A. Espil.
92. See telegram No. 96, May 5, 9 p.m., to the Chargé in Great Britain, vol. iv, p. 727.
93. For correspondence relating to the Disarmament Conference, see pp. 1 ff.
94. Telegrams Nos. 94 and 95, May 5, 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., to the Chargé in Great Britain, pp. 124 and 126; Nos. 327 and 328, May 6, 3 p.m. and 3:14 p.m., to the American delegate, pp. 128 and 129.
95. Hugh Wilson, American delegate to the Disarmament Conference.
96. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.