550.S1/704½

The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary: In accordance with your suggestion of yesterday evening I enclose a note of the message which I then gave to you. I trust you will understand that it is to be regarded as an oral communication.

Yours very sincerely,

R. C. Lindsay
[Enclosure]

Oral Communication

In our view the main purpose of the Economic Conference is to restore both commercial and financial confidence between the nations of the world. We hope to achieve international agreements for cooperation on policies aiming at the restoration of free and stable exchanges and the raising of world prices by credit expansion, better distribution of bank reserves, removal or lowering of trade barriers and abolition of exchange controls, and all these topics are interconnected, [Page 488] and must be attacked comprehensively. But international agreement on these questions presupposes general confidence. No fresh disturbing influence must be allowed to arise in the near future. And no confidence such as is desired can exist so long as there is uncertainty as to the ratification of the Lausanne agreements43 or on the question whether interallied debts or reparations may be reopened. This was the meaning of the sentence in paragraph 15 of your [our] memorandum to which exception has been taken. It was a simple description of the European situation as it appears to us and ought not in any way to be taken as an ultimatum or a bargaining point. The views expressed are unanimously held by the principal experts of the Preparatory Committee as stated in their declarations at Geneva as well as in their report. We are at a loss to understand the suggestion that our statement is inconsistent with that contained in their published report.

The Geneva report says “until there is such a settlement or definite prospect of such a settlement these debts will remain an insuperable barrier to economic and financial reconstruction”.44 We said that “any hope of arriving at better conditions is dependent on the satisfactory settlement of war debts having been reached or at least assured.” There is no material difference between the two statements. It is well known that we would prefer a prior settlement of the war debts; but we have also made it clear that we would discuss the subject of debts concurrently with world economic problems if this prior settlement is unattainable.

Such is still our position but perhaps we should explain it more fully in view of the American comments contained in their memorandum. We believe that, failing a prior agreement as to how a final settlement of war debts can be reached and in fact is to be reached, progress at the conference on any financial and economic problem will be attended with the greatest difficulty. Failing such an agreement some of the most important issues of the conference can only be dealt with provisionally, as indeed was the case at Lausanne. But if it is impossible in the available time to reach a final settlement, and if it becomes clear that no decision can be reached during the conference involving cancellation, or that not even a moratorium (if the United States Government dislike the word) can be arranged, yet it ought to be possible to reach some practical arrangement under which, during the period of the conference and for that period, any debt instalment [Page 489] would be regarded as held in suspense. We feel convinced that the conference will not only be severely handicapped but may even be wrecked if, before it has well begun, its work is interrupted by claims which at once raise the whole disputed issue of debts isolated from the other matters which concern the world situation. But we also believe that if this does not happen, then the conference could get to work early, and discussions for a final settlement of debts could proceed concurrently though independently. This is an objective statement of the position in Europe and is not an ex parte argument.

The Prime Minister’s reply45 to the President’s invitation makes it clear that his object is to confer on world economic problems with especial regard to the conference, and on disarmament. In the foregoing paragraphs we have stated our view of the relation of the war debt question, and particularly of the June instalment, to the economic conference and no mention has been made of this subject in the Prime Minister’s reply to the invitation. We nevertheless hope that the President will bear these considerations in mind in connection with Mr. MacDonald’s visit for we feel sure that he is as deeply interested as ourselves in promoting good will and in solving the problems common to both countries and to the whole world.

  1. For texts of the agreements signed at the Lausanne Conference, June 16–July 9, 1932, see Great Britain, Cmd. 4126, Miscellaneous No. 7 (1932): Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, Lausanne, July 9, 1982; Great Britain, Cmd. 4129, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1932): Further Documents relating to the Settlement reached at the Lausanne Conference.
  2. League of Nations, Monetary and Economic Conference, Draft Annotated Agenda (Official No.: C.48.M.18.1933.II [Conf. M.E.I.], p. 7).
  3. Department of State, Press Releases, April 8, 1933, p. 220.