740.0011 Four Power Pact/69: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 13—12:08 a.m.]
123. For the President and the Secretary of State from Norman Davis. Grandi called to see me this morning at the suggestion, so he told me, of Mussolini to explain the status of the negotiations of [Page 410] the Four Power Pact and to express the hope that we would use our moral influence to help get it consummated. I told him that in so far as the four powers upon whom responsibility for peace in Europe mainly rests shall have as their objective cooperation for the prevention of war in Europe we would naturally wish to be helpful because this would furnish a sound basis for disarmament. Grandi assured me this was the real purpose of the pact.
Grandi also told me Mussolini was ready to accept the French memorandum but the Germans had offered some serious amendments35 which the other three would not support; however, partly to satisfy Germany, the British and French Ambassadors to Italy had agreed with Mussolini on some minor modifications in the French draft treaty which have been submitted to Paris for final approval and then if the participating powers agree upon this he said that they could bring Germany into line. He said they wished to keep us informed and realized that our moral support is essential to success. He gave me confidentially the latest draft of the proposed pact which on comparison with the French text cabled you from Paris I find has drafting rather than substantive changes. A copy is being sent by mail.
He then said he wished to talk very confidentially with me about disarmament. In substance he thought it was of the utmost importance from every standpoint and particularly for the immediate beneficial effect it would have upon recovery from the depression and the success of the Economic Conference36 to get any early agreement on disarmament. This however he was satisfied could be done and only done by getting MacDonald, Mussolini, Hitler and Daladier together with the United States joining in. On [And?] that he was persuaded could only be brought about through my initiative as representing the President because of the great influence of the United States and our impartiality. He earnestly hoped therefore that I would make the effort.
I myself have felt for some time that something of this kind must be done. The main difficulty is that a move by any one of the four to that end is looked upon with suspicion by the others and they are all somewhat hesitant about running the risk of getting together and failing. I am satisfied there is more risk in not getting together. Grandi said he was sure Mussolini would be glad to take part in such a meeting.
If you agree that it would be advisable for me to take any initiative in this direction it would be most helpful if I could say to them [Page 411] that the President is most eager that there should be an early and successful consummation of the work of the Disarmament Conference and believing as he does that the chances of success would be greatly increased if the responsible heads of the four principal western European powers could arrange to meet to consider the matter he would be glad to have his representation [representative] take part in such a meeting if held.37 [Davis.]
- For French version of these amendments (dated April 24, 1933), see Pacte d’entente et de collaboration, pp. 16–17.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Monetary and Economic Conference, held at London, June 12–July 27, see pp. 452 ff.↩
- For subsequent development of this proposal, see telegram No. 650, May 21. 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 165, and telegram No. 336, May 22, 3 p.m., to the Chairman of the American delegation, p. 165.↩