550.S1/707
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) of a Conversation Between President Roosevelt and the French Representative (Herriot), Thursday Afternoon, April 27, 193372
The conversation opened with a reference to the Russo-Japanese situation and to the military conditions in the Vladivostok region. The President mentioned the fact that it was very difficult for us to follow the conditions in Russia because we had no diplomatic or consular representatives there, no one in fact who could give us a continuing picture of developments. M. Herriot replied that he was very closely in touch with the Russian Ambassador73 in Paris and that he would be happy at all times to furnish us with any information which we desired. Moreover, he offered to transmit any messages that we might care to send to the Russian Government through his friend, the Russian Ambassador. The President raised the question of a tariff truce to be applicable not only during the life of the Economic Conference but also during the weeks between April 29th and the assembling of the Conference. M. Herriot said that he had telegraphed to Paris from the boat to ask the attitude of his Government in this regard, and that he had received a reply in favor of the principle of such a truce. In its reply, however, he was informed that the French Government would have to ask guarantees to protect French agriculture. The complication was, he said, that a law already exists giving the French Government power to stop agricultural imports and that this law, of course cannot be altered without special legislation. M. Herriot said he had cabled to-day to Paris to ask that this law should be suspended during the period of the London negotiations. The President described his idea of a tariff truce, which should be in two parts: One, a truce during the life of the Conference; Two, a gentleman’s agreement to be carried out in good faith to last during the intervening weeks before June 12. The President asked me to see that instructions were sent to Norman Davis in London74 suggesting that there might well be a resolution of the Organizing Committee, which could be made a part of the general invitation to the Conference, calling for the truce to prevent tariff increases during the life of the Conference. The President’s thought was that this resolution or motion of the Organizing Committee would also express the hope that between April 29 and June 12 none of the nations invited to the Conference would [Page 498] increase their tariffs nor take advantage of the intervening weeks to change the status quo in relation to imports and exports of goods. (It was to be understood that if there is a devaluation of the dollar or the pound, steps may be taken to compensate.)
At this point the President introduced the subject of intergovernmental debts.75 He described how his hands were tied by Congress and that he was in no position to discuss a moratorium nor a revision. He referred to the fact that under these conditions President Hoover felt that he would not be able even to speak to the debtor governments on the subject of debts, but he, Mr. Roosevelt, regarded this viewpoint as absurd because, under the Constitution, the President is free to talk, discuss and negotiate with foreign powers on any subject. He said that Congress would remain in session until June 1. He could ask for powers in connection with the debt problem, but he had no idea now whether he would receive such powers or whether they would be limited in certain respects. He had, so he said, told Mr. MacDonald that he would probably ask Congress to give him power, but he has no idea now in regard to what powers he will receive from Congress. Therefore, he said, he can promise nothing. If France decides to make the December payment, he can say now, however, that he will ask Congress for power. Meanwhile there is no objection to exploring the realm of figures. He insisted that there are possibilities in the figures themselves, and then he went on to explain the American point of view. He used the simile of a house which is rented for a certain sum of money. Later the lessee says he cannot pay the full rent. The lessor says, in reply, “Pay as much as you can but remain in possession of the house.” The President went on to explain how the loan to France was originally made; that it was a loan by the American people to the Government of the United States for the benefit of France; that the Liberty Bonds were held by the American people; and that the Government must make good to the people themselves who held the obligations. M. Herriot seemed greatly interested in this aspect of the matter and admitted that the French politicians did not approach it from this angle. He wished to be able to take back a formula that would strengthen the “partie democrat”. He gave a picture of the attitude of the French Deputies towards payment. In brief, it was: “Germany won’t pay; therefore, we shall not pay.” Herriot stated his personal position as follows: “I wish to satisfy the law in order to plead equity.” Herriot described how in 1926 Mr. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, had said that “capacity to pay did not mean mere capacity to pay in gold but the true capacity of a country to pay its obligations.” Herriot maintained at the same [Page 499] time that Mellon had said that if the Germans cannot pay, the whole question of payment will be reconsidered. He referred to the fact that in Congress Senator Smoot and others had agreed to the Mellon viewpoint, and then went on to describe the French acceptance of the Dawes Plan,76 the French acceptance of Gilbert Parker’s [S. Parker Gilbert’s?]77 advice that Germany was capable of payment, and other steps, all taken by this country. He touched upon the point that from the French viewpoint, although many of them were taken by American citizens outside of the Government, they were nevertheless construed in the French mind as representing the acts of the Government itself.
There was a diversion at this point when the President told a story of the visit to the United States of Marshal Joffre and Viviani on May 1, 1914 [1917]. Their insistence was that there should be American soldiers in France on July 14. They were told that there was no hope for such accomplishment and left Washington in a dejected state of mind for Chicago. From Chicago they telegraphed asking to be allowed to return and restate their plea. President Wilson agreed. The President described the interview at the White House—how the Marshal appeared suddenly at the door of the President’s room with tears pouring down his face and his arms stretched out in urgent plea. The result of the emotional proceeding was that the President granted the request and the soldiers were in France on July 4 instead of 14. In referring to the debt problem the President repeated that he can explore but cannot do more. Herriot replied somewhat sadly “Je vous [ai] compris.” The President mentioned that any back payments by France would, of course, be included in any arrangement which might be made, should he be given power to make one. The President made clear, and Herriot understood, that the difficulty of going forward in debt conversations was the failure of France to make its December payment. The President concluded the subject of debts by an assurance that he was certain that a settlement of this whole problem could be reached; only it required a little time to accomplish.
- On the previous day, President Roosevelt and M. Herriot had had a conversation which related exclusively to European political conditions and disarmament. For memorandum of this conversation, see p. 109.↩
- Valérien Dovgalevsky.↩
- See telegram No. 83, April 28, 6 p.m., to the Chargé in Great Britain, p. 578.↩
- For correspondence relating to debt negotiations between the United States and France, see pp. 866 ff.↩
- Great Britain, Cmd. 2105 (1924): Reports of the Expert Committees Appointed by the Reparations Commission. ↩
- Agent General for reparation payments under the Dawes Plan.↩