550.S1/581: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:09 p.m.]
64. Personal for the President from Davis. In a long conversation today with MacDonald and Simon we discussed with entire frankness the question of the possible visit of the Prime Minister to the United States. He told me that initially the Cabinet had been almost unanimously against it but that following our recent conversations which he had reported to the Cabinet there had been a considerable change in sentiment and there was still a possibility that the trip could be worked out. He said the matter had been discussed from every angle at a meeting this morning of the Cabinet Council. He remarked that many of the Cabinet object to his going without prior assurance that the June 15 payment could be postponed. At this point Simon remarked that possibly he could explain more easily than the Prime Minister exactly what the Cabinet had in mind. They felt that if Mr. MacDonald made the trip to the United States and immediately after his return the Government were faced with the issue of the June 15 payment, it would have a disastrous effect upon the Prime Minister’s personal prestige and might mean the end of the National Government. I stated that it seemed to me entirely out of the question to get any such assurance prior to or as a condition of the Prime Minister’s possible visit to the United States and that it would be highly unwise to attempt anything of this nature. As I saw the situation there was no hope whatever that any action could be taken about the June 15 payment if, prior to the adjournment of Congress, (which I assumed would be about the 15th of May) we were not already engaged in preparatory work for the Economic Conference with the British representatives under conditions which held out some hope of working together to improve economic conditions generally. I made it absolutely clear that even if such conversations were initiated no one could state what the effect might be upon public opinion in the United States as related to the debt issue and that nothing that I had said should be interpreted as holding out any assurance or promise of any character. They would have to be the judge of their course of action. MacDonald said he fully appreciated this point of view and clearly indicated that he personally was disposed to accept the risk of making the [Page 478] trip as he felt that personal conversations with you could not help but be useful. He stated that there were, however, many practical difficulties. The four power agreement would have to be nursed along. He will continue to deal with an extremely critical situation with Russia, and there was the general feeling to which he had already alluded that he was too often absent from London during these critical days. Further, he was completely tired out and felt it essential to have at least a week’s rest at Lossiemouth. Hence the earliest date he could get off, assuming he made the trip, would be around the 20th of April. He realized that he should make his trip and return prior to the adjournment of Congress and obviously he should not be in Washington at the time of any move, if any was made, with regard to the debt. He quite agreed that now was not the time to attempt debt negotiations and if he came to Washington he would make it absolutely clear publicly that he was not going for the purpose of discussing debts or dealing in any way with this question; but he has been chosen as President of the Economic Conference primarily to see what endurable collaboration could be achieved in order to help make a success of that Conference. He could probably take with him experts and possibly a man like Runciman32 who could carry on the economic discussions after his departure. Thus it could be made clear that the object of the trip was only to initiate this work and to have a personal exchange of views with you and that he, himself, would not attempt to reach any agreements on any subjects so that the world would not be led to expect concrete results from his trip.
MacDonald authorized me to lay these considerations before you and said that it would be helpful to him in considering what was best for him to do to learn quite informally whether you felt his visit to Washington for a few days at the end of April would be agreeable. He emphasized that he did not seek any formal urging and desired no communications on the subject to be sent through other channels. I gained the impression that in the delicate Cabinet situation existing here an invitation extended through official channels might complicate rather than facilitate a favorable decision. In fairness to MacDonald, I should add that the problems he has to face in reaching his decision are such that any message you send him through me had best be limited to a very general suggestion that you would welcome his visit at the time indicated, if he felt free to come then, to help prepare the way for the Economic Conference. If, on the other hand, you feel that a date between the 25th and the end of April is for any reason inconvenient, MacDonald would like to know it as soon as possible. [Davis.]
- Lord Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade.↩