500.A15A4/1757: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State 59
[Received March 12—4:10 p.m.]
562. Your 299, March 10, 7 p.m. Wilson and I much appreciate your telegram which we find very helpful. We venture to lay before you certain further thoughts which may be of interest while you are considering the matter with Norman Davis.
Unquestionably the Conference is in a precarious state. On the one hand the Germans and Italians have voted against the mutual assistance idea for Europe, while in the debate on land material which those two states regard as of the highest importance the French have again made their attitude contingent upon a scheme of security. The debates on this question in the near future are apt to reveal irreconcilable divergence of opinion; tempers are exasperated and discouragement is general.
Mr. MacDonald and Simon are here to make up their minds as to what should be done. We think it essential that we should also place our thoughts before you on this problem.
As we see it a simple adjournment of the Conference would be equivalent in the present state of feeling to a definite breakdown. It is to be anticipated that the German Government would at once declare that the states members of the League are not carrying out their obligation to disarm and that, therefore, Germany feels itself free from the obligations contained in part V of the Treaty of Versailles. No man can foresee what the consequences of such action would be. At least it would aggravate the existing state of tension in Europe; at the worst the possibility of armed conflict in the near future cannot be ignored. Even in the former event a state of mind would be created in which it is difficult to conceive that the nations of Europe could work together for a common purpose and adopt the necessary measures in the World Economic Conference60 to put an end to the crisis. [Page 32] The problem at Geneva now, therefore, has a much wider significance than that of disarmament alone. It is the problem of the entire relations of the European states to one another for a considerable period of time and is of interest to us in that it has a direct bearing on steps which may be taken for general economic recovery. We are, therefore, constrained to the belief that the worst thing that could happen now is the breakdown of the Conference or the abandonment of its work.
From the foregoing conclusion we are led to consider how the breakdown may be prevented. This reduces itself to the problem of how Germany may be induced to continue its collaboration. It is conceivable that Germany may be induced to collaborate and eventually to sign a treaty provided,
- (a)
- That the treaty contains some real measure of disarmament and,
- (b)
- That at its expiration part V of the Treaty of Versailles disappears.
Both these factors are predicated primarily on action by France.
From this point it appears logical to consider in what way if any the United States can participate in bringing about a situation in which these two necessary conditions may be rendered possible.
May we state the position first on the negative side? We are convinced that no disarmament on our part, proposals of disarmament, or persuasion bearing solely on disarmament, will affect the situation. Even scrapping the American Navy, abolishing the American Army and air fleet would not, we believe, alter in any way the European attitude toward disarmament. The representatives of the Continental states have made it plain to us over a long period of contact that they are not concerned in regard to America’s armament but that they are concerned in regard to America’s political position vis-à-vis Europe.
We note that you are giving further study to those problems listed under (b) of your 299, namely, “belligerent and neutral rights and consultation”. Therein, we feel, lies the kernel of our possible action to affect European rapprochement. We know that the states of the Continent are convinced that Great Britain will not even reaffirm Article XVI of the Covenant61 without knowing where the United States stands on neutral rights. We know further that they are convinced that any possibility of concerted European action is dependent on British participation which in turn they believe is dependent on our attitude. We know that the Continental states still feel that concerted action along economic lines is possible against the aggressor within the continent of Europe; but it is only possible with both the [Page 33] acquiescence and the participation of Great Britain; such acquiescence and participation in their thought being dependent on our attitude. Thoughtful people on the Continent do not dream of asking from the United States an engagement to abide by the decision of the Council of the League of Nations or any other body in case of a threat to peace or in case of concerted action by the Continental powers. What they do want is that we shall agree to some machinery by which we will first advise with them and then come to an immediate independent decision ourselves through our own constitutional methods as to whether we will refrain from interfering with such measures as they may judge applicable to the circumstances. In the last analysis this involves incorporating in a treaty, provisions for our taking an independent decision which we would take in any event.
Incidentally I raise the thought here that you may think that there would be certain advantages if our part in the treaty were to be confined primarily to political expressions in view of Japan’s uncertain attitude toward disarmament, rendering our contribution along disarmament lines problematical. You may further feel that such an arrangement would bring about a desirable community of endeavor on the part of the Western powers and a sharing of responsibility while the situation in the Far East remains as it is.
Nothing is farther from our conception than the idea that such a step should be taken without a quid pro quo. If such action is feasible then we feel it should only be taken in such a way that before we are committed to it, even informally, we have a definite statement from the French as to how much it is worth to them in terms of disarmament. Further, we should know definitely whether they feel that with such an understanding from us, presumably entailing a further contribution from Great Britain, they can go before their people and justify and achieve a reduction in armament and a real solution with Germany of the question of part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Our contribution is too important, too valuable to the Continent to be offered either haphazard or unless we know it would be worth while. The timing of the offer is most important and until it is made it should be guarded with the utmost secrecy.
It was thoughts of this nature which led us to hope that developments here would give ample time for consideration of these problems at home. We cannot see how affairs will develop in the near future but consider this aspect of our problem as so much more important than any aspects of disarmament that we venture to hope that your thoughts will be concentrated on it.
In submitting these ideas we do so without knowledge of whether such action may be politically possible in the United States but we should be remiss if we did not put before you our estimate of the situation [Page 34] together with this outline of what we conceive to be the only step we could take which might materially promote the success of the Conference.