550.S1/600: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:12 a.m.]
73. From Davis. MacDonald asked me to meet Monday afternoon with him and his colleagues Baldwin, Simon, Chamberlain and Runciman. Obviously he wished me to learn at first hand the objections certain of them were raising to his proposed trip and also for them to learn at first hand from me the possible advantage which I have felt might accrue from the trip. MacDonald restated the difficulties he would face if he made the trip and no action were taken to defer the debt payments falling due during the Economic Conference [Page 484] negotiations and then he had to return to deal with the June 15th payment. Baldwin, and then Chamberlain, restated in somewhat more forceful language the same position. They all state that they realize that the President could give no assurances. Chamberlain, who was obviously the least inclined to favor the trip, stated however that he felt that at least they should have an indication from the President that the door was not closed to the possibility of favorable action. (I understand that one of the chief difficulties has been that Chamberlain has been anxious to go to Washington himself instead of or with MacDonald and his colleagues in the Cabinet have realized that he would not be an appropriate choice.) MacDonald and the others present clearly indicated that they realized that the President must be the sole and final judge as to whether he should ask any authority from Congress to deal with the debt issue during the interim period of the Economic Conference. They said they only wished to know before the Prime Minister decided to make the trip whether or not the President had determined against asking such authority; that is to say whether there was still the hope that if the Prime Minister made the trip he would not arrive and find the issue foreclosed against them. They would then take their chances whether the effect of his trip would be such as to help create a situation which would facilitate favorable action. I said that I had fully reported the preoccupations of the Cabinet with regard to the Prime Minister’s trip but that I could give no assurances and that I thought it inadvisable to ask the President to do so.
Furthermore, I could not hold out any hope whatever that they would not be expected to make the June 15th payment and that I did not see how the President could be asked to express himself on this subject without an implication which might cause a misunderstanding. I told them that all I could say was that as matters now stand a payment accrues in June which the President has no authority to postpone but that aside from the question of the next payment on the debt there were many more important questions in which both countries were vitally concerned and that naturally the President who was fully alive to their difficulties as well as his own would not encourage a visit from the Prime Minister if he did not think it might hold out possibilities of serving a useful purpose. Our conference then adjourned and MacDonald told me that they would talk the matter over themselves and see if it were possible to reach a definite decision. I may say that I explained to him that the discussion might be more or less academic depending upon whether or not the Prime Minister could get away in time to arrive 2 weeks before Congress adjourns and that I hoped to have further word by the 10th.
At 10:30 this evening the Prime Minister called me by telephone to say that they had been discussing the matter further but that there [Page 485] was still some question in the mind of some of his colleagues. He said they did not want the President to commit himself in any way but that if he should think that it is outside the bounds of possibility to arrange for a postponement of the June 15th payment they would like to know it as it would raise a serious question as to whether the Prime Minister should go. I told them I did not think it advisable to put such a question up to the President because the reply might be construed as an implied commitment but that if the Prime Minister insisted I would cable his inquiry. He did not insist but said that if I would even tell them that in my opinion there was a possibility, even slight, of the President getting authority and would inform the President that I had made such a statement they would be satisfied. I told him I would be unwilling to do this, that I thought the only thing for them to do was to decide their course of action on the information before them. The Prime Minister said that he was anxious to go and hoped to get the matter settled tonight. He did not wish to give the impression that they were trying to get a promise to which I replied that I did not see how I could put the matter up to the President and avoid the possibility of any reply being construed as something in the nature of a promise. MacDonald then went back into conference and said that if there was anything more definite to report he would call me in the morning before my departure for Paris. [Davis.]