500.A15A4/1756: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation ( Gibson )

299. Your 558, March 8, 7 p.m. raises many problems of great difficulty. It is clearly inadvisable for us to consider going so fast or so far until the Administration has had time to appraise the general situation, in both its domestic and international aspects, with Norman [Page 30] Davis who is now in Washington. In particular I should prefer any public discussion of the political questions referred to by you to await the arrival of Davis in Geneva. This of course is for your confidential information only; I think you can handle the matter before the Conference by maintaining the position you took in your speech of February 7,57 namely that an attempt to settle the political phases of the problem before the public is convinced that real measures of disarmament will be forthcoming is a case of putting the cart before the horse.

Subject to later modification I am sending you some preliminary views with regard to the Henderson suggestions.

(a)
No-force pact. The signature of such an undertaking must be considered in relation to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It would imply a lacuna in that instrument which we do not admit. It might be taken to imply that Japanese actions in Manchuria and Shanghai had not been in contravention of its terms. Unless the no-force undertaking means that force may not even be used in self-defense (which of course we could not accept) it is difficult for us to attribute to it any other meaning than that which we attach to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For us to sign a separate instrument reaffirming its principles in other terms would not only weaken the moral force of the existing pact, which we regard as a cornerstone of our foreign policy, but it would complicate the world’s peace structure and mislead public opinion.
(b)
Belligerent and neutral rights and consultation. We are still studying these sections.
(c)
Nonrecognition of the fruits of aggression. It seems to us decidedly premature to codify this doctrine in treaty form. It is still essentially in a formative stage and its ultimate implications have not yet had time to develop. A false step on our part might not only prevent us from consolidating the gains to the world’s peace machinery which we have made in the last few years but might even result in a loss of ground.
Hull
  1. See telegram No. 523, February 2, 1 p.m., from the Acting Chairman of the American delegation, p. 8.