Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/1760: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, March 13, 1933—11 p.m.
[Received March 14—4:20 a.m.]

564. My 563.⁶⁴ After further conversations with the Prime Minister and Simon and talks with Nadolny, Cavallero,⁶⁵ Massigli and the others we submit the following in an effort to give a clear picture of a confused situation.

1. Cavallero who had just arrived from Rome came to see us and said that in Mussolini’s⁶⁶ opinion what was most needed for the moment was a lessening of tension during this critical stage in Europe. As he saw it the most practical way to achieve this was by having no more meetings of the General Commission and Political Commission, where the speech making is done, until after Easter, with the technical committees to go on in the meanwhile. Cavallero stated that he thought he could assure us that the Germans would not be averse to such procedure. He asked that we support this view with the Prime Minister. We said that while the suggestion seemed good we could not commit ourselves to any line of action until we had heard what possibilities suggested themselves to MacDonald and others. We get a clear impression from Cavallero’s conversation that the Italians are apprehensive of present developments in Germany⁶⁷ and are disposed to exercise a moderating influence on the Germans. Cavallero said definitely that they were anxious to avoid any pretext for the rearmament of Germany.

2. MacDonald having told me that Nadolny had adopted a rigid attitude—which seemed to me at variance with our own impression—we called on Nadolny last night to hear what he had to say.

Nadolny is difficult to pin down and is not very clear in his expression. However, in the course of a long conversation he did express himself more reasonably than he has done at any time thus far. He was definite that Germany was in an excellent strategic position in that under the agreement of December 11th⁶⁸ she could demand equality of treatment in a treaty or failing to achieve that could take it for herself without a treaty. He said, however, that from the broader aspect Germany had every interest in securing equality of status by agreement with other nations and would exhaust every effort to secure it in this way. He was quite definite on this and repeated it several times. He added that in spite of the apparent lack of progress of the Conference he felt that they were driving the French slowly but surely toward discussion of real disarmament, and to this end he was willing to continue his efforts indefinitely. Without advocating any course we discussed the various solutions which were generally discussed, among them Cavallero’s idea outlined above. This did not seem to shock him, provided that the technical committees continued working.

3. This morning Wilson and I called on the Prime Minister to tell him of our talk with Nadolny in the belief that he might wish to verify our impressions who [which?] were distinctly less threatening than the impression he had got. MacDonald who was accompanied by Simon said that however reasonable Nadolny might prove to be here we could not escape the fact that responsible people in Germany were indulging in irresponsible talk of an alarming nature. He cited Goering’s⁶⁹ recent speech deriding the Treaty of Versailles and the Disarmament Conference and stating that Germany was going to have a military air fleet. He said that even discounting the present situation in Germany such statements from a responsible minister gave real concern even to the British Government. The Prime Minister seemed greatly perplexed as to what should be done now. The only definite idea he seemed to be experimenting with is that of a treaty of limited objective and short duration. He asked Benes this morning to give him a project containing what he felt could be realized at this time.

4. Massigli called this afternoon after having accompanied Boncour in a long talk with MacDonald. He confirmed our impression that MacDonald had no change in definite ideas as to what could be done and that he had not gone beyond asking Benes for a suggested form of limited objective treaty. MacDonald had apparently spoken with considerable vehemence to the French about the necessity for immediate conclusion of a naval agreement with Italy completing the London Treaty thus making possible a naval chapter in any short term convention. Boncour told him that he was quite ready for further discussions but apparently gave him no encouragement on this subject. MacDonald acknowledged to the French that he was concerned about the situation in Germany but Massigli said that the information they were receiving now caused them such serious apprehension that the whole problem of disarmament for them was now placed in a clear and simple form; that in the face of what they considered a demonstrated beginning of rearmament they were obliged to reply to any British insistence on French reduction by asking categorically “what will you do to support us in the event that Germany violates this undertaking as she has others?” He said that they quite recognized that this was a question the British could not answer under present circumstances but that it was one that France was obliged to insist on. Massigli said that they had no belief in the possibility of a limited objective treaty at this time which could be accepted by both France and Germany and that to raise the question now was merely to aggravate the situation. They were irritated over the visit of the Prime Minister and his attempt to find an improvised solution.

5. Obviously the conclusion of a Franco-Italian naval agreement while desirable does not go to the root of the present difficulty. It is desired by the British for two reasons: to enable them first to resist Admiralty pressure for the exercise of the escalator clause in the London Treaty and second to insert in the naval chapter of those treaty qualitative limitations for naval units with which you are familiar. The French are not particularly desirous of completing their agreement with the Italians but on the other hand they are attracted by the idea of securing agreement on qualitative naval proposals.

Gibson

64. Not printed.
65. Count Ugo Cavallero of the Italian delegation.
66. Head of the Italian Government.
67. For correspondence relating to the situation within Germany at this date, see vol. ii, pp. 183 ff.
68. Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, p. 527.
69. Hermann Goering, President of the Reichstag.